Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

800.014/11–2646

Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Matters to the United States Delegation to the United Nations

secret

[New York,] November 25, 1946.

Meeting on Trusteeship Held in Mr. Herschel Johnson’s Office at 10 a.m.

Present:

Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, Charles P. Noyes, Gordon Knox, Joseph E. Johnson, Harding Bancroft, Hugh Borton and James Green64

The meeting examined the proposed trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, article by article, in connection with the draft commentary⁶⁵ supplied by the State Department.

Preamble. It was agreed that the questions raised by the preamble were very delicate and were likely to be questioned most seriously by the Security Council. Several problems arose:

(1) Under what authority is the United States proposing this trust agreement?

(2) Is it possible to contend that the United States is the only “state directly concerned”?

(3) What is the United States position to be if Russia, for example, insists that it is a state directly concerned and that its signature is necessary before any trust agreement may be submitted to the Security Council?

In regard to question (1) it was agreed that the United States position is that as military occupant it is entitled to propose to the Security Council a trust agreement in regard to these Islands. It is recognized that the United States must in some way overcome the contention that until the Peace Conference recognizes United States legal rights to these territories, it is inappropriate for the United States to submit a trust agreement to the Security Council.

As to question (2), Mr. Green indicated that the Department’s present position in the Assembly is that only “the mandatory power” should be considered a state directly concerned within the meaning of the Charter. This gives rise to real difficulties because the United States certainly cannot contend that it is in the same position as a mandatory power exercising its mandate under the authority of the League of Nations. It was agreed that this difficulty would be studied in the Department. Whatever the technical difficulties involved, it is clear that the best argument we have for obtaining the agreement of other states that the procedure we have followed is appropriate is that the Big Five already have a veto power in the Security Council and that they therefore should not insist on a separate and additional veto power in connection with being a state directly concerned. It was also indicated, however, that if the U.S.S.R. was anxious, as it probably would be, to use this trusteeship question as a bargaining weapon, they were quite likely to insist on their position as a state directly concerned. It was also agreed that while the question was still open in the Assembly, the U.S.S.R. would certainly insist on its technical position because of the precedent involved. It was hoped that the Assembly decision on this question would be reached before it was necessary to have consultations in regard to the Japanese Mandated Islands so that we would be in a position to be guided by the Assembly’s decision.

As to question (3), it was felt that if the Russians took a firm position that they were a state directly concerned, we would have to go back to the Department for further instructions. In any case, we were in no hurry to have the Security Council accept our proposed agreement. Our main purpose was to make our intentions known that we would place these Islands under trusteeship rather than annex them. Now that that has been accomplished by the President’s statement, our main purpose was to obtain the Security Council’s agreement to a trusteeship agreement satisfactory to the United States. Our approach should not be “take it or leave it now”; our approach should be that if the Security Council is unwilling to agree to our proposal at this time we are entirely willing to postpone its consideration, if necessary until the Peace Treaty with Japan has settled the strategic problems of the Pacific.

Article 1. It was agreed that the territory under trust is limited to the Islands with their territorial waters, presumably the three-mile limit, together with the column of air above this area.

Article 2. No problems.

Article 3. It was reported by the newspapers that Mr. Dulles had supported a proposal to take out of the trusteeship agreement for Western Samoa now before the Assembly the words in Article 3 “as an Integral part of” New Zealand. Mr. Green indicated that Gerig had told him that Mr. Dulles had not supported this but had abstained from voting. In any case, the United States has taken the position in the case of other trusteeship agreements that the words should be “as if it were an integral part of”. Therefore, we shall doubtless be confronted with this inconsistency. Mr. Borton indicated that the Navy had been requested to consider a possible revision to the “as if” language but up to date had insisted on the present language. He also indicated that the Navy would resist the deletion of the words “as an integral part”. It was made clear, however, that it was not intended by these words to imply that sovereignty over the territory is vested in the United States.

Article 4. Mr. Green explained that it was the contention of the State Department that in the case of a strategic trust the objectives of the international trusteeship system were limited to “the people of the trust territory” in accordance with Article 83 (2) as contrasted with the territory itself in the case of nonstrategic trusts. The Department felt that this had been done intentionally with the purpose of limiting the obligations to paragraphs (76) a. b. and c. of the Charter and excluding d. He did not know whether there was any history at San Francisco to support this position. It was agreed that this matter would be looked into in the Department as it might be a difficult contention to make without some such support. This contention is important in connection with Article 8 of the agreement.

Article 5. It was pointed out that the last sentence of the Department’s comment under this point had been carefully worded and took into consideration the Navy’s views. Mr. Joseph Johnson did not like the second “if” clause in this sentence. It was pointed out that it might also be a good plan to state categorically that the United States does not propose to exclude consideration of the armed forces, assistance and facilities set forth in this article when the time comes for considering special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Mr. Borton indicated that he thought the Navy considered the proposed bases in the Japanese Mandated Islands as similar in all ways to its other bases insofar as Article 43 was concerned. It was generally felt that the more specific the United States could be on this point, giving general assurances, the better our position would be.

Article 6. It was pointed out that in the fourth line of paragraph (1) the word “self-government” was used without using in addition the word “independence”. This might raise a question. Navy representatives agreed that independence was included within the meaning of the word “self-government”. …

Article 7. No problems.

Article 8. This article was certain to raise serious questions. It was agreed that the basic reason for providing for most favored nation treatment instead of national treatment was the requirements of security and we should be quite frank in so stating. We should also argue that Article 76 (d) of the Charter is not applicable in the case of strategic trusts because of the exact wording of Article 83 (2).

Article 9. No problems.

Article 10. No problems.

Article 11. It was pointed out that the provision of the status of citizens in the trust territory does not exclude giving the inhabitants the status of American citizens or American nationals if that is desired. However, we should not emphasize this as it looks too much like annexation.

Article 12. No comment.

Article 13. It was pointed out that there is at least some doubt whether the provisions in Article 83 (1) of the Charter make it a requirement of a strategic trust that the administering authority undertake the responsibility to submit reports, allow petitions, and provide for periodic visits to the territory, as well as to agree to answer questionnaires. It would be advisable, therefore, for the United States to point out that it was voluntarily accepting the obligations contemplated in Articles 87 and 88 in connection with the Japanese Islands in any part of the Islands which were not closed for security reasons, even though it was not required by the Charter to do so. It was also suggested that Mr. Johnson, in his initial statement to the Council, should go as far as possible in explaining why the United States felt it necessary to have entire discretion in closing in part of the trust territory for security reasons and should give some general assurances that the United States would act in a reasonable manner in this regard. It should also be made clear if possible that even in the case of closed areas, the United States would restrict applications of Articles 87 and 88 only insofar as reasonably necessary to insure security. Such statements would be very helpful in allaying criticism and suspicion in connection with this Article.

Article 14. The question was raised whether the United States could bar the application of any particular international conventions to closed areas. It was felt that it probably could do so by reason of the clause “which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory”. It was apparently the view of the State Department representatives that this clause did not guarantee that the provisions of the inspection agreement in relation to disarmament or the atom bomb would be applied to the trust territory. It was, however, their intention to include in the initial statement of Mr. Johnson’s the statement that this would be done.

Article 15. No comment.

Article 16. No comment.

General Questions. It was stated that Mr. Dulles’ statement to the General Assembly over the weekend, which the papers had written up as a commitment by the United States to consider in the future turning the Japanese Mandates over to the United Nations as the administering authority, was entirely a New York affair and was not in any way authorized by Washington; in fact, the Department knew nothing about it.⁶⁶

It was reported that the Secretary had requested postponement of submission of this whole matter to the Security Council until at least December 1st. The Department was apparently in no hurry to submit the matter to the Council, but in any case the matter should go back to the Secretary before any action is taken.

In regard to the general strategy, Mr. Borton stated that the President had decided that there would be no annexation of any Japanese Islands or Mandates; that at a later date the United States would submit a trusteeship agreement along the lines of the present one covering the Bonins and Volcano Islands; that there would be no attempt at the present moment to make a decision with regard to the Ryukyu Islands. It was the position, however, of the Army and Navy that no commitment could be made that the United States should have to wait for the Japanese Peace Treaty before it could submit a pro-posted trusteeship agreement for either of the latter two categories of Japanese Islands.

Mr. Bancroft stated that a document was being prepared on the question whether special provisions should be included giving the International Court jurisdiction. He indicated that the United States would probably claim that many questions involved in this trust agreement would be questions of domestic jurisdiction and could then be kept from the Court under provisions of the United States agreement on compulsory jurisdiction.⁶⁷

Charles P. Noyes

64. Messrs. Knox, J. E. Johnson, Bancroft, Borton, and Green were, respectively, Assistant to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson), Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, and Associate Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs.
65. Not found attached to file copy. The document before the group for discussion was one of several drafts prepared in the Department of State between November 20, 1946 and February 18, 1947 as a commentary on the United States draft trusteeship agreement for the Japanese mandated islands. This was for the use of the Acting United States Representative when the Security Council undertook consideration of the draft terms and provided an interpretation of each article of the draft agreement. For nonconfidential excerpts from the final version, see Department of State Bulletin, March 9, 1947, pp. 420 ff.
66. See excerpt from the United States Delegation Minutes, November 21, 9 a.m., supra. Mr. Dulles made his statement at the morning meeting of Sub-Committee 1 on November 24 (GA(I/2), Fourth Committee, Pt. II, p. 35). See also the despatch in the New York Times, November 24, 1946, p. 1; text of the statement is also printed on p. 3.
67. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 53 ff.