Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

501.AA/3–1546³⁴

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Sandifer)

undated

secret

United States Attitude Toward Membership Questions During Coming Security Council Meetings³⁵

the problem

The Security Council placed Albania’s membership application on its agenda on January 28. On February 13, the Council voted, on the motion of the United States, to defer disposition of the matter “pending further study until the Security Council convenes at the temporary headquarters.” The issue will, therefore, almost certainly be discussed at the coming meetings.

Its exact place on the agenda remains to be determined. In postponing consideration until its next meeting, the Security Council did not indicate what priority the matter should have on the agenda, several representatives indicating simply that the Council could call up this or any other item for discussion at such time as it wished.

As to action on the application itself, we have the choice of three main alternatives:

(a) To vote for a favorable recommendation from the Security Council to the General Assembly;

(b) To vote against such a recommendation;

(c) To propose or support further postponement.

However, our action on this matter is only a single item in what must be a broad program for the admission of new members. The Potsdam agreements³⁶ reflect a purpose to admit the neutral States (except Spain) and, after the conclusion of peace treaties, Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania and there is a general consensus that this program should be set in motion without unnecessary delay.

Thus a further branch of the problem is the decision whether choice of one of the alternatives set out above should be combined with some other action or statement designed to advance the program of bringing in all qualified States.

proposed united states position

1) The following course should be carefully considered and, if the current political atmosphere is judged not unfavorable therefor, steps might be taken as follows:

(a) The neutral governments might be sounded out to ascertain their views and desires concerning the submission of membership applications;

(b) A few members of the Security Council might be sounded out to ascertain whether or not they plan any action in the present meeting on the subject of admission of new members, and to ascertain their views with regard to possible means of expediting admission of qualified neutral States as a group. Such action would be presented as a procedure for carrying out the provisions of Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué;

(c) If it were found that some of the neutral States were ready to submit applications at once, we might consult and if possible come to an agreement with other Security Council powers concerning means of encouraging and expediting this, and of securing prompt and favorable action by the Security Council;

(d) To provide for neutral States who were not admitted or who did not apply, a resolution might be proposed, providing in substance:

“That the consideration of any applications for membership received from any neutral State be made an item of the continuing agenda of the Security Council, to the end that any ex-neutral State that so desires may, if found qualified, be admitted to membership by the General Assembly at its September meeting.”

(e) We should, if this course were taken, presumably be prepared to vote for Albania’s admission if this should make possible favorable action on a reasonable number of other applications.

2) If conditions appear unfavorable for the successful execution of such a program as is outlined in (1), we should proceed as follows:

(a) If, as is anticipated, General Hoxha makes no satisfactory acknowledgement of the present effect of the treaties in force between the United States and Albania on April 7, 1939:

i. We should, if possible, favor postponement until August or September, of action by the Security Council on this and any other applications that might be received in the meantime. Our position might be explained as follows:

When the subject was discussed before, consideration was deferred pending further study. The primary question requiring such consideration was, and still is, what general procedure the members of the United Nations shall follow in providing for the admission of a number of States, at least some of which have been generally assumed—in the Potsdam agreement, for example—to qualify for membership. This question is not one merely of Security Council procedure—although that has not been put in final form as yet—but one of the general relations of States and one which in particular involves many uncertainties connected with post-war reconstruction. These uncertainties, concerning the internal and external relations of many States, will, it is hoped, decrease during the coming months.

We accordingly suggest that, in the circumstances, the best general procedure for taking the initial steps to bring about the membership of qualified states would be as follows:

(a) Consideration of all membership applications should be postponed until a meeting of the Security Council in August or early September, the exact date to be agreed upon later.

(b) That meeting would be a propitious occasion for considering not only Albania’s application but also any applications from the former neutral and enemy States whose admission was generally envisaged in the Potsdam Communiqué. In the case of ex-enemy States, admission would naturally depend on the prior conclusion of peace treaties.

(c) It should be strongly emphasized that such a program need not delay by a single day the final acquisition of membership by any State that was found qualified. The General Assembly which has the final decision on membership applications, does not meet again until September.

ii. In prior discussions with representatives of other Security Council Members, it should be indicated that our intentions are as stated above and that we should prefer to support a motion to postpone consideration to the alternative of simply voting against a motion to approve Albania’s application. Actual voting tactics should be left to the decision of the American representative in the light of political conditions existing just prior to the vote. However, in view of the fact that the United States representative has proposed two previous resolutions to postpone, it would be preferable to arrange, if possible, that the motion be put by some other State.

iii. In case sufficient support for a postponing vote could not be secured, it would presumably be necessary to vote against the application on the merits or, perhaps, to abstain from the vote. A possible statement giving grounds for an adverse vote is given in Annex B.³⁷

3) In the unlikely case that a satisfactory response should be received from General Hoxha, we should favor the application.

4) Whatever the attitude taken by the United States toward the application we should, in one of our statements, refer to Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué, of August 2, 1945 and point out that since the Security Council will be considering Albania’s application at its meeting in August or September, it would presumably be ready at that time to consider also any applications from States whose admission is envisaged in the Communiqué. In the case of ex-enemy States, this would naturally depend on conclusion of the peace treaties by that time. This government regards the admission of any state to membership in the United Nations as a matter that must be decided through careful consideration of the actual merits of each particular case.

discussion

Our attitude in connection with the Albanian application should be consistent both with our general attitude and program toward the admission of new members and with the individual merits of the Albanian case. As to the former, it is clear that Albania cannot be a major concern of our broad policy. Our action should, therefor, not be such as to delay necessary steps toward the admission of a number of States whose membership would strengthen the United Nations. Unless a rather bold course such as is outlined under (1) above is practicable, it seems that the needs of our broad policy toward admission to membership would be served by incorporating into our proposal for postponement some indication that the Security Council should be ready in August or September to consider applications from neutral States.

It is believed that a reference to Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué, which registers the views of the Big Three in favor of the admission of the neutrals other than Spain and, following the conclusion of peace treaties with the enemy states of Italy, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary and Finland, would serve our purpose of giving some public hint of our interest in securing the admission of at least some ex-neutral states. The reference to the Potsdam Communiqué would also indicate that we wish to limit the field at this time and that we would not be open to any possible suggestion that further Soviet Republics be admitted.

With regard to the three possible alternatives of action in Albania’s application, set out in the statement of the “problem” above, it seems clear that unless the Hoxha regime modifies its present attitude in important respects, it will be impractical for the United States to cast a favorable vote on the application. The background of the case is briefly as follows:

This Government sent a political representative to Tirana in May 8, 1945, and negotiations looking toward recognition of the Hoxha government have supposedly gone on since then.³⁸ The United States made an acknowledgment by the Hoxha regime of the continued validity of the treaties in force between Albania and the United States on April 7, 1939, a condition precedent to recognition. General Hoxha has made no such acknowledgment and has stated that the validity of no treaty could be accepted “in advance”. While negotiations were thus supposedly continuing without leading to tangible results, the American mission was subjected to increasingly inconsiderate and unfriendly treatment in a number of respects. The American representative accordingly delivered to General Hoxha, under instructions, a strongly-worded memorandum expressing the dissatisfaction of the United States Government and indicating that it would not grant recognition to Albania unless the attitude of the Hoxha regime became satisfactory in respect of the basic questions at issue. It was intimated that Albania’s admission to the United Nations would be opposed unless proper respect for treaties was shown by the Hoxha regime.

It is not understood that a satisfactory response has thus far been received.

In case a satisfactory reply were received, so that recognition could be granted to the Hoxha regime it would seem logical and desirable to vote in favor of the application. This eventuality, however, appears unlikely at present.

In case no such satisfactory reply is received, it would presumably be impossible for us to support the application. However, unless general circumstances favor a flat negative vote on the merits of the case, it would seem preferable to find some formula for postponing any vote on the merits. A negative vote would, of course, create resentment, would probably provoke discussion in the Security Council on the special issues between ourselves and the Hoxha regime, and would in any case require explanations on our part that would receive much publicity. However, the general circumstances may possibly be such as to make it desirable for us to raise the issues publicly and to make a strong statement of our attitude on them.

The need for special care in choosing the ground on which we favor postponement is obvious. The application has already received some discussion in the Security Council on two different occasions and we and the British took the attitude then that more study of the subject was necessary before a decision could be given. We ourselves moved postponement of the vote until the present session; this attitude would naturally create the expectation that we would at this time be prepared to cast our vote on the merits of the case. Accordingly, it will be fairly obvious to all concerned—and particularly to the Russians, who are doubtless familiar with the issues between ourselves and Hoxha—that our attitude of favoring postponement contains the element of unwillingness to approve the application at the present time. We should attempt, by prior discussions with Security Council members, to get our attitude accepted without the necessity of airing our views on the precise issues between ourselves and Hoxha. However in case circumstances should make it necessary to do so, we should presumably be prepared to make a statement along the general lines of Annexes A and B.³⁹

34. No date appears on this document; internal evidence indicates that it was drafted in the early part of March, probably no later than March 15.
35. The Security Council was scheduled to reconvene in New York on March 25.
36. See Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué of August 2, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, pp. 1509 and 1510.
37. Not printed.
38. For documentation concerning this matter, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff., and ibid., 1946, vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.
39. These contingencies did not arise, and the annexes are not printed.