Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

501.BC/11–2346

Minutes of Meeting of the Representatives of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council¹⁸

secret

[New York,] November 23, 1946.

Present

	U.S.S.R.
	M. Molotov (Chairman)
	M. Vyshinsky
	M. Pavlov
U.S.A.		U.K.
Mr. Byrnes		Mr. Bevin
Mr. Connally		Mr. Cadogan
Mr. Vandenberg		Mr. Jebb
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Bohlen
China		France
Mr. Wellington Koo		M. Couve de Murville
Mr. H. T. Liu		M. Parodi
Mr. Chu Hsin Min		M. la Tournelle
Dr. Quo Tai-Chi		Mr. Bevin

Mr. Bevin: Will you take the chair, Mr. Molotov.

M. Molotov: Thank you. Are there any remarks on the procedure for the meeting?

Mr. Bevin: I wonder if there are any other views to be expressed since the papers have been circulated and if there is any possibility for agreement? There were the proposals of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom and the different questions evolved at Committee No. 1 at the Assembly. It seemed to me that the papers and the questions gave so much light that we might clear up the matter.

M. Molotov: I gave the general view of the Soviet Union the other day. Since reading the papers I should like to make additional remarks to clarify our view. The Soviet Delegation will submit certain proposals being typed now, and I will explain them. We hold that in the general discussion and in the proposals submitted to the General Assembly and to the Big Five that there were two outstanding questions: 1) revision of the Charter, 2) method of applying the procedure. As to a revision of the Charter, as far as I can judge from recent proposals submitted to the Five, no one insists on making such changes. It appears from these proposals that no one here thinks it would be timely or wise. There is no way we can avoid this matter as the question of revision of the Charter was raised in the Assembly, and as we think it should react in some manner. We think the Assembly should reject the proposal to revise the Charter as not timely.

As to the second question, application of the Charter and the procedure agreed to by the Assembly, it is evident from reading the proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and China that the question centered around that. The Soviet Delegation believes that we should agree in regard to question two not to take the road of new agreements between ourselves intended to regulate our decisions. The matter has been the subject of many proposals which will not be helpful but harmful to the United Nations and the Security Council. We think that the relations between the United Nations and individual countries, particularly the Great Powers, should not be based upon technicalities and regulations. This is a serious question. As to the substance of the question, we can’t agree that anyone applied the veto wrongly in the Security Council and think it undesirable to foment passion around this question. It would hurt not only the Soviet Union but all of us. This attitude is not calculated to induce us to seek agreement; therefore, it is essential that we adopt a decision saying that it is not correct to make more rigorous rules for the Security Council or the United Nations. We should make clear that any attempts to stiffen the rules are calculated to do harm and will not be useful. I can now read the draft proposals prepared by the Soviet Delegation:

• “1. Bearing in mind that the Organization of the United Nations is still in the first period of its activity, the General Assembly considers it important that all States of the United Nations strive for the further strengthening of the Organization of the United Nations and the improvement in every respect of the work of its organizations in conformity with the lofty principles and aims of the Charter which has received commendation from all peace-loving peoples. The General Assembly considers incorrect attempts to revise the Charter in view of the short period which has elapsed since its unanimous adoption by the United Nations.
• “2. Attaching special importance to the unification of the efforts of nations both large and small in the development of firm relations between them and in the establishment of durable peace and security, the General Assembly calls on the United Nations for the broadening of international cooperation on the above-mentioned basis, avoiding superfluous regimentation and formality in the work of its organizations and furthering the development of practical achievements in political, economic, and cultural cooperation between nations. In accordance therewith, the General Assembly rejects the proposals aimed at the regimentation of the application of the rule of unanimity set forth in Article 27 of the Charter.”

Mr. Bevin: It seems to me that the text you read, Mr. Chairman, applies rather to the General Assembly. But it seems to us that this is a matter for each Delegation. We said that we had no desire to change the Charter. All we tried to get is a code of conduct between ourselves to see if we can avoid these difficulties. We have no desire to have a lot of rules and regulations, but we want to establish more confidence in the United Nations, as, quite frankly, we haven’t much confidence now. We couldn’t do anything like making a general resolution such as you have read. That is a matter for the General Assembly to express its views upon. It is a general matter. As for the British Government, we are working out our policy now, and we hoped that we could agree amongst ourselves so that I could say to the British people whether we could build security on the Security Council. After this first year that seems very doubtful. I thought we could settle it here as there are only five powers here who can use the veto. A general statement of the character of the one you read does not help understanding amongst the Big Five. We have tried, and we can’t do more than explain our position as to what we have been doing.

M. Molotov: I would like to make plain that if the draft I just gave is unacceptable on the ground that it is drawn up in the form of a decision of the General Assembly, that this can be put right. We can regard the draft not as a decision of the General Assembly but as a draft that will enable us to reach agreement on the questions being discussed now. The form is secondary; the substance is what matters. If Mr. Bevin says that his Government is engaged in drawing up its long-term policy, we are prepared to discuss this in businesslike language.

Mr. Bevin: It was not so much the form as the substance which does not deal with what my Government has felt to be the points at difference in the operation of the Security Council. It desires to know if the operations can be on a more understanding basis than in the past year.

Mr. Byrnes: I made at our last meeting a statement with regard to the position of the United States. The United States has announced that it does not approve efforts to amend the Charter but sympathizes with the point of view of small states that the Great Powers have exercised the veto in a manner never envisaged at San Francisco. It is evident that there was a serious misunderstanding among the Permanent Members. The United States believes that the veto should be sparingly exercised and only on the most important matters. The United States will join in a statement that the veto will be exercised only in times of great emergency to create assurance. This might lead to the cessation of attempts to amend the Charter. It would be a mistake to make a statement of the kind proposed which suggests that the General Assembly is trying to regiment the Permanent Members. It will be better to say nothing at all if we can’t make a better statement.

M. Parodi: The resolution which has been submitted would be important for the collaboration of the nations belonging to the United Nations. I think it is somewhat general and vague in tone. We have made numerous efforts to achieve collaboration in the Security Council. I think also that a great atmosphere of unquietness has characterized the discussions in the General Assembly. We must do everything to quiet this spirit in the Assembly. If the Permanent Members of the Security Council submit such a statement as you propose, it would poison the spirit in the Assembly. The very important questions the Assembly has to decide would not be helped by such a resolution. It would be better to submit nothing than to say that. I understand the desire not to augment the rules, but the proposals presented to the Assembly are aimed not at augmenting the rules, not at making the procedures more rigid, but at making them more supple.

M. Koo: At the last meeting I gave the views of my Government on the veto. I won’t repeat them today since we have also presented some concrete suggestions, but I would like to say a word or two on the Molotov statement and also the words of explanation he has given. None of us desires to revise the Charter. As to that part of the statement, it is in accord with the views of the Chinese Delegation. The problem has two aspects. I believe those two will have to be met. a) The effective working of the Security Council has been commented on in the General Assembly. The general view, which we share, is that the past workings of the Security Council have not been as effective or as smooth as we might have hoped. The Security Council should see itself how it can improve. Since the question was raised in the General Assembly, we should meet that criticism as far as we can. I agree with Mr. Molotov that we should not add to the rules in the Security Council. We have sixty articles already. Whereas the past has produced agreed procedures, I think they might be put in writing. If the procedures were enlarged, the criticism of the General Assembly might be met. What I have in mind is matters such as the inclusion of an item on the agenda, or the removing of an item from the agenda. If I am correct, that could be included in the list of procedures established by the Permanent Members at San Francisco. We should make use of our past experience to improve the workings of the Security Council for the future.

The second question is a situation in the General Assembly which we must meet in some way. This is really a matter between the five Permanent Members and the five members coming from the Assembly. So far as the emphasis in the Soviet proposal is on strengthening the United Nations and improving relations between great and small nations we all agree, but we wish the conclusion at the end were more concrete. I mean some definite procedures which we in the Security Council have reached in the past, or here. Only by this step can we meet the criticism from the General Assembly. If only a negative statement is made, we will only get a long debate, and I can’t see what the outcome would be. Only if we make concrete suggestions, can we dispel the criticism, and we would thus contribute to the collaboration Mr. Molotov urges.

M. Molotov: Various remarks have been made with regard to our draft resolution, and, owing to the fact that differences of opinion came to light, the opinion was expressed that we could dispense with the statement. The Soviet Union thinks that some statement is necessary. It is desirable that certain conclusions be placed for our work in the future. It would be a good thing if after our discussion of the veto, the Charter, and other things, we could arrive at a unanimous opinion, at least on the part we can express an opinion on now. It can be stated that the Five think revision of the Charter untimely, as it has been in force only one year. To revise it now would be to discredit the work of the United Nations last year. I wonder if we can’t make a resolution saying that we deem it essential to maintain the prestige of the Charter agreed to by all peace-loving nations. It was said that our draft contained certain negative elements, and that such a resolution was undesirable. Although we are the authors, we won’t insist upon it. Let us modify it, or eliminate the negative elements but find a solution which will strengthen the Charter and establish more harmonious work in the Security Council and in the United Nations as a whole. When the reference was made to the Security Council in the initial period, the approach was one-sided. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the discussion of the Iranian question in the Security Council. The method used was not conducive to harmonious work. It is easy to say that this or that government has no confidence in the Security Council, but we must remember that confidence in the Security Council depends upon each of us, and we should all try for harmonious work and not be one-sided or use the Security Council against one of the members. Take the question of the veto. It wasn’t raised today, but discussion of this took a one-sided trend, and the atmosphere around it was one-sided, too. The impression was created in the outside world that certain of us are encouraging this view. In the long run the work of the Security Council depends not upon new decisions but upon each of us trying to improve the work. The method of majorization has acted several times to the disfavor of the minority, to the disfavor of the opinion of delegations which did not have a majority on any of the questions under discussion. I think the method of majorization in the Security Council and other conferences will not be useful. It would be better to establish business-like relations and understanding to allow us to improve the work. Upon each of us five much depends. We should say there was room for improvement in this respect. There is no need for new formal decisions upon the regimentation of the work, but we should secure the character of the work so as not to injure any one of the partners, but so that the interests of the minority are taken into account as well. The statement under discussion will be good if it contributes to the improvement of the work.

Mr. Byrnes: At the last meeting proposals were presented by the United Kingdom, China, and the United States, and France expressed approval in principle of the three resolutions. The Soviet Delegation was unable to agree and added its own resolution. The United States cannot agree with the Soviet resolution. One hour and forty-five minutes have gone by, and, as the matter must be settled elsewhere,¹⁹ I suggest we adjourn for fifteen minutes and then go on with consideration of the treaties.²⁰ I would add that we will all have the opportunity to express our views in Committee No. 1. It is useless to go on here.

Mr. Bevin: I agree. We must reserve our position for the Assembly, and state our case there. There is nothing positive we can put forward elsewhere than in Committee No. 1. Certainly my Government understood the use of the veto was to be quite different after San Francisco. I hoped we could have agreed. If we had, I should have been very happy. If we can’t—

M. Molotov: Any objections?

M. Koo: I want to ask Mr. Molotov if he said he could not accept the other papers. I understood that his observations were of a general character.

M. Molotov: I take it we have been engaged today in the examination of these drafts as well as of our own.

Mr. Bevin: We are as well divided as the Security Council.

M. Molotov: We will adjourn until 6:00 p.m.

18. United States minutes; no drafting information on document but probably drafted by Mr. Bohlen.
19. That is, in the General Assembly.
20. This is a reference to the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was meeting in New York at approximately the same time as the General Assembly.