Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

501.BC/11–1846

Minutes of Meeting of the Representatives of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council¹⁵

secret

New York, November 18, 1946.

Present

U.S.		U.K.
The Secretary		Mr. Bevin
Senator Connally		Sir Alexander Mr. Cadogan
Mr. Cohen		Mr. Jebb
Mr. Bohlen		Interpreter
U.S.S.R.		China
Mr. Molotov		Dr. Wellington Koo
Mr. Vyshinsky		(Two Advisors)
Mr. Pavlov
	France
	M. Parodi
	Mr. Detourelle
	Interpreter

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Mr. Bevin said he had asked for this meeting because his Government considers that the Security Council as set up at the San Francisco Conference was the central organization of the United Nations and that it was a body that to fulfill its functions must command the greatest respect among the nations of the world and be the body to which they would turn for protection and security on the most important questions. It must be capable of preserving peace in a serious crisis. The British Government had never felt that it should be used as a substitute for direct negotiations between states but only when states could not settle their differences.

As to the question of the veto, he had been a member of the Cabinet when the voting formula had been adopted after much discussion and had been regarded as a protection which would only be used when the vital interests of the Big Five were affected and only as a last resort. He said he wished to state first of all that the British Government had no intention of suggesting or supporting any amendment to the Charter on this subject but it was anxious that the permanent members of the Council should give a lead to the Assembly on this question and announce a code of conduct concerning the use of the veto, which would clear up the confusion regarding the use of the veto which has existed among other nations and public opinion during the past months.

He said vital questions of disarmament and similar matters which are now being considered by the British Government would eventually go to the United Nations. His Government felt strongly that they could do nothing in these vital fields unless there was confidence and clarity concerning the manner in which the veto would be used. He said the British Government was considering formulation of basic policies and it was their desire to base these policies squarely on the United Nations, but before abandoning old methods of defense the British Government wished to be sure that the United Nations would be able to function as it had been expected at the time it was set up. It was for this purpose that he had circulated to the other permanent members of the Security Council a 7-point document which, as would be seen, was designed to clarify the problem of the use of the veto.

He said that he felt that much of the difficulty in this field had come from the lack of common agreement on the application of this principle. He said he must state that the confidence of his government in the United Nations after the experience of the past year was not so great as to permit it to go as far as it would like in basing its policies on the world organization. He said he thought that this was the most critical period since the end of the war, since everyone had recognized for the 15 or 16 months after the end of hostilities there would be great difficulties growing directly out of the war. Now future policies of long duration would be decided.

He repeated that Great Britain wished to base its policy on the United Nations but wished to be sure that the Organization would operate as intended. He said that the veto power made the preservation of peace in the first instance dependent on the five countries represented here and that if they could give the proper lead then in the next 15 or 20 years there was hope that a rule of law, as against a rule of war, would develop in the world.

He then said he would like to hear the views of his colleagues and called on Mr. Molotov.

(Copy of Bevin’s proposal attached. See Annex 1.)

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not asked for the floor but he was ready to state his views. He said they had studied Mr. Bevin’s document and they fully shared his desire to strengthen the authority of the Security Council and the United Nations organization. This had always been the view of the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Government felt that recent efforts to popularize the discussion of the veto or its use was somewhat artificial. In so far as the Soviet Government was concerned it had only used the veto in essential cases and could not agree that anyone had abused the veto. Talk of abuse of the veto was a wrong method of work and participation in the activities of the United Nations, which could only harm it. The purpose should be not to weaken the foundations of the United Nations but to strengthen them.

In regard to the veto, certain members of UN bear the responsibility for the adoption of an attitude contrary to what was correct. He said he did not believe that Australia and Cuba would have unleashed this campaign against the veto and its use without having been encouraged by certain other delegations. Account must be taken of the results of this campaign, which had been conducive to a bad atmosphere in the Security Council on the question of the veto. The proper course was to give a rebuff to those delegations who for some reason or other do not value the foundation of the Charter adopted by 51 nations over a year ago.

The Soviet Delegation does not understand such a course of action whereby simply because some members of the United Nations failed to conduct themselves properly others should follow their example. He said that the disposition to have no confidence in the Security Council was in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation a one-sided attitude and an unconvincing one. As to the Security Council, he said that its work depended not on others but in the first instance upon ourselves, and that it would be better not to base our attitude on the incorrect attitude of others but to show confidence and support to the Security Council and along with others to try to increase mutual collaboration and the settlement of questions that not only affect the members of the Security Council but all members of the organization. The best answer, therefore, to the question he felt was to agree to cooperate more fully and he felt that this duty applied more directly to the permanent members of the Security Council.

There had been various proposals for special agreements or new regulations concerning the use of the veto in the Security Council. The aim of these proposals was to create stricter rules, which he felt were calculated to have an adverse effect on the work of the Security Council and unnecessarily restrict its activities under formalities and rules. This course, he said, instead of doing good would do harm. He added that the Soviet Delegation was not against Mr. Bevin’s proposal that the five permanent members should consult whenever possible. He felt that on certain questions it would be desirable to have a preliminary understanding if such understanding would facilitate the technical work of the Security Council and help the members to reach understanding and to further cooperation between permanent and non-permanent members. He said he felt everyone wished to act along lines which would be in harmony with the principles of the United Nations and consequently in the interests of the countries there represented.

The Secretary stated that the United States had made its position clear at the General Assembly and in the Commission [Committee?] through the statements of Senator Connally. We consider hasty amendments based on inadequate experience to be unnecessary and harmful. That is not our conception of constitutional growth. For example, in a hundred years there had only been five amendments adopted to [after?] the U.S. Bill of Rights, which was an example of the slow development of a fundamental charter. Prior to the San Francisco Conference there had been a great deal of discussion concerning the wisdom of the veto. We recognized the necessity of this power but we had envisaged that it would be used primarily in cases involving enforcement of action and only in matters of the greatest importance. We recognized, for example, that if the United States were called upon to supply armed forces over its adverse vote, there would be great difficulties in putting any such course into effect because of the opposition from the United States Congress. Therefore, the United States had sympathized with those nations urging the inclusion of the veto in the Charter and had supported its inclusion.

On the other hand, we had always recognized the feelings of the smaller nations and their fear that the veto might be exercised in secondary questions. For this reason, they had joined in the San Francisco Declaration, which was in effect a pledge that the veto would not be abused.

The United States, he continued, is satisfied that many of the difficulties on this point had arisen from the practical application of the voting formula. He would not be frank if he did not say that the United States was disappointed at the too frequent use of the veto power. He said he had not been associated closely with the work of the General Assembly but from all his information the majority of small nations have serious objections against the use of the veto. He thought that they should devise some plan in order to reassure the small nations on this point. He said since we apparently had a common desire to avoid any question of amendment of the Charter at this time it would be well to find a solution which would prevent the question of amendment arising. He had therefore prepared in writing some suggestions to that end which he would now distribute.

(Copy of The Secretary’s proposal attached. See Annex 2.)

Dr. Koo said that the Chinese Delegation had little to add to the statements already made. He would not take the time of the Committee to elaborate further the attitude of the Chinese Government which was sufficiently well known.

They had always attached great importance to the question of veto in the United Nations and had accepted the Yalta formula with certain diffidence because they had recognized the need of unanimity among the great powers in order to promote success of the organization. Having subscribed to the Charter, including Article 27, the Chinese Delegation wished to show its respect for the Charter in every way and feel that it should be given a test for several years before any consideration of an amendment. Therefore, the Chinese Delegation tried to make it clear, both in General Assembly and in Commission I that they did not wish any change in the Charter at this time.

This does not mean that the Chinese are not aware of or indifferent to the volume of criticisms, both in the General Assembly and outside, concerning the use of the veto. The Chinese Delegation has been deeply influenced by this criticism of the veto power and they are anxious to work out by agreement with the other permanent members some improvement on the use of the veto without commenting in any way on the manner in which any representative has used the veto. In this opinion, there has been too much discussion on procedure and too many votes on procedure.

The Chinese Delegate feels that in the light of the experience of the past year it should now be possible to agree on improvements in the work of the Security Council, which would in large measure meet the existing criticism without in any way revising the Charter. He pointed out that at San Francisco the four sponsoring powers and France had issued a Declaration concerning the use of the veto. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Declaration gave an example of questions which would be regarded as procedural. If at that time, without any experience in practice, it had been possible to give a list of such questions, now after ten months of existence it should be possible to extend that list.

In actual fact, the Security Council had already dealt with a number of procedural questions and had adopted some new rules. It would be wise to explore what further questions could be by mutual agreement regarded as procedural, thus in effect amplifying the San Francisco Declaration. The five permanent members might help the Security Council to amplify its rules of procedure. For example, at present there were 60 rules, but only one on voting, which merely said that voting in the Security Council would be in conformity with the Charter and Statute of the International Court. He felt that if they could clarify and elaborate the practical application of the voting formula it would not only meet criticism but would also fulfill the promise contained in the San Francisco Declaration that the permanent members would not use the veto in any way to obstruct or block the work of the Security Council. He said the Chinese Delegation welcomed Mr. Bevin’s initiative and in this spirit had some suggestions of their own to make.

(He circulated document containing these suggestions. See Annex 3.)^15a

In explanation he said that many of these suggestions were along the lines of Mr. Bevin’s paper, but perhaps more concrete. He thought that if they could reach an agreement along these general lines it could either be embodied in a Declaration of the Five Powers or an addition to the San Francisco Declaration.

M. Parodi said he was the last to speak and would be brief. The French views on this subject were well known. They considered it would be neither wise, justifiable nor right to attempt to amend the Charter at the present time but they felt that certain improvements could be made in the function of the Security Council without touching the Charter. The French Delegation was in general agreement with the three texts which had been circulated. He would like to make a few observations.

He pointed out that points 3 and 4 of the Chinese draft were already in effect in the Security Council. As to Mr. Bevin’s suggestion, the French Delegation were in favor of the idea of consultation but he felt that to make that consultation effective there would have to be some agreement along the lines of points 4 and 5 of Mr. Bevin’s paper. As to the other points, he said he attached the greatest importance to point 7 and he had already made the views of the French Government known on this question of abstention. He recognized that there were legal difficulties and also that the adoption of this view on abstention would not be a final solution but would indicate a way to solution.

The Secretary then suggested that they should adjourn in order to study the documents which had been circulated. He said he thought every effort should be made to reach an agreement because once the question had been raised before the permanent members, failure to agree would have a bad effect on the General Assembly and those who opposed the veto would take it as an indication that the permanent members had no intention of changing their views.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had already expressed its views on the general question. He would like to add a few words with reference to what had been said here.

He knew that there have been many critical observations concerning the work of the Security Council and the use of the veto. He wished, however, to say that the Soviet Delegation did not regard criticism of the Security Council or of any organ of the United Nations as anything to be afraid of. Criticism is necessary. Different views were held and if they were not stated there was no method of reaching agreed decisions. However, it is essential that criticism should be based only on the desire to strengthen the foundations of the United Nations and not to break them. If they could take that as a starting point and follow this aim, the criticism would be useful and even welcome. He said we should not fear criticism but he felt if they should proceed in their discussion to increase the regulation of the work of the Security Council they would be taking the wrong path and would create difficulties for the Security Council and the United Nations by heaping up formalities. There are enough rules already. In fact, no one here could even remember all existing rules. He said they should draw the necessary conclusions from the situation in order to help the practical work of the Security Council. To increase the regulations would bring about the opposite result.

The Soviet Delegation therefore takes as its aim, based on these considerations, the improvement of the work of the Security Council and not to add to its difficulties by more formalities and regulations.

He concluded that since he had no translation of the American or Chinese papers he would have no concrete observations to make on those. He said in general his attitude towards these suggestions would be as he had outlined here.

M. Parodi said that Committee I was meeting this afternoon in order to consider a resolution to suspend discussion on this question until the Secretary General has drawn up a list of the various proposals which have been submitted, and that this would require several days.

Mr. Bevin said that they should not interfere with the work of the political committee or vice-versa. He did not wish in any way that this meeting of the five permanent members would be regarded as a substitute for anything in the United Nations. He said the difficulty as far as Great Britain was concerned was that the criticism had not been confined to the General Assembly but had in England unquestionably influenced the feeling of confidence in the Security Council. Some declaration as to the future work of the Security Council would be of great importance. It was not a question of regulation but of intent. He said everyone in England—the Government and the people—wished to build on the United Nations, but they could not ride two horses, and before shifting from one to the other they wished to make sure that the UN horse would run.

He repeated that the British Government wished to base its policy with [without?] qualification or reservation on the United Nations, but that any uncertainty as to its future functioning must be removed.

It was agreed that they would meet again tomorrow, November 19 at eleven o’clock, if such a meeting did not conflict with the meeting of the Political Committee which Mr. Molotov wished to attend.¹⁶

[Annex 1]

(British Paper)

Note

It must be recognised that the use of the “Veto” in the Security Council in recent months has called forth almost universal criticism from Members of the United Nations.

His Majesty’s Government themselves are amongst the first to admit the necessity for the maintenance of unanimity amongst the Great Powers. But the manner in which the “Veto” has often been used takes no account of unanimity, and its constant use in this way makes achievement of unanimity all the more difficult.

There can probably be no question of amending the Charter at this stage, but are there not some things that could be done to avoid in practice the situations that have given rise to so much criticism?

For instance,

(1) The Powers possessing the right of “Veto” might agree amongst themselves to consult each other, where possible, before a vote is taken, if their unanimity is required to enable the Council to function effectively.

(2) If there is not unanimity, it might be agreed that the minority of the permanent members, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of all the United Nations, would only exercise the “Veto” where they consider the question of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole, and they would explain on what grounds they consider this condition to be present.

(3) The permanent members might agree that they will not exercise their “Veto” against a proposal simply because it does not go far enough to satisfy them.

(4) The permanent members might agree to advocate rules of conduct for the Security Council providing that questions are only brought before the Security Council after other means of settlement have been tried and must then be presented in proper form to the Council.

(5) The permanent members might agree to support the establishment of further rules of procedure for the conduct of the Security Council’s business, e.g., for the consideration of any question, the Council should appoint a rapporteur, or a Committee of some of its members, to make a further attempt at conciliation before resorting to the final discussion and voting.

(6) It might facilitate the work of the Security Council, and ensure that the Charter is properly applied, if a formula could be devised on which all could agree, for the definition of a “dispute”.

(7) It would be of great advantage if it were possible to provide, by some means, that a Permanent Member could abstain from voting without automatically vetoing the proposal. Similarly, that mere absence of a Permanent Member should not have the effect of a veto.

[Annex 2]

November 18, 1946.

Proposed Statement To Be Made by the Permanent Members of the Security Council¹⁷

1. The permanent members of the Security Council recognize that the responsibilities imposed upon the permanent members of the Security Council under the Charter require them to make every effort to reach agreement on substantive questions before the Security Council.

2. The permanent members of the Security Council recognize that many of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its operation have been due to lack of certainty and differences of opinion regarding the practical application of the voting formula. They believe that these difficulties can in the main be worked out by the Security Council in the light of experience and practical need.

3. Specifically, that the permanent members of the Security Council undertake, with a view to removing or reducing these difficulties, to have the Security Council give attention to the development of practices which will ensure so far as is consistent with the Charter

a. that matters which are truly procedural and matters which are truly non-procedural will be determined in advance of controversy by agreed rules of procedure;

b. that no state shall act as judge in its own cause;

c. that a permanent member shall be enabled to abstain from voting without exercising its veto power.

15. United States minutes drafted by Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
16. Not printed. The views set forth in the document are incorporated substantially in a draft resolution dated October 10, 1947 which was submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly by the Chinese delegate in the committee and printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee, pp. 621 and 622.
16. Although there was no meeting of the First Committee at that time the Five Ministers do not seem to have met again on this problem until November 23.
17. Submitted as an United States paper.