501.BB/11–2046
Memorandum of Conversation, by John C. Ross, Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation
Following my telephone conversation with Mr. Hiss on the question of election to the Economic and Social Council slates I went over the points we had discussed with Senator Austin.
Senator Austin felt that to drop Byelorussia at this time would be embarrassing to him in view of the commitment which he had given to Ambassador Gromyko to support Byelorussia.
Gromyko had urged that the United States support Yugoslavia and Byelorussia. The Senator had indicated we could not support Yugoslavia57 but would support Byelorussia. Following his telephone conversation with the Secretary just before the four o’clock session of the Assembly yesterday when it was decided that the United States would support Turkey and Byelorussia, the Senator had gone to Mr. Gromyko and confirmed that we would not support Yugoslavia but would support Turkey and Byelorussia.
The Senator and I then tried to find a formula that would give him a fair release from his commitment to Gromyko and which would, at the same time, give some encouragement to the Dutch in line with the views developed in the Department this morning.58 It occurred to us that these objectives might be accomplished if we were to make it known to the Russians, the Turks, and the Dutch that on the next (fifth) ballot we would again vote for Turkey and Byelorussia but that if this ballot should again result in a stalemate we would then vote for Turkey and the Netherlands, dropping Byelorussia at this point. If instead of resulting in a stalemate one of these three countries should be elected on the fifth ballot, then we would determine in the light of the circumstances which of the remaining two countries we would vote for.
[Page 232]We then discussed this briefly with Mr. Sandifer and I discussed this on the telephone with Mr. Hiss. He in turn discussed this proposal with Mr. Acheson and called back, speaking to Senator Austin and telling him that Mr. Acheson’s reaction was that if the Senator felt that this proposal was the wisest one in view of the tactical situation then the Department would certainly go along. However, Mr. Acheson felt, subject of course to the Senator’s views and the Senator’s discussion with the Secretary, that the conclusions reached earlier in the morning as stated in my memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hiss were probably sound.
Senator Austin then telephoned Secretary Byrnes. He read to the Secretary my memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hiss and then explained, as stated above, the nature of his commitment to Gromyko. He then indicated the possible way out and the reaction which Mr. Acheson had to this proposal.
The Secretary made it very clear that despite the conclusions and reasons developed in the Department earlier this morning, he was perfectly clear in his own mind that the decision he had made yesterday for us to support Turkey and Byelorussia was the right one. He made it clear that the considerations he had in mind outweigh those advanced with regard to dropping Byelorussia in order to restore the Netherlands.
With reference to what our position should be after the next ballot the Secretary felt that we should not make any statement indicating that we would then support Turkey and the Netherlands. He said this would be too inflexible and would involve a commitment which we might find it difficult to get out of. He said that we might let it be known that our commitments would stand only for the next ballot. He said that if conditions then change we wouldn’t consider ourselves bound. He felt that the Senator should hold himself free.
The Secretary felt that we should inform the Turks, the Dutch, the Russians and the Byelorussians where we stand. He did not seem to feel there was much point in taking the initiative in spreading our position among other delegations, although it was my impression that he felt if other delegations should ask us our position we should be free to state it. In closing the conversation the Secretary said his reaction right now was to stick by Byelorussia, which remark, in its context, seemed to imply quite clearly that the Secretary felt we should stick by Byelorussia, not only on the next ballot but any succeeding ballot.
- The following is recorded in a memorandum by Mr. Ward P. Allen, a Political Officer on the Delegation Staff, of a conversation with Ambassador Vlada Popovich, Representative on the Yugoslav Delegation, on November 26: “… Ambassador Popovich stated that he assumed that the United States was still opposed to Yugoslavia. He remarked that it would be unfair to oppose her and favor Turkey in view of the latter’s well-known neutrality during the war. … Reaffirming our support for Byelorussia, it was suggested to him that where the United States had to choose among Yugoslavia, Netherlands and Turkey for the remaining post, he could understand that we would naturally favor either of the other two, with whom our relations were excellent and with whom no trouble had arisen concerning airplanes or other matters.” (IO Files, document US/A/160) See vol. vi, pp. 867 ff., regarding these references.↩
- See memorandum of telephone conversations, supra.↩