740.0011 P.W./5–2145

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary: Following are the views of the War Department on the questions contained in your memorandum of 12 May regarding the Soviet Union in the Far East.

1. The War Department considers that Russian entry into the war against Japan will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little regard to any political action taken by the United States. The War Department’s view is that while the U. S. S. R. will seek and will accept any political inducement proffered by the United States as a condition to her entry into the war against Japan, such political inducements will not in fact affect the Russian decision as to when, if ever, she will enter the war. Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives.

Military considerations therefore do not preclude an attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war.

2. The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U. S. military action short of war. The War Department believes that Russia is militarily capable [Page 877] of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto,39 Manchuria, Korea and Northern China before it would be possible for the U. S. military forces to occupy these areas. Only in the Kuriles is the United States in a position to circumvent Russian initiative. If the United States were to occupy these islands to forestall Russian designs, it would be at the direct expense of the campaign to defeat Japan and would involve an unacceptable cost in American lives. Furthermore, the Russians can, if they choose, await the time when U. S. efforts will have practically completed the destruction of Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date.

From the foregoing, it appears we can bring little, if any, military leverage to bear on the Russians in so far as the Far East is concerned, unless we choose to use force. From the military point of view it would be desirable to have a complete understanding and agreement with the Russians concerning the Far East. If it is believed that the reconsideration of the Yalta agreement will assist such a complete understanding and agreement, then the War Department would favor it, but it is not believed that much good will come of a rediscussion at this time.

3. With regard to Soviet participation in the military occupation of the Japanese homeland, the War Department considers this to be a matter for political decision. From one military standpoint, this participation appears desirable, since it would reduce the military requirements of the U. S. for occupation purposes. On the other hand, our experiences with the Russians in the occupation of Germany may in the future lead to considerations which would point to the wisdom of exclusive occupation by our own forces. The discussion of this subject prior to Russian entry into the Japanese war does not appear necessary at this time.

The War Department concurs in the desirability of obtaining the four commitments and clarifications desired of the Soviet Government by the Department of State, If the present schism in China continues and, at the same time, Russian forces advance to areas giving them close contact with the Chinese Communists, our present problems in China will become more complicated, unless a prior satisfactory understanding has been reached with the Russians. However, as a preliminary, some sort of understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Generalissimo seems to be in order as of first importance.

As to emergency landing rights for commercial planes in the Kuriles, it would probably be best to make a specific proposal on this [Page 878] matter to the Russians in case it is desired to discuss the subject with them. However, Russia has the military capability of implementing unilaterally the Yalta agreement (except possibly the Kuriles). Hence, as pointed out above, measures other than U. S. military assistance must be found to persuade the Russians to give their agreement to the four points listed in the State Department memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
  1. South Sakhalin island.