761.93/5–1045: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to President Truman 29a
101142. Knowing the great strain under which you must be working I have hesitated to burden you with problems by which we are confronted here. In my last conference with President Roosevelt he [Page 866] entrusted me with two specific missions in addition to my duties as Ambassador to China.
The first mission was to bring Churchill29b and Stalin29c to an agreement on the policy that the United States has been pursuing in China, namely (1) to take all necessary action to bring about unification under the National Government of all anti-Japanese armed forces in China, (2) to endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free united democratic Chinese Government, (3) to continue to insist that China furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions and be responsible for her own policies and thus work out her own destiny in her own way.
As you have no doubt been advised by the Secretary of State, I obtained concurrence of Churchill and Stalin on the plan outlined. The British claim that the policy to which they now agree has always been British policy. This statement is incorrect. Roosevelt knew it was incorrect and that is why he sent me to London. We have conclusive evidence on this point which it now seems unnecessary to resubmit since agreement has been reached. The policy of all the Southeast Asia imperialist governments was to keep China divided against herself. This policy would seem to have been altered now that the British and the Soviet have agreed to the Roosevelt policy in China. See my reports to the Secretary of State No. P–28255 dated Teheran 13 [14] April 194529d and No. 1212 dated Moscow 24 [17] April 1945.29e
New Subject:
The second mission entrusted to me by President Roosevelt in my last conference with him pertains to a decision affecting China reached at the Yalta Conference.29f Before my last visit to Washington and before I had been informed by the President of the Yalta decision pertaining to China including particularly the all-important prelude,29g the Generalissimo had discussed with me China’s position on the same problems decided upon at Yalta and had given me his attitude relating to them. He gave me, at that time, an aide-mémoire summarizing his position on some of the problems. Of course, the subject discussed in the prelude to the Yalta decision was not known to him and so far as I am concerned the matter has not yet been presented to him.
[Page 867]Since my return we have continued to discuss the problems that would be involved in promoting future friendship and peace with Russia, without referring to the Yalta decision as such. All of the problems decided, except No. 1 in the prelude, have been raised by the Generalissimo and discussed fully with me. I am convinced that he will agree to every one of the requirements but will take exceptions to the use of two words “preeminent” and “lease”. These two words have bad connotations in Chinese. They have been involved in the controversies over extraterritoriality. These two words seem to impinge on the principles of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China.
Both Roosevelt and Stalin advised me that it was agreed between them that I would not open the subject of the Yalta decision with Chiang Kai-shek until the signal was given me by Stalin. Stalin said he would give me carte blanche and let me use my own judgment as to when and how to present the subject. However, both Harriman and I were of the opinion that it would be best to delay the presentation because of the possibility of leakage which in turn might bring undesirable results. I explained this to Stalin and it was finally decided that I am not to present the subject to Chiang Kai-shek until we have advised Stalin that, in our opinion, the time is opportune and until we have received the signal from him.
I want to emphasize to you that prior to my recent visit to Washington I had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek all phases of the Chinese-Russian problem before we knew what was contained in the Yalta Agreement, and since coming back to Chungking we have again thoroughly covered the same subjects without alluding to the primary subject. We are therefore in a position to proceed with dispatch on the Yalta Agreement when we are authorized to submit the particulars thereof to the Generalissimo.
My purpose in wiring you this report is to give you the foregoing brief and somewhat cryptic outline of the situation and at the same time advise you that the Generalissimo has received telegrams from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington summarizing all of the items decided at Yalta except the primary one. The Chinese Ambassador’s recitations of the various items are not all correct although he states that he got the various points in conversation with President Roosevelt. The Chinese Ambassador has indicated that the United States will join as a third party in the agreement between Russia and China on the various instrumentalities described. No such participation is indicated in the Yalta decision.
In addition to this the Chinese Government yesterday received a cable from a Chinese representative in Switzerland which reports movements of troops that we know are taking place and which indicate [Page 868] Russia’s intent. The Chinese Government also has other information of movements and plans from which they have concluded that the object referred to in the prelude of the Yalta decision is definitely expected to happen. From the reports the Chinese are now receiving and with what they already know it is reasonable to expect them to reach approximately correct conclusions on this subject.
It is of utmost importance that the Generalissimo as head of a state vitally concerned should be informed officially and in an appropriate straightforward manner becoming the character of the United States when the time is propitious. This information could and probably would have been given to him some time ago were it not for the lack of security associated with China. It now appears desirable that you discuss this situation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State to determine when you should direct me to ask Stalin for his approval of the time when I am to officially inform Chiang Kai-shek. Telling Chiang Kai-shek and asking him to clamp down secrecy which no doubt he would do to the best of his ability would, I believe, keep the secret from the enemy longer than it will be kept by letting the Chinese continue to conjecture publicly on the facts that come to their knowledge from other sources. The American Theater Commander is familiar with the contents of this message.
- Copy obtained from former President Harry S. Truman.↩
- Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.↩
- Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union.↩
- Ante, p. 329.↩
- Ante, p. 338.↩
- For agreement signed February 11, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.↩
- It provided for Soviet entry into the war against Japan.↩