Moscow Embassy Files—800 China
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)28
Estimate of Soviet Political Policy Regarding China
While the Soviet Government has been preoccupied in the European war, it has not played a prominent part in China but has been content to permit the United States to take the lead in that area. It has, nevertheless, been following developments closely and through its encouragement of the Chinese Communists in central China it has maintained an effective apparatus in that country for future eventualities. Moreover, while the Soviet authorities have ostensibly withdrawn their personnel from Sinkiang there seems to be little doubt that through the military activities of the Kazaks in that area they are keeping this situation fluid in order to be in a position to exert strong influence there at a later date if they should deem it advisable. [Page 864] Because this area is linked more closely economically and geographically with the Soviet Union than with China it is quite probable that the Soviet Government will in the not too distant future make vigorous efforts to increase their influence in this area by linking it more firmly economically with the Soviet Union and exercising considerably more political control. In regard to Manchuria, there seems to be little doubt that the Soviet authorities will, as a minimum, demand the re-establishment of the dominant position they held in this area prior to the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.29
It is obvious that the Soviet Government does not look with favor on the Chungking Government and while they pay lip service to it now by continuing to recognize it they will in all probability endeavor to undermine its influence still further by either giving additional and substantial assistance to the Chinese Communists or if a coalition is effected between the Communist and Chungking Governments the Soviet authorities will immediately apply their well-perfected infiltration tactics to take over control of the coalition. Under present circumstances, they would undoubtedly prefer the latter course to civil war and, therefore, they may not be expected to oppose any efforts made by the United States to bring about such a coalition.
On the basis of reports from American observers in Yenan, it is evident that the structure of the Communist Government is a replica of that of the Soviet Government. If and when the Soviet authorities decide to take a more active part in China, they will, if they wish to use it, have at their disposal an effective machine to build upon and expand their influence in a somewhat similar manner to the methods they have used in central and eastern Europe. The principal difference will be that they will be dealing with an agricultural population with a comparatively small number of urban workers. This fact may make their task more difficult since the Marxian appeal is usually more difficult of implementation with rural populations who by instinct are individualistic and only desire outside aid in order to increase their own individual well being and economic plight [sic]. The Soviet authorities, therefore, will champion a policy which will be directed to win over the peasantry by a well-integrated program of land reforms and promises of material aid for the rural population which will be implemented by some positive action coupled with a large share of glowing promises, which may be fulfilled later.
Therefore, unless the Chungking Government can liberalize itself, adopt a definite forward-looking program and carry it out, the chances are that the Communist-controlled groups will prevail in the end.
It is evident that the Soviet authorities desire the complete destruction of Japan as a force in the East so that, as in the west, with the [Page 865] defeat of Germany, there will not be any powerful force to either threaten the Soviet Union itself or prevent, or be in a position to hinder, the extension of Soviet influence in this region. For this reason, it seems clear that the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan at such time as it alone decides that its best interests will be served in taking this action. As indicated above, the minimum demands of the Soviet Government as a result of their participation in the Far Eastern war will be the complete elimination of all the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth and an assured place for itself in the final settlements to be arranged in the Far East. In its efforts to attain considerable influence in this area, the Soviet Government will undoubtedly endeavor to use, if they are permitted to, the same unilateral methods which they have so effectively applied in eastern and central Europe.
While we should in no case try to prevent the attainment of legitimate Soviet interests in China, we should in our own interests exert every effort to prevent Soviet influence from becoming predominant in China. To do this, it would appear that we should bend every effort to bring about a liberalization of the Chungking Government, assist them in drawing up a positive program which would have a direct appeal to a large section of the population and assist them financially and materially to carry out effectively such a program. The United States is in a position to furnish the material aid necessary to implement such a program while the Soviet Union is not. For this reason, the Soviet Government will find it difficult to give large-scale material assistance to the Communist elements in China in order to help them to carry out their promises. If we, on the other hand, can furnish such material assistance to liberal non-Communist elements, many of whom may now, because of lack of faith in the present policies of Chungking, be turning to the Communist groups, we should be in a position to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union in this area and start China on the path which should lead eventually to the creation of a truly liberal regime rather than the establishment of another “proletarian” dictatorship.
- Marginal notation stated that this was prepared for a “General Estimate” paper. Copy also sent to the Embassy in the Soviet Union as “of possible interest to the Ambassador and John Davies”. The latter was Second Secretary of Embassy there, having been transferred from China.↩
- Signed September 5, 1905, Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 824.↩