811.20/11–2745
Minutes of Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy86
| Present: | The Secretary of State accompanied by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson |
| The Secretary of War accompanied by Assistant Secretary of War, Robert Lovett and Colonel Charles W. McCarthy | |
| The Secretary of the Navy accompanied by Major Correa | |
| Mr. Hickerson |
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The Far Eastern Situation
There was a long discussion of the situation in China. Mr. Byrnes read aloud portions of the Joint War and Navy Department letter87 [Page 685] on the subject which was sent to him last night. Mr. Acheson said that he was interested in several questions which are not fully dealt with in the letter. First, he inquired, could more Chinese armies be supported logistically in North China if transportation could be found to get them there. Next, if the Japanese are moved out, will not the Communist forces move into the territory from which the Japs are evacuated and perhaps be able to get some of their arms; in the circumstances will not the Chinese National Government oppose the evacuation of the Japanese troops. Finally, he commented, if Japanese troops are moved out by rail to the ports and 3,000 per day can be transported by boat to Japan, this will mean that it would take more than 90 days to move out the Japanese troops with an additional BO days to move Japanese civilians.
Mr. Forrestal commented that he is convinced that we cannot “yank the Marines out of Northern China now”, but, he said that he feels that the situation is not adequately understood by the public in this country. He inquired whether we could not talk the matter over realistically with the Russians and, if that is not practicable, whether it might not be a good idea to try to get the United Nations Organization into the picture. Mr. Byrnes said that he was puzzled over what we should ask the Russians to do; that they are committed to move out by December 2 and the Chinese Ambassador tells him that the Chinese Government believes that the Russians will keep to the schedule in moving out their troops; should we ask the Russians to stay in Manchuria or just what should we ask them to do. Mr. Forrestal said that we shouldn’t ask them to stay in Manchuria but we might ask them to support the Chiang Government. Mr. Byrnes referred to the commitments which the Soviet Government made in its recent treaty with the Chinese Government and the assurances which they have given the President and him that the Soviet Union will not support any faction in China other than the National Government. He went on to say that in the face of all of this it was difficult to know just how we should approach the Soviet Government on the subject. He said that one course would be to assume Soviet good faith in the whole matter, determine our policy, and tell the Soviet Government. Mr. Byrnes added that he doubted whether the United Nations Organization, which is not yet established as an organization, could make a contribution in time to help in the present difficulties. Mr. Patterson said that it would help if the Soviet Union stated publicly what they had agreed to do in the treaty with China and what they have assured the President and Mr. Byrnes would be their attitude and policy in regard to China.
Mr. Byrnes said the Chinese Ambassador had told him that the Russians have assured the Chinese Government that they would not permit armed Communists to enter Manchuria. Mr. Patterson said [Page 686] that he was troubled over General Wedemeyer’s view that we cannot disarm and remove the Japanese from Northern China without becoming involved in the Chinese civil conflict.
Mr. Byrnes said that taking everything into account perhaps the wise course would be to try to force the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists to get together on a compromise basis, perhaps telling Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that we will stop the aid to his government unless he goes along with this. It might be well, he said, to tell Russia what we intend to do and to try to line them up with this policy. Mr. Patterson stated that it is his opinion clearly in our interests to see China united under Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek if that is possible.
Mr. Acheson said that the State Department is now at work on an approach to the problem under the following three points:
- (1)
- Is it possible to bring more Chinese armies north by water and support them;
- (2)
- A possible truce in the area evacuated when Japanese troops are moved out;
- (3)
- A political settlement under Generalissimo Chiang with Communist participation, with pressure on Generalissimo Chiang to go along with this.
Mr. Byrnes said that if it is possible to work out an approach along these lines Ambassador Hurley would carry this proposed program back to China with him for urgent presentation in China. Mr. Patterson inquired whether it might not be desirable for Ambassador Hurley to go by way of Moscow and Mr. Byrnes said he thought the urgent thing was to get him back to China with such a program if an agreement could be reached here.
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