Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

Nanking Embassy Files, Lot F–73: Telegram

The Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower)

[Chungking,] November 26, 1945.

[CFBX 15676.] Further comments to War 84094⁷⁶ follow. It is my considered opinion that the Chinese Central Government does not now have the capability to eliminate Japanese from North China and Manchuria under existing conditions without further United States and/or Allied assistance and, in the case of Manchuria probably the wholehearted cooperation of the Soviet Russians. The Generalissimo has stated that he has decided to temporarily forego reoccupation of Manchuria. His current operations in Southern Manchuria he personally described as having the objective of seizing the line in Jehol Province including the railroad running from Chihhsien (121 degrees East 41 degrees North) to Ishsien–Chaoyang–Yei Pai Shan (119 degrees 30 minutes East 41 degrees 15 minutes North)–Chengte (118 degrees East 41 degrees North) to Peking. He wants to deny the port of Hulutao to the Chinese Communists and to contribute to the protection of the north flank in his operations in North China against forays or penetrations south into North China. Concurrently the Generalissimo said that he intends to cope with the Chinese Communists in the area south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze Valley with a view to eliminating all Japanese and establishing political and economic stability. This appears to be sound procedure but I doubt his ability to achieve satisfactory results in North China for several months, perhaps years. He simply does not have adequate or appropriate resources to protect the long lines of communications against depredations and interceptions by Chinese Communist guerrillas. He now has five armies in North China and desires urgently to move five more there. He can not support logistically the five armies presently in the area with his available sea and air transports even when his armies are operating close to seaports. As his forces advance inland and become more widely dispersed, logistical support will be confounded and probably rendered impossible by aforementioned Chinese Communist action.

With regard to repatriation plan in China Theater, it was visualized that all of the Japanese in the area north of the Yangtze Valley and south of the Great Wall would be evacuated in first priority for obvious reasons. A joint conference was held in Shanghai to formulate plans for repatriation of Japanese from China, including representatives of SCAP, China Theater, Chinese National Military Council, Chinese Supreme Field Commander, Chinese War Transport Board, United States Seventh Fleet, Seventh Amphibious Force and Third Amphibious Corps.

Responsibility for organizing concentration pools at ports of embarkation and for maintaining flow of Japanese to these pools was accepted by the Chinese.

Commencing 15 November [19]45, the Seventh Fleet agreed to employ 14 LST’s in shuttle service between China and Japan. By 15 December [19]45 the number of LST’s was to be increased to 107.

Initially Japanese were to be evacuated from Tangku, Tsingtao and Shanghai. After 1 January [19]46, when South China ports would be cleared of mines and when it was estimated that available Japanese would have been evacuated through at least one of the northern ports, it was planned to initiate their evacuation from South China areas.

There are three limitations to evacuation of Japanese, exclusive of shipping, as follows:

a. By SCAP: Ports of Hakata, Kagoshima and Sasebo are prepared to receive a total of 8,000 repatriates a day from China.

b. By Chinese: The Chinese have agreed to maintain a flow of Japanese to the ports equal to the average daily evacuation rate of 3,000. However they have already indicated their inability to move the Japanese from the interior due to current disorders, involving intercepted lines of communications. Further, the Chinese Central Government considers essential retention of armed Japanese in the area to protect LOC⁷⁷ and certain key areas until the Central Government is in position to assume these responsibilities and also to prevent Chinese Communists from moving in and assuming control.

c. By CNO⁷⁸ and CinCPac:⁷⁹ CNO 181755Z dated 18 November [19]45⁸⁰ and based on CinCPac recommendations limited use of naval shipping to areas occupied by United States Forces, that is, to Tangku and Tsingtao. These two ports are limited to shipping a total of 90,000 a month. Subject radio further states that repatriation of Japanese in United States naval vessels will cease upon the inactivation of China Theater. If China Theater is inactivated on 31 December [19]45 as currently contemplated, United States naval vessels would be able to move approximately 130,000 repatriates from two North China ports mentioned above, assuming of course that Chinese continue flow to those ports. As of 30 November [19]45 it is estimated that only 35,000 Japanese will be repatriated through those two ports. According to information from U. S. sources in North China, the Japs will not be made available in adequate numbers.

There are approximately 723,000 Jap soldiers and 126,000 civilians in the area between the Yellow River and the Yangtze Valley inclusive. Practically all of these have been disarmed. If the Navy could remove the restriction on the use of Shanghai and could make shipping available, the bulk of these Japanese could be evacuated in about 7 months time, contingent of course upon the amount of shipping made available and the ability of the Chinese to insure a steady capacity flow. The port of Shanghai could handle about 4,000 a day. This evacuation of Japanese from the area between the Yellow River and the Yangtze Valley is deemed feasible and would contribute materially to the accomplishment of the over-all repatriation program.

If United States Forces are required to remain in China until repatriation of all Japanese is completed, it is readily apparent that the inactivation program will be postponed at least for 1 year, possibly longer. Examination of my last directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Warx 77563⁸¹ refers) in the light of repatriation, so far accomplished, and military developments transpiring since the date of issue 21 October [19]45 indicates following with reference to specific paragraphs in that directive:

Paragraph a—The evacuation or disposition of United States Army equipment and supplies is well in hand, in consonance with announced United States policies and regulations. This will not be accomplished until authorized representatives of FLC⁸² under State Department dispose of surplus property for Army personnel will be required to protect property until property is disposed of.

Paragraph b—Practically completed, with only few isolated cases requiring attention. Should be consummated by December 15th.

Paragraph c—Plans and preparations for United States Military Advisory Group have advanced to stage where further progress can not be made until firm instructions are received from the War Department concerning final agreements reached by the United States and Chinese Governments. It is understood that negotiations continue and it is recognized that the over-all situation may strongly influence future action in this regard.

Paragraph d—By December 31st all United States Army installations, command, and activities of the China Theater will be closed out except in Chungking, Nanking and Shanghai areas. The closing of a few installations may be delayed by negotiations for surplus property disposal and by time involved in turning over weather stations to Chinese. When the Generalissimo and his Government move to Nanking, installations in Chungking area will be closed out promptly. A nucleus will be maintained in Nanking and by the first of the year United States personnel in the Shanghai area should total not more than 6,000, assuming of course that present inactivation plan can be carried out in view of limitations mentioned above. I should like to invite the attention of the War Department that all of my directives (Warx 51593,⁸³ supplemented by Warx 47513⁸⁴ and further supplemented by Warx 77563⁸⁵) do not indicate that United States Forces, China Theater, have the mission of assisting the Chinese to disarm and/or to deport Japanese in the area, although certain War Department messages received in the Theater may be construed that we have responsibilities therewith. I have been admonished in Warx 47513 paragraph 5 that the Japanese will surrender to the Chinese Central Government and if circumstances require their surrender to U. S. Forces, they will be immediately turned over to the Chinese Central Government. In paragraph 6 of the same supplementary directive I have been directed to assist the Chinese Government in the rapid transport of Chinese Central Government Forces to key areas in China. This I have done with U. S. planes and with U. S. shipping to an appropriate degree in order to facilitate reoccupation by Chinese Central Government Forces of key areas formerly held by the Japanese. If I were to assist the Central Government in transporting additional forces and supplies to such areas, it would be definitely to facilitate their operations against Chinese Communists which I have been directed repeatedly to avoid.

General Comments:

There are so many intangibles involved in the situation, it is difficult to provide the War Department with firm answers. Broadly viewed, developments in the Far East have created a situation, which subject the foreign policy of the United States to supreme test concerning realistic implementation. It must be recognized in the War Department, and I hope in the State Department, that our present situation is untenable principally because:

a. The Chinese Communists are doing utmost to intimidate and to involve United States Forces in military operations that definitely can be construed as offensive in nature. They hope thereby to influence public opinion in the States and abroad in their contention that the United States is interfering with the internal affairs of China and that our military forces should be removed summarily.

b. The Generalissimo and all Chinese Central Government officials are constantly pressing for increased United States aid and also are striving to create conditions that render our military assistance against the Chinese Communists, and possibly the Soviet Communists, mandatory or inevitable.

c. Enemy troops and civilians are not being repatriated. For the present the Chinese Central Government is circumventing repatriation plans because armed Japs are being used to protect LOC and key areas. The Chinese Communists want the Japs disarmed and removed because they are poised to seize their arms and equipment and also to occupy areas vacated by the Japs.

I would appreciate War Department support in presenting the above pertinent information and emphasizing the following basic premises to the President and to the State Department:

a. It is impossible to unify China and Manchuria with United States assistance without becoming involved in fratricidal warfare.

b. It is further impossible to assist the Chinese Central Government in the repatriation of the Japanese in the area without U. S. Forces becoming involved in fratricidal warfare.

c. It is impossible to accomplish the unification of China and Manchuria and the repatriation of the Japanese in the area without additional U. S. or Allied Nations Military Forces and shipping resources far beyond those now available or contemplated in the Theater.

Recommendations:

It appears that the United States Government must decide upon one of the following courses of action:

a. Evacuate all U.S. Forces from China as soon as practicable and accept resulting consequences. I consider it impossible to carry out the following conflicting orders now contained in the present apparent U. S. policy:

(1) Assist in the rapid deployment of Chinese Central Government Forces to key areas in China.

(2) Assist in disarming the Japanese and their deportation to Japan.

(3) Avoid participation in fratricidal warfare.

b. Approach the solution to the problem presented in the Far East unilaterally, change existing Theater directive and make available to me sufficient United States Forces, including air, ground and sea as well as shipping, to carry out the unification of China and Manchuria under the Central Government including the orderly and prompt repatriation of all Japanese in the China Theater. This abrogates recently enunciated United States foreign policy of self-determination. It would undoubtedly be contrary to United States public opinion.

c. Invoke the machinery visualized in United Nations Charter, establish immediately a trusteeship for Manchuria and Korea and pool the military resources of the United Nations for temporary employment in China proper to insure the expeditious repatriation of the Japanese. Thereafter withdraw all United Nations Forces and assistance from China and permit the Chinese to determine for themselves through processes of evolution or revolution, by whom and how they will be governed. Adoption of this course of action establishes precedent similarly in Java, Palestine, Iran, Indo-China and other potential explosive areas.

76. Telegram of November 19 from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, p. 644.
77. Line of communication.
78. Chief of Naval Operations.
79. Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
80. Not found in Department files.
81. Not found in Department files; for extract, see enclosure to memorandum of November 13 from the Acting Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, p. 621.
82. Foreign Liquidation Commission under Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly.
83. Telegram of October 24, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 178.
84. Telegram of August 10 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, p. 527.
85. See footnote 81, above.