Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

Nanking Embassy Files, Lot F–73: Telegram

The Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower)

[Shanghai,] November 20, 1945.

[CFBX 15120.] Following message provides résumé designed to assist in solution of problems presented by developments in China. The American Minister Walter Robertson has seen this message and heartily concurs:

[Part I]

Evaluation of over-all situation in China was intentionally withheld until sources of information could be contacted and the implications of events transpiring in the China Theater could be carefully and objectively analyzed. I have visited the Peking area and discussed the situation with the Marine Corps Commander (Major General Rockey) and a Marine Division Commander (Major General Shepherd) presently located in Tsingtao. Also many nationals including British, French, Dutch and Chinese leaders were most anxious to talk, particularly about current and future conditions in the Northern Provinces. In Shanghai I have talked to many nationals including Chinese leaders and have reviewed the situation with members of U. S. China Theater staff located there. Five days in Chungking where I had several conferences with the Generalissimo, Doctor T. V. Soong, the Minister of War,⁵³ the Minister of Finance,⁵⁴ General Ho Ying-chin,⁵⁵ American Minister Robertson, the British Ambassador,⁵⁶ the French Ambassador⁵⁷ and U. S. officers who are performing liaison duty with Chinese Government. With that background I submit herewith information, analyses and recommendations which may be helpful in formulating continued policies and reaching decisions with regard to U. S. Forces in China Theater.

I believe that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is sincere in his desire to bring about stability within the country, to initiate democratic procedures, to unify China and to implement wide sweeping social reforms. Considering his background, training and experience as warlord, politician and his oriental philosophy, his approach to problems presented would probably be inefficient, incomprehensible and unethical by American standards. The task is beyond the capabilities of one man. He lacks not only the organization but also competent advisors and assistants. The Generalissimo is selfless in his approach to the problems presented, however, he is surrounded by unscrupulous men who are interested primarily in their self-aggrandizement. The Generalissimo is extremely loyal to those warlords and officials who have supported him in the past. Consequently, even though they are unscrupulous and/or incompetent, he appoints them to responsible positions in the Government. They exploit the opportunities presented. Further they appoint worthless subordinates in lesser positions. Many are members of same families or have connived in chicanery in the past.

To clarify further, the integrity of Chinese political leaders and businessmen might appropriately be contrasted with that of Americans in similar positions. The Chinese businessman has and usually conforms to an exemplary code of ethics, whereas the Chinese politician operates with the object of enriching himself through chicanery and machination. In fact, it is commonly recognized in China that governmental positions are normal lucrative means by which one can amass great fortune. In America businessmen are accepted as a class that might amass great wealth. Their methods would not always however bear close scrutiny. In governmental positions Americans on the other hand uniformly follow an ethical course and only in isolated instances acquire great wealth through unscrupulous political manipulation or through dishonest government processes.

I am confronted daily with problems created by the above type of officials who deal constantly in intrigue and machinations. For example, a senior Chinese General has been dealing surreptitiously and unilaterally with the Japanese General Okamura in the use of Japanese shipping available in Chinese waters. It had been carefully explained to the Chinese General that such shipping must be pooled in the Allied effort to accomplish rehabilitation and repatriation in the Far East. This is only one of numerous instances where high officials operate unilaterally, surreptitiously and corruptly rendering coordination and effective accomplishments difficult, if not impossible. I report such circumstances to the Generalissimo but there are so many of a similar nature, it is readily apparent and understandable that he is bewildered and impotent in evolving a solution.

The Generalissimo appointed uniformly Southern Chinese to key posts, governors, mayors, etc., in the Northern Provinces. Apparently he does not have confidence in Northern Chinese. These appointments have embittered the people of the North and thus further retard military, political and economic stabilization in the area.

There is some evidence that the Chinese are determined to exclude and/or restrict foreigners particularly British, French, Russians and Dutch in a commercial sense. Prewar most of the utilities, lines of communication and industrial establishments were financed and operated by foreigners. There are not available sufficient Chinese executives or technicians to take over the operation of these facilities. Industrial effort is presently stultified and economic stabilization is impracticable, even in those areas where Central Government Forces have undisputed control. Appropriate measures for recovery will be impossible unless foreigners are permitted to function with a reasonable amount of initiative and authority.

I have pointed out all of the above observations very frankly and clearly to the Generalissimo. I strongly urged that foreigners be retained to assist in economic recovery, indicating that this appeared essential at least until the Chinese produced from among their own nationals sufficient trained executives and technicians capable of assuming the inherent responsibilities. Also I recommended that Northern Chinese be appointed governors and mayors in Northern Provinces and that the people be permitted to elect district magistrates. Further I suggested that civilians should be considered for these important posts hoping thereby to eliminate the military hierarchy presently and disastrously entrenched.

The Chinese Central Government appears to have a modicum of control in the area including the Yangtze Valley and south therefrom, commonly referred to as South China. With foreign assistance as above depicted, economic stability could probably be accomplished promptly particularly if small industries were created and operated efficiently.

In most of the area north of Yangtze Valley extending to the Great Wall, referred to as North China, Central Government control is strongly and at present effectively disputed by the Chinese Communists. I believe that the average Chinese in North China are in an understandable quandary relative to the political implications of Central Government vis-à-vis Chinese Communists’ control. They have been strongly propagandized by the Communists who have emphasized the corruption and inefficiency of Central Government officials. Those who tend to support the Generalissimo are subjected to intimidation by the Communists.

I have advised the Generalissimo to concentrate his effort upon establishing control in North China and to execute promptly social and political reforms designed to remove prohibitive taxes and the practice of corruption by officials. I again suggested that the assistance of foreign executives and technicians who had been operating in the area prior to Japanese occupation should be retained, at least during the period China’s political and economic adolescence.

With reference to Manchuria, a complex situation has developed. The importance of Manchuria both economically and psychologically to China is recognized by the Generalissimo as well as by the Communists, both Chinese and Soviet. Russian military forces quickly overran that area in August and are reported to have indulged in loot, rape and pilferage. Their program according to reports included the destruction of property that they did not desire or that could not be removed. Further the Generalissimo informs me that the Russians surreptitiously, often openly, collaborate with the Chinese Communists in making Japanese arms and equipment available and in placing definite obstacles in the way of Chinese Central Government troops when attempts are made to move them by sea and/or air to Manchuria. The Chinese do not have sufficient or appropriate resources to recover North China, and concurrently to launch a successful military and political campaign for the recovery of Manchuria under existing circumstances. Further definite demands will be made upon Central Government resources to maintain order and to facilitate economic recovery in South China.

Actually I do not feel that the Central Government has sufficient forces to gain and retain control of North China at least for many months, possibly years. The area is vast, communications limited and loyalty of population doubtful. Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if present activities are criteria, harass and restrict movements of Central Government Forces to such a degree that an extended, costly campaign will result.

The Generalissimo planned and urged me recently to provide U.S. air transport to move two armies from the Tientsin–Peking area to Manchuria. Logistical support for these forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria had not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. Consideration of these factors and the lack of appropriate forces as well as transport caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and consolidate his military and political positions there prior to attempting to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agrees with this concept.

I pointed out that the Americans had assisted the Central Government in moving sufficient Chinese armies into North China, North FIC⁵⁸ and Formosa for the explicit purpose of disarming and facilitating the deportation of the Japanese. With reference to Manchuria sufficient armies were moved to occupy that area but entrance therein was prevented by Chinese Communists and Soviets. I also indicated that I am not authorized to employ American Forces and resources to move additional Chinese Central Government troops and/or equipment under existing directive because, irrefutably, such action would provide direct assistance to the Central Government Forces in their operations against Chinese Communists.

Related to the above is the position that developments in China have created in connection with my duties as the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff and concurrently as American Commander. The Generalissimo rightfully expects me to advise him in formulation of plans and in the procurement of assistance in the solution of his internal problem, which are at present essentially full-scale operations against Chinese Communists. When the President authorized designation of an American as the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff, I feel certain that he did not visualize that I, or any officer on active duty in the Army, should serve as the Generalissimo’s advisor in matters pertaining to political and internal affairs and more important to fratricidal or internecine warfare. When in Washington recently I suggested for this reason that the officer appointed as Chief of the Military Advisory Group should not be permitted to serve in any capacity on the Generalissimo’s staff or in the Chinese Government. Pertinent example: Only recently the French Consul General in Shanghai requested my assistance in connection with several hundred Frenchmen who were disarmed in Shanghai area by the Japanese. The Chinese have now recovered the French equipment however they refuse to return it to the French. I explained to the French Consul General that this matter should be taken up direct with the Chinese Government. He replied that he submitted his appeal to me as the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff. Another example: The Generalissimo asked me to contact the British in Chungking in order to secure shipping for the movement of additional forces to the North. I did this and the British were most sympathetic however they recounted the many British grievances including what they termed discriminatory acts and restrictions against British subjects who have heavy investments and important commercial interests in China and who desire to resume their various activities. The British strongly urged me to prevail upon the Generalissimo to take remedial action. I am asked to scratch the back of the British Lion to insure that the British Ambassador will do some scratching along the tortuous spine of the Chinese Dragon.

In North China the Generalissimo is determined to retain the Marines in their present areas. In fact he would like to have them extend their occupational areas to include long lines of communications. His plans envisage using the Marines as a base of maneuver. Instead of repatriating Japanese his plans and efforts are now concentrated upon conducting a campaign against the Chinese Communists. As indicated above such campaign may last for several months or years. In the meantime the Marine Forces are subject to unavoidable incidents which may involve the United States in very serious difficulties and commitments. The implications of removing the American Forces including the Marines in China have been carefully considered in suggesting that we withdraw all of our men from the area. Under the present circumstances it is impossible to avoid involvement in fratricidal warfare or political strife, yet I am admonished by my directive to do so. As I view it, the presence of American troops in the Far East is for the expressed purpose of accomplishing world order and insuring continued peace. However, I doubt that the American people are prepared to accept the role inherent in world leadership under the United Nations Charter. In removing our men we can be justly accused of deserting an ally in a critical period. We now recognize that China is incapable of repatriating the millions of enemy troops and civilians within her borders and also solving her political and economic problems.

Conclusions:

a. The Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians and inaugurates economic, political and social reforms through honest, competent civilian officials.

b. He will not be able to stabilize the situation in North China for several months perhaps years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is accomplished, followed up realistically by action indicated in subparagraph a above.

c. He will not be able to recover Manchuria for many years unless again satisfactory agreements are reached with the Chinese Communists and Soviet Government.

d. A satisfactory understanding between the Chinese Central Government and the Chinese Communists appears remote.

e. The Soviet Government is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist and possibly their own plans in North China and Manchuria, this in contravention to recent Sino-Soviet agreements.

f. The continuation of American Forces in the China Theater particularly in the North will inevitably lead to serious involvement in fratricidal warfare and possibly in a tense and dangerous situation with Soviet Government.

g. The dual capacities of American Commander and Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo are no longer tenable.

h. The Americans have given appropriate and full assistance in consonance with existing Theater directive by moving with American air and sea transport Chinese Central Government Forces to disarm and facilitate the deportation of the Japanese in North China. However these Chinese Forces are now being largely diverted and employed against Chinese Communists and/or dissident groups.

Recommendations:

United States Government notify the Chinese Government:

a. That the American Commander can be immediately relieved as the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff in that this appointment was approved during the war with a view to coordinating the Sino-American combat activities against the common enemy, the Japanese.

b. That my decision to remove, as early as practicable, all American Forces in China Theater, including Marines, be confirmed or my existing directives be changed to justify under U. S. policies their retention and employment in the area.

c. That plans and arrangements for the implementation of the projected American Military Advisory Group be continued, however, actual consummation be withheld until the United States is satisfied that appropriate political and military stabilization in China has been accomplished.

Part II

The following considerations cover the broader aspects and the strategic implications of the situation depicted in Part I (above). The policy of China to attain the goal, frequently stressed by the Generalissimo, namely the establishment of a strong, unified, democratic China will be definitely influenced if not actually determined by the policies of and the amount and form of assistance given by foreign nations including the United States, the British Commonwealth, France, Holland and Soviet Russia, particularly the last named country.

It is my considered opinion that China is not yet capable of implementing, nor is she psychologically prepared for, democratic procedures in government. China is experiencing the difficulties that history accurately records in Western Europe when countries in that area passed from an amorphous mass of feudalistic dynasties to more homogeneous monarchies and republics. It is in the interest of world peace and advancement that China should be able to transcend from the medieval state to a democratic form of government by processes of evolution as opposed to bloody, chaotic revolution.

Based on the premise that China’s resurgence will be determined by the assistance and policies of the world powers, it is fitting that we first examine Soviet Russia’s possible policies because China and Russia are in close juxtaposition geographically with several thousand miles of common border and further, there exist in China certain facilities which are of paramount interest to Russia both commercially and militarily. It appears that Soviet Russia may pursue one of the following two courses of action.

a. She may become intensely nationalistic and continue the policy epitomized the past few years by Stalin in the program of building a strong internal structure, industrially and politically. Concurrently she may establish on her frontier a buffer of areas in which she maintains the initiative. This is a fait accompli in Western Europe for in the Balticum States, Eastern Poland and throughout the Balkans she maintains paramount sphere of influence. It is reasonable to assume that she will also establish such buffer areas in the Middle and Far East. At present there are indications of strong Russian military forces in the Caucasus with a view to intimidating Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Her actions in Korea, Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Jehol, Chahar and Sinkiang Provinces suggest the pattern for the Far East where she may create conditions similar to those now existing on her western frontiers in Europe.

b. Russia may have adopted the policies described in subparagraph a above as an expedient to cope with the situation created by the war and thereby permitted international revolutionary features of communism to remain quiescent. She may now adopt an aggressive policy and utilize the buffer areas above referred to as spring boards for ideological penetration and territorial expansion by employment of military force. Her intention to implement such a policy may be indicated by worldwide invidious propaganda, establishment of Communist cells in South America, Afghanistan and through Arabic areas, overt activities in Manchuria, Korea and North China, and more than normal interest in MacArthur’s stabilization program for Japan.

It is my considered opinion that Russia is not prepared to implement successfully the policy covered in subparagraph b above. Thousands of her cities, towns and villages must be rehabilitated. Her industries even prewar were not effectively operating, although strongly permeated by American, British and German technicians. Large numbers of Russian soldiers have come in contact with the Armed Forces of Allies and have received information concerning democratic procedures and the standards of living outside of Russia that strongly refute the disparaging propaganda to the contrary. There is increasing evidence also that bureaucratic procedures are being followed in Soviet Russia and in numerous ways the basic communistic tenets of Karl Marx and Lenin are being abrogated. It probably will be many years before Russia would be sufficiently strong to undertake successfully an international program as depicted in subparagraph b above. For many years prior to June 22, 1941, the press and radio of most countries in the world bitterly assailed communism with its associated atheism, programs, regimentation, stultification of free enterprise and restriction of human liberties. After the Germans attacked Russia there was a complete about face and justifications were found in the Allied press to ameliorate public opinion and to justify military alliance. It is only natural that the Russians are suspicious of our motives today and are preparing bulwarks against possible interference with whatever program they adopt. Coupled with these facts, when one considers that the vast majority of the Russian people are not true Communists but are actually being controlled by a small group whose powers equal or may even surpass those of the Czarist Rulers, it is logical to assume that Soviet Russia’s policies today will conform to those defensive stratagems depicted in subparagraph a.

There is one other important consideration should communism spread unabated and effectively throughout the Far East that may influence the future policy of the United States and other powers interested in democratic or capitalistic forms of government. There are approximately 450 million people in China, 390 million in India, 100 million in Japan and Korea, and 100 million through the Philippine Archipelago, the Melanesian and Micronesian Islands, Netherlands East Indies, Malay, Burma and Indo-China, totalling about 1 billion 40 million persons, over half the population of the world, who might embrace communism in various forms. If we were to add to this number the approximate 190 million in Soviet Russia and the several million scattered through Western Europe and in other parts of the world, it will readily be apparent that strategically the position of democratic and capitalistic countries would be seriously jeopardized or rendered impotent.

American policy has always supported the aspirations of China to attain unity and a democratic form of government. The present situation however might indicate that several million Chinese are opposed to the attainment of that goal. Interference in the internal affairs of China would not only be repugnant to U. S. foreign policy recently enunciated in the President’s Navy Day Speech⁵⁹ wherein the principle of self-determination was reaffirmed, but also might involve the U. S. in serious dispute or possibly war with Soviet Russia.

Traditionally our policy has insisted upon the territorial integrity of China and has always opposed the domination of China by any one power. We have not attempted colonization in the Far East but have encouraged western economic, cultural, religious and political influences.

China represents a bridge between East and West. Today, as the result of the emergence of a powerful Soviet Russia, China is also a political and economic arena of the world’s two greatest powers, Soviet Russia and America. If China were to become a puppet of the Soviet which is exactly what a Chinese Communist victory would mean, then Soviet Russia would practically control the continents of Europe and Asia. Domination of so great an expanse, particularly by a totalitarian power, would jeopardize world peace. We were determined to prevent Japan from making China a puppet power. It is believed even more important, if we are to realize our policies with reference to China, that Russia not be permitted to do so.

The question may properly be asked—are we backing the wrong horse or is there realistic justification for the hope that China may emerge from her difficulties? When the Japanese attacked China, the Generalissimo was undertaking an industrial and political revolution to achieve self-government and unity, to provide barriers against foreign economic domination, and to effect social changes including the emancipation of the coolies and peasants. He was making splendid progress and this is often alluded to as the real cause of the Japanese attack in 1937. The militarist felt it necessary to strike before China became unified and strong,—a realistic threat to Japan’s program of aggression in the Far East.

The proof of the progress made and of the unity achieved includes the fact that China survived the loss of all her newly developed industries, her ports and communications with the outside world. Although almost denuded of weapons and industrial support, China, as a totally blockaded nation, waged war for nearly 8 years and performed this miracle under the Generalissimo and under the present Government. It appears logical to retain confidence in China’s ability to solve her problems. In consonance with present U.S. policy of noninterference with internal matters, we should continue to provide encouragement and material aid to the recognized Government of China. However we should not participate militarily during the process of evolution or revolution within the Chinese Government unless world peace is definitely jeopardized thereby.

It would appear sound therefore to withdraw all U. S. Military Forces from China proper and thus remove any chance of involvement in the internal affairs of China. Concurrently we could provide arms and equipment as well as raw materials for newly created and revitalized small industries and also we could import processed goods.

The United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia recognize China’s legal and ethnological rights to Manchuria. Should we not invoke their combined aid to protect those rights? This seems to be a logical step from the U. S. viewpoint to preclude that area from becoming a Russian satellite or puppet government. The United States could invite Great Britain, China, Russia to join in an immediate trusteeship over Manchuria and Korea until China as a government is sufficiently strong and stabilized to assume the responsibilities of full control in that area. Korea’s autonomy could be determined after her people give satisfactory evidence of their capability to govern themselves.

Recommendations:

a. Withdraw as early as practicable all U. S. military personnel from the China Theater and concurrently provide continued and increased economic assistance to the existing recognized Chinese Government; or announce a U.S. policy indicating determination to continue military and economic support to the Chinese Central Government until the Japanese troops and civilians in the area have been repatriated to their homeland and until China has evolved sufficient internal strength to assume her rightful role in the family of nations. (This latter course would entail a change in my Directive.)

b. Establish immediately trusteeship under United States, Russia, Great Britain and China over Manchuria and Korea. Duration of this trusteeship to last until these four nations agree that China is prepared to assume the responsibilities for control of Manchuria and that the Koreans themselves are prepared for complete autonomy.

53. General Chen Cheng.
54. O. K. Yui.
55. Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army.
56. Sir Horace J. Seymour.
57. Gen. Zinovi Pechkoff.
58. French Indochina.
59. Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1945, p. 653.