893.00/11–645
Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
| Present: | The Secretary of State |
| The Secretary of War, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of War Mr. McCloy and Colonel McCarthy | |
| The Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Lieut. Colonel Correa | |
| Mr. Matthews |
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Transportation of Additional Chinese Armies to North China
Mr. McCloy said that a cable9 had just been received from General Wedemeyer which had been transmitted to the State Department on a lower level which he felt should receive immediate consideration at the top level. He said that he thought it involved the making of a basic decision as to how far this Government is going in its support of the Kuomintang. In the cable General Wedemeyer stated that the Generalissimo had requested American air transport of another Army to North China. General Wedemeyer expressed the belief that Chiang has sufficient troops in North China to handle the communists unless they receive strong support from the Russians, that no further troops should be transported in American planes and that we should withdraw our Marines from North China. Mr. McCloy said that the basic decision involved was how far we should back Chiang in his efforts to unify the country and he pointed out that we have already a considerable investment in this policy. He said that wherever our flag flies this is evidence of American support and greatly strengthens Chiang’s prestige. He went into some of the problems of China pointing out that there are nearly 2 million Japanese soldiers and another 2 million Japanese civilians and technicians to be repatriated. This presents an enormous migration problem and he does not believe that the Chinese have the staff or ability to handle it. He said he did not know what the solution should be but he felt that a prompt decision on a high level must be made. As the matter now stands General Wedemeyer has declined to transport the additional Army and favors the withdrawal of our Marines. Mr. Byrnes inquired what effect the Marine withdrawal would have. Mr. McCloy said that he thought that Chiang’s prestige would suffer. He is likewise worried about the matter of controlling the Japanese Army which he feels is still very cocky; it is an undefeated Army and quite different in its morale from [Page 607] those in Japan or elsewhere. Mr. Byrnes inquired what would be the justification of our transporting the additional Army since we have no commitment to do so. Is it [the Army] really necessary to secure Japanese surrender? Mr. McCloy felt that Chiang’s real need of our aid is to increase his Army’s strength in North China against the communists. He fears that opportunity might be given to the Soviets to say there is chaos and that, therefore, they can not withdraw from Manchuria. Mr. McCloy, in reply to a question, said that while there were many stories as to the extent of Russian support of the communists he had nothing tangible or hard on the subject. Mr. Byrnes remarked that we would seem to be involved only to the extent of furnishing the transportation. Mr. McCloy said this would be taken as a highly significant step and as evidence throughout the Far East of our continued support for Chiang. He said that he is seriously worried about Manchuria and has grave doubts as to the Chinese ability to administer and absorb the area. They lack technicians. If chaos ensues then the whole agreement with Russia might fall through and give the Soviet an excuse to remain in Manchuria. One solution, he said, might be to permit the Japanese technicians who are now in the area to remain. He said that the Kuomintang must have our support if it is to be able to cope with the situation. If the Russians, however, decide to give active support to the Chinese communists then we are “in a real mess”. Mr. Patterson said that he felt that it would constitute a very important aid to Chiang to lend our planes to transport this Army. On the whole he was inclined to follow the recommendations of the man on the spot, General Wedemeyer, who opposed the furnishing of such transportation.
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