Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram
The Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater (Wedemeyer), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)
CFB 13529. Following message received yesterday from Generalissimo and our answer thereto is repeated paraphrased for your information.
From Gimo “As a result of the recent serious developments in North China I desire that the following sea moves of armies be accomplished: Eighth Army to Tangku instead of Tsingtao as now planned. Sixty-second Army to Tangku instead of Formosa as now planned. If both armies cannot satisfactorily be landed at Tangku area, second choice is for the 62d Army to go to Tsingtao.
“The 31st Army will go to Formosa from its present location near Foochow.
“Urgent that Seventh Fleet land these armies at Tangku in the immediate future.”
Our reply follows:
“The granting of your most recent request cannot be done.
“In the initial stages of planning our combined staff determined the requirements for troops to disarm and accept the surrender of the Japanese in the areas concerned. Ample Central Government troops now have arrived in areas of North China except Tsingtao (where the Eighth Army will arrive about 17 November according to present plans) to complete the mission assigned to United States Marines.
[Page 604]“Dissident elements and not Japanese are the cause of the present serious trouble and therefore the move of additional troops is not within the scope of our mission.
“We could not justify to our Government the delay in release of shipping involved in such a move.”
To acquaint you more fully with the reasons which prompted our action, the following facts are presented:
a. The Theater Commander has directed that all U. S. personnel be evacuated from French Indo-China as early as possible. Target date to complete this evacuation is 15 November. If 62d Army is moved to North China instead of Formosa it will be necessary to load in Shanghai and ship to Haiphong winter clothing, trucks and motor maintenance personnel not now planned for the move to Formosa. To accomplish this will set back loading date of 15 November by several days. Issue of winter clothing at port of embarkation is necessitated by type of shipping to be used (LST’s). Shipping presently allocated for move of 62d Army necessitates return to Haiphong for second load. Estimated that minimum time to close Army in North China port will be 40 days or close to 1 January 1946. Because of unsettled conditions in FIC4 it is not desired to retain Americans there until that late date.
b. The substitution of the 31st Army, consisting of two poorly trained and equipped student divisions, for the 62d Army in Formosa to assist the 70th Army in the disarming of 275,000 Japanese military personnel, the security of a large number of Japanese civilian nationals, and the occupation of such a large and important island is not considered sound.
c. The delay in the release of the shipping allocated to the 62d Army which would ensue as a result of the move of that Army to a North China port would directly affect present plans for its use in Magic Carpet and the repatriation of the Japanese.
d. In my CFBX 12638,5 I recommended that Marine Forces in China be withdrawn commencing 15 November. This recommendation was based on the fact that the areas now occupied by the Marines will be reached by Central Government Forces by that date in sufficient numbers to take over the responsibility for the Japanese forces in the areas involved. To comply with the request of the Generalissimo to move both the Eighth and 62d Armies to Tangku would leave the Tsiangtao area, now occupied by the 6th Marine Division, without Central Government Forces and unjustifiably delay the withdrawal of the Marines from China. The present target date for the [Page 605] Eighth Army to close in Tsingtao is 17 November. Gimo’s alternate choice of Tsingtao as Port of Debarkation for 62d Army in event not feasible to land both Armies at Tangku is not acceptable in that delay attendant on this move as explained by paragraph a above again unjustifiably delays the withdrawal of Marines from China.
e. The following extracts define part of the current China Theater Mission:
Warx 51593 (25 [24] October 1944)6 paragraph 3 (c) “You will not employ United States resources for suppression of civil strife except insofar as necessary to protect United States lives and property”.
Warx 47513 (10 August 1945)7 paragraph 1 b. “All of its provisions apply only in so far as action in accordance therewith does not prejudice the basic U. S. principle that the United States will not support the Central Government of China in fratricidal war”.
Paragraph 4 “U. S. Forces will turn over points in China liberated by them to agencies and forces accredited by the Central Government of China”.
Paragraph 5 “It is desired that insofar as permitted by military considerations the surrender of Japanese Forces in China, whether complete or piecemeal, will be to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or his representatives. U. S. Commanders under you may at your discretion and with the approval of the Generalissimo be authorized to accept temporarily for the Generalissimo local surrenders of Japanese Forces. The principle will be that Japanese Forces in China surrendering to any U. S. Commanders will be turned over to the Chinese Central Government subject to the assurance of satisfactory arrangements and treatment on the part of the Chinese”.
Paragraph 6 “You will assist the Central Government in the rapid transport of Chinese Central Government Forces to key areas in China”.
Our mission in North China will be accomplished upon the arrival of the Eighth Army in Tsingtao. Sufficient Central Government Forces will then be present in all key areas initially occupied by United States Marines to warrant withdrawal of the Marines. Any additional Central Government Forces will be employed unquestionably against Communist forces in areas adjacent to those now occupied. Transport of troops for such employment is in contradiction to our mission to refrain from actions which could be interpreted as lending close support to the Central Government in instances of civil strife.
f. Therefore we have disapproved this request and other similar requests and shall continue to do so under our present mission. Request this message be acknowledged and our decision confirmed.