893.00/3–2145
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Chase)
Reference Service’s report no. 21, March 21, 1945.
Taking Kwangsi as an outstanding example, Service pictures the Generalissimo’s methods of weakening opposition groups—to attain what “he47 calls unity”—as actually increasing disunity and impairing the war effort.
One can hardly deny that China’s disunity has increased during the war; that Chiang’s treatment of provincial groups and forces has aroused their deep resentment; or that Chiang has a major share in responsibility for the failures in China’s war effort.
Many, however, would dispute the apparent thesis of the despatch—that China’s disunity is primarily the result of a deliberate Machiavellian policy pursued by Chiang since 1927. They would probably contend that, without Chiang’s astute and persistent efforts, China’s prewar measure of unity would never have been achieved; and that her subsequent loss of unity is the result, not only of Chiang’s mistaken [Page 385] policy, but of many other factors. They might include among such factors: the selfish ambitions of some war lords (who might well have not responded to any type of treatment by Chiang); and the strains and stress of war, which, in a nation such as China in 1937, must almost inevitably exert a disintegrating influence beyond the power of human control.
- President Chiang Kai-shek.↩