FE Files, Lot 52–354
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)45
Mao Tze-tung in an important speech to the Chinese Communist Congress on May 1 makes the following statements in regard to the Soviet Union:
“We are of the opinion that the Kuomintang government must stop its attitude of enmity towards the Soviet Union and swiftly improve Sino-Soviet Diplomatic relations …46
“We welcome Marshal Stalin’s speech of last November rebuking the Japanese aggressors and the recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact by the Soviet Union.…
“We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.”
Mr. Service, during talks with Mao in March, came to the conclusion that the Communists, despite their reticence to discuss the question, expect the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. His conclusion was based on Communist statements that Russia must be considered an important Far Eastern power, that she is uncompromisingly opposed to Japanese Fascism, and that she will insist on a voice in the Far Eastern settlement.
Rejecting alternative lines of Soviet action such as aid to China through Sinkiang or direct link-up with the Communists through Mongolia, Communist military leaders such as Chu Teh argued (to Service) that the reasonable course for Russia to take will be direct attack by the Red Army against northern Manchuria with the main effort probably coming from the west, in the Manchuli or eastern Outer Mongolian region, possibly supported by a secondary attack from northeastern Manchuria.
The Communists make no secret of their own preparations to take an active role in the conquest of Manchuria. For the last two years they have been energetically strengthening their guerrilla bases on the southwestern fringe of Manchuria and they claim to have a strong and extensive underground organization in Manchuria, including close contact with remnants of old but presently dormant resistance groups. It is difficult to evaluate the strength of these claimed forces because their present policy is to remain underground and avoid premature open activity. The Japanese, however, have from time to time announced [Page 384] capture of Communist agents and fear of Communist activity seems to be reflected in rigid restrictions on travel between north China and Manchuria and intensive anti-Communist propaganda. In addition the Communists, through their early advocacy of a policy of active resistance to Japan, have won to their side (rather than the Kuomintang) a large number of the Manchurians who fled into China after 1931.
The Chinese Communists are very emphatic that the Russians have no ulterior motives or designs in Manchuria and will not demand any special concessions or territory. They insist that the Russians will be satisfied with a friendly government in Manchuria (as in the rest of China), which will have close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, permit full use of the facilities of the ports and railways of Manchuria on a normal commercial basis, and not impose onerous restrictions to Soviet trade with or transit through Manchuria. This contention that the Soviet Union has no ambitions beyond the desire to see a liberal regime in China with which it can have close and friendly relations was frequently reiterated. The Communists refused to discuss with Mr. Service the separation of Manchuria from China or to consider the permanent separation of China into two countries or spheres.