Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

FE Files, Lot 52–354

Memorandum by Mr. John S. Service³²

[Washington,] May 4, 1945.

Mao Tse-tung’s May 1 speech³³ should be regarded as being of special significance. Made by the Chairman of the Communist Party to the long-awaited Communist Party Congress, it is an official and definite statement of that Party’s policy. Based on this high authority, it publicly establishes a position from which retreat will be difficult.

In general the speech is a continuation of the Communist line since September, 1944: the demand for the end of the Kuomintang one-party rule through the establishment of a coalition government. This is now supplemented by opposition to the convening of the National Congress before the end of the war (on the ground that the Kuomintang would monopolize such a meeting and might use it as an opportunity to declare such opposition groups as the Communists to be rebels).

The tone of Mao’s speech is more restrained than that of some recent Communist statements and there is no personal attack on Chiang (possibly indicating Communist awareness that the violence of the Communist reply to Chiang’s March 1 speech did not make a favorable impression abroad).³⁴ There seems to be an attempt to appeal to liberal groups in Kuomintang China by limiting criticism to the “ruling” and “reactionary” clique of the Kuomintang. Also, care is taken to leave the door ajar (and avoid blame for unwillingness to negotiate) by the statement that the Communists are willing to resume negotiations whenever the Kuomintang “abandons its erroneous policy …³⁵ and consents to democratic reform”. This is, however, qualified by a refusal to listen to “empty talk” (the common Communist characterization of the proposed powerless, consultative “war cabinet” and other Kuomintang offers for which Ambassador Hurley has permitted himself to be the transmitter).

A definite step forward in Communist policy is the proposal to call a conference of “people’s representatives” at Yenan to discuss: (1) unification of action of all liberated areas; (2) leadership of the anti-Japanese democratic movement of the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and the underground in the occupied areas; and (3) promotion of the unity of the entire nation in formation of a coalition government. This is the first public statement of this long considered Communist move. Mao emphasized to me in conversation at the end of March that this body would be consultative only and should not be considered a “government”. But the threat of the possibility of its becoming an independent government is obvious.

Also to be noted are the accusation that the Kuomintang will start civil war when “certain Allied troops have driven the Japanese from certain parts of China” and the reference to General Scobie in Greece. The Communists make no secret of their preparations and determination to attack large Japanese occupied cities, such as Shanghai, which their guerrillas now surround, and expect the Kuomintang to try to involve American forces in its own attempt to gain control of the same cities.

Figures of Communist strength (910,000 regulars, 2,200,000 militia and 95,500,000 population) are a moderate increase over statistics for January and indicate continued active building up of Communist strength.

The fact that the speech does not differ from Mao’s statements made to me in March (reported in my reports nos. 10 and 26 from Yenan³⁶) would seem to indicate that the Communists’ increasingly strong and independent policy has not been favorably influenced by subsequent events: the token representation given the Communists at San Francisco; Ambassador Hurley’s return to China after what the Communists regarded as his threatening press statement on April 2 (in which the Communists considered that he dismissed them as a rebel, armed party and reaffirmed American policy as committed to the support of the Central Government alone); and Ambassador Hurley’s visits to London and Moscow and his subsequent statement of American-British-Russian agreement regarding China.

32. Mr. Service, formerly Second Secretary of Embassy in China on detail to Yenan, had been recalled to the Department.
33. See digest of Yenan broadcast monitored by the Federal Communications Commission, p. 362.
34. For Chiang’s speech see telegram No. 343, March 2, from the Chargé in China, p. 254; for the reply of the Chinese Communists, see memorandum by Mr. Julian R. Friedman of the Division of Chinese Affairs, March 8, p. 265.
35. Omission indicated in the original memorandum.
36. March 13 and April 1, pp. 272 and 310, respectively.