During my sojourn in Yenan I became personally acquainted with Mr. Chen Chia
Kan who was assigned as one of the interpreters to
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the American Military Observers Section. He has acted
as private secretary to Mr. Chou En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the Communist
Party and accompanied him to Chungking at the time of the negotiations
conducted by the Central Government and the Communist Party.
No new light is shed on the Chinese situation by the remarks recorded in the
closed interview. Nevertheless I believe it is of interest to note the
general attitude toward Soviet Russia. Mr. Chen Chia Kan said he could not
conceive of any fundamental conflict arising between Soviet Russia and the
Chinese Communists. He made no criticism of Soviet foreign policy, either in
the past or at present, but took pains, as usual, to point out the
independence of the Chinese Communists in their execution of policy. He
could not imagine a conflict of policy with Russia over Manchuria but
affirmed that the Chinese Communists would never agree to the transfer of
Manchuria or Outer Mongolia to any foreign nation.
After our luncheon together, Mr. Chen Chia Kan introduced me to the Communist
delegate, Mr. Tung Pi Wu. The latter expressed the keenest interest in the
future course of American policy toward China. [Chen] Chia Kan had told me
previously that they hoped during their stay in the United States to get a
clearer picture of what the attitude of the United States toward China was,
and especially to learn whether there was any intention of making landings
on Communist-controlled Chinese coast.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John K. Emmerson,
Foreign Service Officer
[San
Francisco, April 28, 1945.]
I asked Mr. Chen Chia Kan whether he thought the Central Government had
changed its attitude toward meeting the demand of the Communists for a
coalition government since I had seen him in Yenan in January. He
replied in the negative. The Chinese Communist Party will not support
the National Assembly to be convoked in Chungking in November on the
grounds that it is the creation purely of the Kuomintang and will not be
representative of the people of China. However, the policies of the
Communist Party are now being decided in Yenan by the meeting of the
Party which had not concluded when he left China.
The Chinese Communists are not prepared to accept the draft constitution
for China. I asked about the phrase “according to law” which appears to
restrict or nullify the guarantees of freedom of
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speech, religion, etc., considered fundamental in
the American Bill of Eights. A prominent Chinese had explained to me, I
said, that the phrase had been incorrectly translated into English, that
in the original Chinese it did not possess this restrictive meaning.
Chia Kan said that the English translation was correct. He said the
Communist Party opposed Chiang Kai-shek’s principle of “government by
law” as expounded in his Chinds Destiny.
Our conversation then centered on the subjects of Russia and the
differences in Chinese and Russian Communism. Russian policy to him was
clear: Russia was willing to join the world security organization but at
the same time wished to guarantee her own security in her own way.
Chia Kan said, that all Communists accept the same philosophy, the same
doctrines, and the same ultimate goal. They differ, however, in their
policies, and programs. The Chinese Communists are now carrying out the
“New Democracy” which does not follow the Russian system but on the
contrary encourages the institution of private property and private
enterprise. I asked him whether he then saw the likelihood of a conflict
between the policies of the U. S. S. R. and the Chinese Communists. He
replied that he did not believe any fundamental
conflict would ever arise; there might be differences over minor issues
and the application of policies.
I inquired regarding the attitude of the Chinese Communists at the time
of the signing of the German-Russian Non-aggression pact30 and again on the
occasion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.31 He replied
that the Chinese Communist Party had taken the stand that Soviet foreign
relations were Russia’s affair and it was not for the Chinese to blame
another country for its diplomatic acts. The Chinese Communists had
consistently opposed German fascism and Russia’s non-aggression pact did
not change this attitude. In the case of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact, the Chinese Communists did not blame the Soviet Union for this
act. It was obvious that the Russians needed to secure their eastern
front so they could concentrate on the war against Germany. The Chinese
were fighting the Japanese and continued to fight them unrelentingly but
they did not oppose the U. S. S. R. for the policy it had taken.
It is of interest, incidentally, that with reference to the
Soviet-Japanese pact, David J. Dallin in his book Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 1939–1942, remarks: “The
Chinese Communists, fearing treachery on Moscow’s part, never even
referred to it.”
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Chia Kan said he thought there never would arise a conflict over
Manchuria between Russia and China. The position of the Chinese
Communist Party had been made clear repeatedly: all lost territory must
be returned to China, including Manchuria. The Chinese Communists would
never consent to the transfer of Manchuria to Soviet Russia or to any
other country. Furthermore, he stated, the Chinese Communists want Outer
Mongolia to be part of China.
I pointed out that there seemed to be one fundamental conflict in the
application of Communism in Russia and China. The Chinese Communists
opposed a one-party dictatorship and advocated the 3–3 principle, which
meant equal representation for Communists, Kuomintang, and third
parties. Soviet Russia was a government which tolerated only one party.
Chia Kan admitted that this was true and referred again to the “New
Democracy” as the particular policy now being put into effect in
Communist areas in China.
As is usual in conversations on the subject of Russia, Chia Kan stressed
the fact that none of the “Big Three” of the Chinese Communists: Mao
Tze-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai, had been educated in Moscow, and
that the Central Government of China had received far more aid from the
Russians than had the Yenan regime. He knew none of the members of the
Russian delegation to the Security Conference and his group had had no
contact with them. The Chinese Communists wanted friendly relations with
all nations, for example, they hoped for a friendly Japan after the
war.
