Attached is a memorandum of a conversation on this date with a group of
Communist leaders: Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee; Chou
En-lai, second ranking political leader and functioning “Foreign Minister”;
and Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the Communist armies. Tung Pi-wu, the
Communist member of the Chinese delegation to San Francisco, joined the
group near the end of the talk.
General Chou had been informed the evening before of my receipt of orders to
return to Chungking. This talk, which lasted for half the afternoon and
through supper, was obviously intended to give me
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an up-to-date statement of the Communist position and
the line to be taken at the imminent Communist Party Congress.
Three points are new and worth notice.
[Annex]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of
Embassy in China (Service)
I was invited to Mao Tse-tung’s residence at 4 p.m. Chou En-lai and Chu
Teh were already there. There was about half an hour of general
conversation.
All showed interest in the reason for my return to Chungking,
particularly whether it might be for return to the United States—which
presumably might indicate consultation regarding China. (I had received
no indication of the reason for my return.)
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Mao repeated previous hopes that American political observation and
contact with Yenan would be maintained. He expressed that the
developments in China during the coming months would be important and
that the Communists hoped for American understanding from on the spot
contact.
Chou twice made pointed remarks to the effect that it was unfortunate
that I could not stay in Yenan another ten days; that I would find the
stay worthwhile and interesting. (I took this to be a hint that the
Party Congress is to be convened within that time.)
I touched on the military situation. Chu did not consider that the
Japanese had yet shown definite signs of intention to take either Sian
or Hanchung but believed that they will eventually take both cities in
order to push back American airpower and protect their flank and vital
communications for the long fight which (the Communists are sure) the
Japanese are planning to wage in China.
I recalled that when the Japanese campaign in Honan last year seemed to
develop into a threat against Sian, the Communists offered to send
troops to join in its defence. There was some looking from one to the
other. Finally Chu said that the Communist offer last year had been
refused and that the Communists would wait this time to be asked. Pie
did not seem to care to pursue the matter.
Mao then took control of the conversation. He was in exceptionally good
spirits—getting out of his chair to act out dramatic embellishments of
his talk, and diverging to recall amusing anecdotes. Chou occasionally
explained or amplified Mao’s points. Chu sat back, silent and
smiling.
Mao skimmed over the history of the recent fruitless negotiations with
the Kuomintang. He felt that foreigners in general did not yet
understand that the Kuomintang-Communist issue was far more than the
usual bickering and jockeying between two ordinary political parties.
The issues here were basic and vital to China’s future.
He proceeded to devote some time to discussion of recent articles in the
Economist and New York
Herald Tribune, questioning whether they were typical of the
lack of understanding of foreign opinion.
The Economist had suggested that Chiang’s
announcement of the National Congress in November was a clever stroke
because it “stole the Communists’ thunder”, and that the Communists
would make a great mistake if they did not join. Mao pointed out that
the Communists could not join if [it?] even if
they wished; that it was a strictly one-party assembly whose members
were fictitiously elected 9 years ago (since when many have become
puppets) at a time of open civil war by the Kuomintang against the
Communists; that almost two-thirds of the people of China (Japanese
occupied and Communist liberated areas) would not be represented; and
that no real
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democracy could
be expected under these conditions from a party which since Chiang’s
counter-revolution in 1927 had been repressive and anti-democratic. He
vigorously insisted that for the Communists to agree to the calling of
such a false Congress would be to desert all their principles and betray
the people of the liberated areas. It would therefore be a great
mistake. (Much of what Mao said in this connection was repetition of his
remarks in our conversation of March 13, 1945—see my report no. 10 of
that date.)
The Herald Tribune had said that the Communists
had “increased their demands” and become “more unreasonable” because of
Soviet victories and the attention of Americans in, for instance, the
despatch of the Observer Section to Yenan. At great length, Mao argued
the consistency and unchanging character of Communist policy; how even
in the civil war days the Communists were calling for union on the basis
of nation-wide resistance against Japan, the granting of democratic
rights, and the full mobilization of the people; how the United Front
had finally been created in 1936–7 when these promises were given by the
Kuomintang; how the Communists had repeatedly during the war found it
necessary to demand the observance of these principles as essential to
the unification of the country and successful prosecution of the war.
(Interesting confirmation of the validity of this argument can be found
by referring to Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China
in which he records talks with Mao in 1936. The similarity of Communist
objectives then and now is striking.)
As for the effects of Soviet victories and American attention, Mao
humorously recalled the civil war when the slogan was “Kill Chiang
Kai-shek”, the violent recrimination after the New 4th Army Incident
(January, 1941) when the Communists openly defied the Central
Government, and the belligerence created when the Central Government
threatened the Border Region with military force in the summer of 1943.
All of these, he pointed out, were instances of a much stronger
Communist attitude toward Chiang than at present, and all were before
Soviet victories and American attention.
Repeating the unchangeableness of Communist objectives, Mao emphasized
that the Communists had fought for them when weak, few in numbers and
entirely alone, and that they would continue to work toward those
objectives regardless of outside influence, for or against.
In one sense, Mao admitted, the Kuomintang’s complaints are justified.
“Our objectives are unchanged but our voice gets louder as the situation
in China becomes more desperate and more urgent and as more and more of
the people see that we are right. Such complaints by the Kuomintang show
that it is feeling the pressure. Delay, however, will not help it.”
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Mao then proposed to give a brief statement of Communist policies toward
the United States and toward the Kuomintang, from which it could be seen
that they were as consistent and unchanging as the Communist main
objectives.
Communist policy toward the United States is, and will remain, to seek
friendly American support of democracy in China and cooperation in
fighting Japan. But regardless of American action, whether or not they
receive a single gun or bullet, the Communists will continue to offer
and practise cooperation in any manner possible to them. Anything they
can do—such as intelligence, weather reporting and rescue of airman—the
Communists consider an obligation and duty because it helps the Allied
war effort and brings closer the defeat of Japan. If Americans land in
or enter Communist territory, they will find an army and people
thoroughly organized and eager to fight the enemy.
The Communists will continue to seek American friendship and
understanding because it will be needed by China in the post-war period
of reconstruction. (For amplification of this argument, please refer to
Mao’s talk on March 13 reported in my despatch no. 10.)
Whether or not America extends cooperation to the Communists is, of
course, a matter for only America to decide. But the Communists see only
advantages for the United States—in winning the war as rapidly as
possible, in helping the cause of unity and democracy in China, in
promoting healthy economic development of China through
industrialization based on solution of the agrarian problem, and in
winning the undying friendship of the overwhelming majority of China’s
people, the peasants and liberals.
Communist policy toward the Kuomintang will remain on one hand to
criticize and try to stimulate progressive reform; and on the other, to
offer compromise which can be a basis for real unity, democracy and
devotion of the forces of all the country to winning the war. The gist
of this compromise is contained in the Five Points proposed by the
Communists and endorsed by Ambassador Hurley. The compromise must mean
the termination of the dictatorship of the Kuomintang and Chiang
Kai-shek. If Chiang continues as President, he and the military forces
must be responsible to a coalition government including all parties. The
compromise must include recognition of the Communist armies, as part of
the National Army, and of the liberated areas as legitimate local
governments.
This compromise and the coalition government which must be its result
will of course be temporary. It cannot be perfectly democratic because,
with much of the country behind enemy lines or under enemy occupation,
it cannot be completely representative. (Mao divided China as follows:
Chungking areas 190 million, Japanese
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areas 160 million, Communist areas 100 million.)
It will be the best possible government under the existing circumstances
and until it can carry out the transition to full democracy after all of
the country has been recovered.
The Communists do not insist on outright and immediate agreement by
Chiang to a coalition government. They are willing to discuss the matter
and work out details in an inter-party conference. But such a conference
of parties must have authority and be able to make decisions that will
control the government and prepare for the transition to
constitutionalism.
The crux of the problem is that the Kuomintang will not accept any
limitation of its dictatorship and therefore cannot convene a conference
that has authority. Chiang has therefore discarded the proposal of an
inter-party conference in favor of his National Congress.
The calling of the National Congress before the end of the war, before
the legalization of all parties, and before the election of new
delegates by all the people must be opposed uncompromisingly.
Communist opposition will be to refuse to recognize the Congress or
accept its orders. This is the logical course because the people of the
liberated areas will not be represented. Then the next move will be up
to Chiang. “We will not strike the first blow. We will not fire the
first shot.”
“But the Congress as now planned will certainly bring civil war. It will
be the excuse for Chiang to have the opposition declared rebels. If he
is going to continue his bluff, he will (because it is the only means he
knows and understands) try to use force. When attacked we will fight
back. We are not afraid of the outcome because the people are with us.
The Japanese haven’t been able to wipe out the liberated areas. How can
Chiang’s conscript, un-indoctrinated army of unwilling peasants? Chiang
could not whip us during the civil war when we were a hundred times
weaker. What chance has he now? We are not worried about Chiang’s
American arms, because a conscript peasant army will not use them
effectively against their brother conscripts fighting for their homes
and economic and political democracy. What we are worried about is the
cost to China in suffering and loss of life, in destruction of property,
in the delay in rebuilding of the country. China needs peace. But she
needs democracy more, because it is fundamental to peace. And first she
must drive out the Japanese. We think America, too, should be concerned,
because her own interests are involved.”
I asked what the Communists would do if the Kuomintang asked them to
participate in the National Congress by assigning them a number of
seats. Chou immediately and emphatically replied that
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they would refuse. Mao indicated agreement
and Chu nodded. Chou amplified as follows. Communist participation in
the San Francisco delegation cannot be taken as precedent. Nor can
Communist proposals for a coalition government or inter-party
conference. They are arrangements between Parties because it is
impractical to have the people elect their representatives. But a
National Congress to pass a permanent Constitution and set up a fixed
form of Constitutional Government is something entirely different. The
membership of the Congress must be elected freely by the people, not
bargained for or appointed by political parties.
Mao resumed. At present the liberated areas are not recognized by
Chungking. They receive no guidance, help or military supplies although
they are bitterly fighting the enemy in the occupied territory. “They
are children without a mother”. They face many common problems. They
should work and plan together for the most effective prosecution of the
war. The Communists are therefore proposing that the various areas send
representatives to join in forming a “Chinese People’s Liberation Union”
(Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-Fang Lien-Ho Wei-Yuan-Hui). The purposes of
this body will be: to unify the war effort of the people of the
liberated areas, discuss common problems, and make joint plans of action
for the most effective defeat of the enemy; to stimulate and organize
resistance against the Japanese in the occupied areas; and to encourage
the people and Government in the rest of China to greater efforts in
active prosecution of the war.
Mao said with emphasis that this Union would not be a “government” and
that “it would be a mistake to consider it one”. It will not have the
powers or functions of a government, being merely consultative.
Mao avoided being specific regarding the form of organization of the
Union, saying that these details could be worked out later. He also
cautioned that neither the definite decision to form the Union, nor its
exact name, had yet been formally passed by the Communist Party. “But”,
he said with a slight smile, “they probably will be.” (This is not as
undemocratic as it sounds. All the delegates to the Party Congress have
been assembled in Yenan for some time and important meetings and
consultations have been proceeding continuously. It is certain that
agreement on all important matters have already been reached. The actual
meeting of the Congress, therefore, may be little more than the formal
presentation and acceptance of reports, the election of new Committees,
and the passing of already agreed upon resolutions.)
To my question of how soon the Union would be formed, Mao replied that it
would not be for several months. It would take that long for
representatives to arrive from the more distant areas.
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I asked how the delegates to form the Union would be selected. Mao
suggested tentatively that the Peoples Political Councils of each
liberated area would send representatives. He pointed out that these
councils were democratically elected by universal suffrage and
represented all classes and parties.
To my question whether groups other than those in the liberated and
possibly occupied areas would be included, Mao replied that
participation would be open to all groups who wished to join. This, of
course, would include any groups in Kuomintang China. But he did not
see, under present conditions of certain Kuomintang disapproval, how
they could participate directly. “Places”, he said, “would be
saved”.
Mao emphasized that all groups in the liberated areas, and if possible in
occupied areas, would be represented and that the Union would have a
thoroughly United Front character.
I asked whether the proposal for the Union would be dropped if the
Kuomintang agreed to a coalition government. The question was not
directly answered. Mao said that: “There are coalition governments and
coalition governments.” If there was an ideal coalition government, it
might be assumed that the Union would be unnecessary because the
coalition government would take the liberated areas under its wing and
do all possible to help the people of China win their liberation.
J[ohn] S[tewart] S[ervice]
