893.00/3–3145
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 23.]
Sir: The Ambassador has the honor to enclose an English language summary84 of a lecture by V. Avarin delivered on March 14, 1945 at Moscow and entitled, “The Struggle of the Chinese People for Their National Independence.” Avarin is a writer, believed to be specializing in Far Eastern affairs.
Avarin’s comments, while introducing no new element into the pattern of the Russian attitude to China, constituted an authoritative and up-to-date statement of the Soviet position. He condemned “reactionary elements” among the ruling circles, discussed the weakness of the Chinese Army and lauded the 18th Group Army and partisans. The popular demand for democracy, Avarin claimed, had assumed great proportions in China. He clearly implied that the Chinese Government was not representative of nor responsive to the popular will. The breakdown of Government-Communist negotiations was briefly referred to.
The role of the United States in China received comparatively sympathetic treatment from the speaker. He stated that one of the reasons for the recall of General Stilwell was that the Chinese Government was loath to accept the General’s recommendations for a more effective alignment of Chinese military forces and that Stilwell’s recall was instigated by “reactionary” Chinese elements. Avarin pointed out that it would be an error to assume that the Stilwell recall signified a departure from the American policy of attempting to promote Chinese national unity. Ambassador Hurley’s visit to Yenan and his “mediation” in the Government-Communist negotiations were referred to as evidence of continuing American interest in Chinese unity.
Asked what the prospects were for the establishment of a genuinely democratic government in China, Avarin observed that they depended [Page 310] upon the influence of the “reactionary” elements in the Kuomintang and ruling circles. If the Chinese people succeeded in eliminating these forces, the speaker stated, and the progressive elements of the bourgeoisie and ruling classes gained enough influence, a united democratic government might be established.
In response to a question regarding the Soviet attitude toward China, Avarin remarked that the Soviet Government’s policy was based on the Leninist-Stalinist principles of the equality of all peoples. He added that the Soviet people were warmly sympathetic to the Chinese people and their struggle for national liberation and desired to help them in their aspirations.
Comment.
It is perhaps significant that Avarin’s criticism, following the general present line, is directed at the ‘“reactionary” elements in the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang and not against the Government or the Party as a whole. This may indicate that if the Soviet Union has decided on an anti-Chungking and anti-Kuomintang policy, it is not prepared at this juncture to reveal it; or that the Kremlin reckons that the situation in China is still sufficiently fluid to warrant hope for the emergence in China of a “reformed” regime (presumably including the Communists) congenial to the Soviet Union. Supporting the second interpretation is the answer Avarin gave to the question regarding prospects for a genuinely democratic government. If this interpretation is correct, the Kremlin certainly will have no desire, so long as it believes the situation in China remains fluid, to condemn wholesale either the Kuomintang or the present Chinese Government.
- Not printed.↩