Subject: The Views of Mao Tse Tung: America and China.
Attached is a memorandum of a conversation with Mao Tse-tung. I consider this
extensive expression of Chairman Mao’s views as of great importance at this
critical juncture of China’s internal affairs.
I am as convinced as I was during my talks with Mao last year that American
policy is a decisive factor in influencing the actions of the Chinese
Communist Party—as well as those of the Kuomintang. Applied to bring about a
true coalition government, the Communists will be cooperative. But devoted
to support of the Central Government and Chiang, to the exclusion of the
Communists, disunity will be stimulated and the consequences will be
disastrous.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of
Embassy in China (Service)
Mao commenced by asking a number of questions about my recent trip to the
United States. He was interested in American official and public opinion
toward the war in the Far East, toward China generally, and toward the
Chinese Communists particularly.
He then rather mildly observed that America, did not yet have a clear
view of the issues involved in China, that it did not yet fully
understand the Communists, and that although American policy as recently
shown in China was still an enigma, he could not believe that it was
fixed and unchangeable. America would eventually realize that support of
the Central Government alone was not the best way to fight the war, to
speed China’s progress toward democracy, or to ensure post-war stability
in the Far East. “A few months ago”, he said, “we were told that the
Kuomintang and the Communists were only this far apart”. (Holding his
thumb and forefinger about an inch apart.) “Now it is certainly apparent
that we are this far apart”. (Extending the thumb and forefinger in as
broad a V as possible.)
From this introduction, Mao launched into a long discussion which may be
summarized as follows.
Between the people of China and the people of the United States there are
strong ties of sympathy, understanding and mutual interest. Both are
essentially democratic and individualistic. Both are by nature
peace-loving, non-aggressive and non-imperialistic.
China’s greatest post-war need is economic development. She lacks the
capitalistic foundation necessary to carry this out alone. Her own
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living standards are so low
that they cannot be further depressed to provide the needed capital.
America and China complement each other economically: they will not
compete. China does not have the requirements of a heavy industry of
major size. She cannot hope to meet the United States in its highly
specialized manufactures. America needs an export market for her heavy
industry and these specialized manufactures. She also needs an outlet
for capital investment.
China needs to build up light industries to supply her own market and
raise the living standards of her own people. Eventually she can supply
these goods to other countries in the Far East. To help pay for this
foreign trade and investment, she has raw materials and agricultural
products.
America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic
development of China: she is also the only country fully able to
participate.
For all these reasons there must not and cannot be any conflict,
estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and
America.
But the Chinese people are really the rural population, the farmers. Out
of China’s 450 million, they number at least 360 million. The
intellectuals, the civil officials, the merchants, the capitalists are
only a thin crust on top. The peasants are China.
A country of China’s size and backwardness cannot be made over quickly.
China must be predominantly agricultural for a long time to come.
The problems of the Chinese farmer are, therefore, basic to China’s
future. China cannot industrialize successfully except on the basis of
the solution of the agrarian problem, because the farmers must provide
the real market for the products of that industrialization.
We have the example of Japan. She was forced to follow imperialism and
aggression because she sought to industrialize on the basis of a feudal
society. She did not start with the solution of her domestic agrarian
problems.
Wallace52 and other American statesmen and writers (for
instance a recent article by Brooks Atkinson in the New York Times on the “Chinese Farmer”) show a clear
understanding of this fundamental fact about China.
The fundamental demand of the Chinese farmer is freedom from his
feudalism condition of tenantry and dependence on the
landlord–capitalist for credit and purchase of his products. There must
be land reform. And democracy. The farmer must have independence and
power to protect his own interests.
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Neither the farmer nor the Chinese people as a whole are ready for
socialism. They will not be ready for a long time to come. It will be
necessary to go through a long period of private enterprise,
democratically regulated. To talk of immediate socialism is
“counterrevolutionary” because it is impractical and attempts to carry
it out would be self-defeating.
The Kuomintang has no contact with the agrarian masses of the population.
It is the party of the military and landlord groups who govern through a
conservative and unimaginative bureaucracy. It has done nothing, and
will do nothing, fundamental to improve the condition of the farmers, to
carry out real land reform, or to do away with the still existing
remnants of feudalism. It cannot, because to do so would be to attack
the basis of power of its main supporting groups.
Afraid of real democracy, the Kuomintang is forced to be Fascistic. Thus
we have the strange feudal-fascist combination of the present
Kuomintang. This is a background and character from which the Kuomintang
is unable to divorce itself.
Unwilling to solve the agrarian problem and thus raise the living
standards of the farmers as a basis for industrialization, it turns
toward the principle of rigidly planned, State directed and controlled
industrial development. Unable, therefore, to create a solid basis for
power at home or for cooperative and amicable relations with Russia and
other neighbors, it concentrates on “national defense industry” and
engages in the dangerous game of power politics.
The expectation of future conflict, internal and external, is implicit in
these policies. If its policies are persisted in, this expectation of
the Kuomintang is certain to be realized. Under these policies, which
cannot be changed without a revolution within the Party and a whole new
leadership, the Kuomintang cannot solve China’s basic internal problems,
cannot lead the country to full democracy, and cannot be a stabilizing
power in the Far East.
The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is the party of the Chinese peasant. Its program—reduction of
rent and interest, progressive taxation, assistance to production,
promotion of cooperatives, institution of democracy from the very
bottom—is designed to bring about a democratic solution of the peasant’s
problems. On this basis, and with its realization of the necessity of
free capitalistic enterprise based on the unity, not conflict, of all
groups of the people, the Communist Party will be the means of bringing
democracy and sound industrialization to China. These are the only
possible guarantee of peace and stability.
Just as the Chinese farmer cannot be ignored in China’s future, neither
can the Communist Party. The Kuomintang is seeking to
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ignore it. But its guns cannot give it
victory. After all, the great majority of the soldiers, as of the
people, are peasants. We speak for the people of China because we are
for and of the people. And the people know it by our record.
It is to be expected that Chiang will do everything possible to avoid
compromise in which he and the groups supporting him will have to yield
power and give up their dictatorship. But the road he is taking now
leads straight to civil war and the Kuomintang’s eventual suicide.
Chiang’s refusal to permit any real coalition government and his
announced intention of calling the National Congress in November, 1945,
are the indications of his growing desperation. This Congress will be
wholly a Kuomintang creature. Any invitation for a few non-Kuomintang
persons to participate will be insignificant and intended only for
window dressing. The delegates to this Congress were chosen by the
Kuomintang machinery, with only the hollowest pretense of popular
elections, at a time (1936) when there was open civil war between the
Kuomintang and the Communists. Those delegates cannot pretend to
represent the people who have been fighting the Japanese and governing
themselves in the liberated areas for the past seven years. They cannot
even pretend to represent the people of Chungking-controlled China.
The election of Chiang as President and the legalization of his
government as the “democratic government of China” by this assembly of
stooges will be a farce. Such a body is not intended to, and cannot be
expected to, do anything else. But the real danger is that this National
Congress will be used by Chiang as the means for demanding that the
Communists submit to its authority and lay down their arms.
Unrepresented, and with the enemy not yet driven from their soil, the
Communists and people of the occupied areas will refuse these
unreasonable demands. They will then be proclaimed rebels and the stage
for open civil war will be laid.
The danger inherent in this latest tactic of Chiang’s—the determination
to set up constitutional government at once on the basis of the
Kuomintang alone—must be made clear to liberals in China and to China’s
most important friend abroad, the United States. This is the reason for
our present seemingly violent propaganda campaign against Chiang. This
issue is so vital that we have to make as big a noise as possible.
China’s liberals, in and out of the Kuomintang, are numerous and
increasing. They include the Democractic Wing and affiliated groups of
the Kuomintang, the Minor Parties, most of the intellectuals, and many
of the modern capitalists.
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But they cannot overthrow the Party machinery or change the present
reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. They will be powerless to
control the new “constitutionalism” planned by Chiang’s group. Without
the help of American influence, real unity and democracy will have to be
won by a long and bitter struggle.
The only hope for a peaceful transition to constitutionalism that will
democratically include and represent all the country is a coalition
government. Such a coalition government must not wait, for it is also
the only way to unify the country now and make effective China’s war
effort against Japan.
Why does Chiang determine to push through “constitutionalism” now, before
the country is regained from the Japanese and the people of the
liberated areas given a chance to express themselves? Because he knows
that they will not agree. For the occupied countries in Europe, it has
been decided that the definite decision of the form of government is to
wait until the country has been liberated and the people themselves can
decide and choose their own political leadership. This policy is just
and we commend the Allied leaders for adopting it. Why is China an
exception? Shanghai is bigger than Athens, and occupied China a far
larger country than Greece!
America does not realize her influence in China and her ability to shape
events there. Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on American help. If he had
not had American support, he would have either collapsed before now or
been forced to change his policies in order to unify the country and
gain popular support. There is no such thing as America not intervening
in China! You are here, as China’s greatest ally. The fact of your
presence is tremendous.
America’s intentions have been good. We recognized that when Ambassador
Hurley came to Yenan and endorsed our basic five points.53 He could not
have endorsed them unless he knew that President Roosevelt thought
likewise.
We don’t understand why America’s policy seemed to waver after its good
start. Surely Chiang’s motives and devious maneuvers are clear. His
suggestions of “war cabinets” and “inter-Party conferences” did not
solve any basic issues because they had absolutely no power: they were
far short of anything like a coalition government. His proposals of
“reorganizing the Communist armies” and “placing them under American
command” were provocative attempts to create misunderstanding between us
(the Communists) and the Americans. We are glad to accept American
command, as the British have in Europe. But it must be of all Chinese
armies.
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Chiang has tried continually to make it appear that the Communists are to
blame for the failure of the negotiations. He has pulled a very smart
propaganda trick—for foreign consumption—by the promise of immediate
“democracy”, this year, through a false National Congress. We refuse to
believe that Americans are so easily misled.
It is vitally important that America realize that in calling this
Congress, Chiang is playing his “last card”. It will close the door.
Once it has been convened, the die will be cast and compromise
impossible. We will fight if we have to, because we will be fighting not
only for the democratic rights of the 100 million people in the present
liberated areas but for the rest of the masses of China as well.
The National Congress cannot be called while half the country is cut off
or occupied by the enemy and while all parties but the Kuomintang are
denied legality. What the situation requires, and the only thing that
can save it, is a coalition government. We hope that America will use
her influence to help achieve it. Without it, all that America has been
working for will be lost.
J[ohn] S[tewart] S[ervice]
