893.00/3–1245
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent)48
I called on Lieutenant General Wedemeyer this afternoon to discuss certain matters in connection with Embassy personnel on detail to his Headquarters. In connection with the discussion, the question of Communist–Kuomintang relations came up.
General Wedemeyer explained that he was staying out of Chinese politics and that he had directed the officers under him to do likewise. He said, however, that even though he kept to his military job he couldn’t help thinking about some of the political problems.
I told him that it was the military angle of the Kuomintang–Communist relations that was at present of paramount importance. For instance, the question of whether or not Communist troops could be [Page 271] effectively used against the Japanese if they received material aid from us was one which only our military was competent to decide.
General Wedemeyer mentioned Atcheson’s recent telegram from Chungking,49 and expressed surprise that Atcheson had advocated a policy contrary to that of Ambassador Hurley. He said, however, that he was not attempting to judge the merits or demerits of Atcheson’s position. I recalled to General Wedemeyer that Atcheson’s recommendation of material aid to Communist forces was clearly premised on an assumption that they could be effectively used against the Japanese. If Atcheson’s assumption were incorrect, then his recommendation required no further consideration. I added that, whereas the political and military advantage of an agreement between the Government and the Communists along the lines being promoted by Ambassador Hurley were obvious, I could see no political advantage to be gained from aiding the Communists in the absence of Chinese unity.
General Wedemeyer said that the Communists had wanted him to accept command over their troops and to organize and equip those troops to fight the Japanese. He intimated that he did not favor our building up a Communist army in China.
I told General Wedemeyer that our thinking had not gone beyond the point of considering the advisability of using the Communist forces for what they were presently worth (that is, as a guerrilla outfit) and of giving them only such supplies as they would be capable of effectively utilizing as guerrillas, such as demolition material and captured Japanese small-arms.
General Wedemeyer said that he was awaiting a “green light” from the Department as to whether aid to the Communists on the limited scale I had described should be given. I again told General Wedemeyer that the question of whether or not such limited material aid could be effectively used against the Japanese to further our prosecution of the war was one which only our military authorities were in a position to decide and that their decision should be based solely on military considerations. If the answer should be in the negative, then there would be no question actually for the State Department to decide. If the answer were in the affirmative, then the State Department would be faced with the problem of deciding whether the military advantages were or were not out-weighed by possible political disadvantages, such as the effect upon Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government. I told him that I could not predict what the Department’s decision would be, I recalled to General Wedemeyer the statement made by the Acting Secretary in reply to an inquiry made by the Secretaries of War and Navy that, “if operations are [Page 272] undertaken along the China coast it is suggested that our military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese forces which they believe can be effectively employed against the Japanese and that we should at an opportune time so advise the Chinese military authorities” (Memorandum of January 29th50). I said that if a similar inquiry were made with regard to aid to Chinese Communist forces elsewhere, the Department presumably would have to consider its reply in the light of existing circumstances.
General Wedemeyer said that there had been much information coming to him with regard to the Communist forces in north China but that he did not consider any of it of a character to warrant a decision as to whether the Communist guerrillas could prove really useful if supplied with American material. He said that I had put the matter in a new light to him; that he had thought the case rested with the State Department when he had mentioned earlier our giving him a “green light”; and that as it now stood he felt that he should obtain fuller and more reliable information regarding the Communist forces. With this idea in mind he felt that he should personally visit Communist territory upon his return to China.
In conclusion we discussed briefly possible developments in the event Russia came in the war in the Far East. General Wedemeyer seemed convinced that the Russians would work independently with the Chinese Communists, should their line of attack bring them into contact with the Communist forces, irrespective of the military command or political situation in China at the time. I had mentioned, quite apart from our immediate problem of effecting military unity in China, the overriding importance of preventing by positive measures on our part (an over-all American command of Chinese troops, for instance) development of a situation in China that would lead to discord between the Russians and ourselves. (Actually it may be that the only feasible method of preventing such discord will be through direct understanding between us and the U. S. S. R.).