Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:52 p.m.]
401. Thayer69 reports that recent discussions with Tito and his advisers have revealed Partisan concern lest we endeavor to introduce officials into Yugoslavia and to report on political activities who would not be regularly accredited diplomats. It is believed that Tito’s readiness to continue to deal with Subasic is in great part based on assumption that in this manner he can achieve satisfactory recognition by the great powers and that were he to suspect that this would not be forthcoming he might change his outlook on the whole subject. In Thayer’s view Tito might be persuaded to accept provisionally accredited Ambassadors, but considers it doubtful that Tito would accept much less, especially if he thought that the Russians and British would give more.
In short Thayer believes that although recognition is important to Tito, his program is much more so and his present control over the country is sufficiently well established that it is neither necessary nor to his advantage to permit of any relaxation simply for the sake of recognition.70
Sent Department, repeated London for Patterson as 56.
- Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer, Commanding Officer of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito.↩
- In telegram 402, February 2, 1945, from Caserta, the U.S. Political Adviser reported that in a recent speech “Tito stated that he had made considerable concessions in order to demonstrate his readiness to cooperate with genuine Yugoslavs but that he was not prepared to make any more. The Allied Governments had given indication that they approved the agreement and if London Cabinet was not prepared to accept it as it stood, he could do without the Cabinet. Although not opposed to political parties as such, it was his view that the present was not the time for political campaigns but for unity in struggle for national liberation and that, in any event, the former political parties no longer enjoyed support their leaders seemed to assume. . . . He said that genuine democracy prevailed in Yugoslavia and not among the exiles in London … who represented no one but themselves and were forever forming and un-forming governments. He was careful, however, throughout to except such men as Subasic.” (860h.01/2–245)↩