861.24/6–845: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the War Department

M 24603. To Protocol Committee (York): The Ambassador concurs in the following and urges that immediate action be taken.

Since receipt of Soviet list of 28 May stating their requirements for last half of 1945, we have maintained continuous pressure in an effort [Page 1013] to have Soviet authorities justify requests. They have made some attempt to do this in oral discussions, but generally speaking, we have had little success. The climax came this morning with the receipt of a letter, from Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade of which pertinent extracts follow:

“During our last conversations, I gave you detailed explanations regarding the matters connected with our requisition of 28 May 1945 on Lend Lease deliveries for the period from 1 July through 31 December 1945; furthermore, your attention was called to the fact that this requisition is to cover the minimum requirements of the Far East in deliveries of equipment and material necessary in order to meet the urgent needs and to strengthen the defense capabilities of this region and likewise, for undertaking measures connected with the Far East. In particular, I have emphasized more than once that the requisition of 17 October 1944 (Annex III)69 was only an addition to the Fourth Protocol and has never been considered by us fully satisfying the full requirements of the Far East.”

“Communications equipment: There should be no doubt whatsoever that this equipment, as well as all other, is fully for the Far East, and for the undertakings in connection with this region.”

“Taking into consideration the urgent nature of the measures being undertaken in the Far East, the short time of delivery (until the end of this year) and the necessity of avoiding dragging out of deliveries, I shall be grateful to you for the quickest information of your offers in carrying out our requisitions.”

The above comment on communication equipment is typical of comments on other items. From this you may obtain some indication of the difficulty which we are having in changing the Soviets’ point of view and procedure that has been in existence since the inauguration of Lend Lease. Nevertheless, we have ample justification for supporting the purposes for which Annex III and the list of May 28 are intended. If our support is to be effective, it must be accomplished with the minimum delay. We definitely believe that it is to the United States’ interest to make certain that our support is timely and effective even at the risk of supplying the Soviet Union some items over and above the needs which could be fully justified. For this reason, we have selected a list of items from the May 28 list which we know will be required to support the purposes of Annex III, at least in some amount. In most cases, we cannot give full justification for the amounts requested and an effort to force the Soviet authorities to do so would be so time consuming as to destroy the effectiveness of our aid. Factors considered in making up this list and our recommendations are:

(1)
A reduction of the East-bound load on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, as this railroad is the limiting factor in the Far East military effort.
(2)
That no material will be approved unless it can be shipped prior to 1 January 1946.
(3)
That no equipment will be approved unless it can be installed and ready for operation by 1 February 1946.
(4)
That, at an early date, an alternate plan will be made, to become effective if the capacity of the Pacific route is reduced by enemy action, this because the recommended list should then be reduced by the amount of those items then available in Western Russia but which had not been shipped by rail to the Far East because of the limitations of the Trans-Siberian capacity.
(5)
As detailed breakdown of many items is not available, it is assumed that appropriate screening will be done in Washington.
(6)
The supply of raw materials which will be fabricated in the Far East is justified in view of the rail transportation situation.
(7)
Shipments should be scheduled not on an equal monthly basis, but so that for each month the full capacity of the Pacific Fleet is utilized, and shipments of any items advanced to the maximum practicable. The possible interruption of the route makes this imperative. Every effort should be made to fill to capacity all ships available for sailing in July.

It is recommended:

(a)
That the Soviet Purchasing Commission be informed that except as indicated in the following, no item or quantity will be approved without adequate justification.
(b)
That the Soviet Purchasing Commission be informed promptly of the action taken on those items which are approved (and the Military Mission be advised).

The list referred to above and the specific recommendations are contained in M 24602.70

[Deane]
  1. See footnote 59, p. 942.
  2. Dated June 8, not found in Department files, but see footnote 54, p. 1003.