Office of the Historian

861.24/5–1145

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to President Truman 47

Washington, May 11, 1945.

It has been the policy of the United States Government, in view of the outstanding contribution of the U.S.S.R. in the prosecution of the war against Germany, to provide that country with the maximum possible lend-lease assistance in meeting its war needs for military supplies, raw materials, industrial equipment and food.

Commitments of lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R. under the Fourth Protocol expire, with certain exceptions, on June 30, 1945. These commitments are subject to review by this Government in the light of major changes in the war situation.

In order to plan for the continuing provision of lend-lease aid to the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to take into account:

(a)
The end of organized resistance in Europe.
(b)
The fact that the U.S.S.R. has not declared war against Japan.
(c)
The anticipated entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at some future date.

On the basis of these considerations, we wish to make the following recommendations, which are concurred in by the War and Navy Departments and by Ambassador Harriman:

1.
Deliveries of supplies under current lend-lease programs for the U.S.S.R. should be adjusted immediately to take account of the end of organized resistance in Europe. So long as it is anticipated that the U.S.S.R. will enter the war against Japan, it is proposed to continue deliveries under the program in Annex III of the Fourth Protocol which includes military supplies, raw materials, industrial equipment and food to support Soviet military operations in the Pacific theater. Additional supplies now on hand or on order for the U.S.S.R. would also be delivered to the extent that they are necessary to support such military operations. Supplies needed to complete industrial plants already partially made available under previous commitments should be delivered. Other lend-lease supplies now programmed for the U.S.S.R. should be cut off immediately as [Page 1000] far as physically practicable, and such goods and the related shipping tonnage should be diverted to the approved supply programs for Western Europe. Future supply programs for the U.S.S.R. should be designed to meet new military situations as they arise.
2.
Current and future supply programs should be developed, without the conclusion of a Fifth Protocol, on the basis of reasonably adequate information regarding the essentiality of Soviet military supply requirements and in the light of all competing demands for supplies in the changing military situation.

If you approve these recommendations, it is proposed that the attached note be sent to the Soviet Ambassador.48

The above recommendations contemplate that the programs of supplies for the U.S.S.R., because of their military importance, will continue to have the priority ratings given to supplies under the Fourth Protocol and that the Soviet Protocol Committee will continue to have responsibility, to be exercised in accordance with its existing instructions, for the over-all coordination of the Soviet supply program in conformity with policies approved by you.

Joseph C. Grew
[Leo T. Crowley]

  1. This memorandum was approved by Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Clayton.

    In a memorandum of May 11, Mr. Grew recorded a conference with President Truman, attended also by Mr. Crowley, Assistant Secretary of State Clayton, and Charles E. Bohlen. Mr. Grew wrote: “Mr. Clayton presented our proposed Lend-Lease agreement with Soviet Russia, the highlights of which he and Mr. Crowley explained to the President, as well as Mr. Clayton’s testimony before the Senate Committee this afternoon. The President approved and signed the agreement.” See infra. In a memorandum of a telephone conversation prior to the meeting, Mr. Grew indicated that Mr. Crowley told him that “he wanted to be sure that the President thoroughly understands the situation and that he will back us up and will keep everyone else out of it. He stated that he would be having difficulty with the Russians and he did not want them to be running all over town looking for help.” (861.24/5–1145)

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  2. See note dated May 12, below.↩