861.00/11–1545
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 11.]
Sir: I have the honor to comment below on certain manifestations of internal discontent which have been evident in the Soviet Union since the conclusion of the war.
In general, it may be said that this discontent is the product of (a) the economic deterioration and social maladjustments which in any country result from war and invasion and (b) the nature of Soviet bureaucracy.
The enclosures98 to this despatch suggest that the discontent is fairly widespread. For reasons to be discussed at the end of this despatch, it would be an error to deduce from the enclosures that it is also of such general intensity as to jeopardize the stability of the Soviet system. The current dissatisfaction does, nevertheless, probably result in impairment of the morale, efficiency and, consequently, strength of the Soviet Union.
The evidence of discontent may be divided into three categories: (1) that involving demobilized soldiers and sailors and troops transferred back to the Soviet Union from East and Central Europe; (2) that arising in trades union organizations; and (3) that prevailing among the general public.
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Conclusions.
Having viewed in some detail the evidence of discontent in the Soviet Union, an attempt should be made to evaluate this dissatisfaction in broad perspective. Such an evaluation raises and answers the question why Soviet discontent finds expression in resignation rather than revolt.
A number of factors in the Soviet Union nullify whatever impulse there may be to revolt. One is the ubiquitous strength of the Soviet control and repression mechanisms. The group now in power in the Kremlin got there through conspiracy and revolt; they know better than anyone else in the U.S.S.R. the symptoms and course of revolutionary conspiracy. In these circumstances, there is slight chance of serious organized opposition making an appearance, much less surviving. Another factor is the capacity of the Russian masses for long-suffering submission to authority. A third factor is that the people of the U.S.S.R. are now in the Soviet groove. They have lived for 28 years in the Soviet system. They undoubtedly desire modifications within the Soviet system, but few of them can now construct in their thinking a practical alternative philosophy of government. Finally, Soviet propaganda is an omnipresent and powerful pressure in the direction of conformity to and acceptance of the Soviet system.
Realizing all of this, the shrewd, inexorable and pitiless men who rule the Soviet Union can, if they wish, afford to overlook much of the popular discontent. They undoubtedly recognize that discontent means a lowering of morale and, consequently, efficiency. But discontent is not likely to jeopardize the stability of the system unless it becomes so general and intense as to disaffect the personnel of the state control and repression mechanisms.
The rulers of the U.S.S.R. are therefore able to handle (and have generally had to handle, since their advent to power) a wide margin of discontent—perhaps the widest known in any contemporary state. In the vital sphere of state planning—blue-printing the portentous future of the Soviet Union—the breadth of this margin enables the men who rule the U.S.S.R. drastically to limit production of consumer’s goods and in direct ratio, to augment capital and military production and construction. All indications are that this is exactly what is being done—individual wants are being sacrificed to the aggrandizement of the economic-military might of the Soviet Union.
Discontent will therefore probably continue. If it approaches the boiling point of serious disaffection or if efficiency is dangerously impaired, concessions can be made in the form of a slight increase in [Page 918] consumers’ goods. Otherwise, discontent will be allowed to exist as a necessary evil attendant to the realization of towering ambition.
Respectfully yours,
First Secretary of Embassy
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