740.00119 Council/11–545: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:40 p.m.]
11577. Warner96 indicates British official thought is divided on extent to which atomic energy question influences Soviet policy. One school, noting Communist line and recent Moscow radio broadcasts, believes Soviet leaders seriously concerned lest Anglo-Saxons use present monopoly as implied threat behind active policy in eastern Europe. This school believes maintenance of monopoly tends to increase Soviet suspicions of anti-Soviet trend in western countries. Other school, including Warner, holds controversy has little influence on Soviet policy, Soviet leaders knowing Anglo-Saxons have no aggressive intentions and being confident Soviet science can catch up in [Page 915] reasonable time. This does not discount possibility of Soviet feelings that their prestige suffers from exclusion from the secret and consequent anxiety to avoid any sign of weakness in face of it.
No matter how much Communist agitation there may be for sharing secret, Warner does not believe sharing it would have any material influence on Soviet policy. He believes Soviet leaders much more concerned at Anglo-American pressure in eastern Europe, at American unilateral control of Japan and at Anglo-American insistence on broad, rather than Big Three, cooperation. He says he has become increasingly convinced Soviet obstructiveness at Council of Foreign Ministers was not due to any deep change in policy but was tactical and sprang from Molotov’s or Moscow’s surprise at Anglo-American insistence on these points. Reassurance on Anglo-American intentions in eastern Europe, solution of controversy over control of Japan, and reaffirmation of continuing Anglo-American interest in close Big Three as well as broader international cooperation would, he feels, be more effective in promoting Soviet desire to end deadlock.
Reassurance in regard to eastern Europe need not mean relaxation of pressure, which is having effect. Soviet Govt naturally prefers to achieve its ends within sugar coating of eastern and democratic appearances. Attainment of Soviet ends in eastern Europe has lately encountered some difficulties, including decline of prestige in various areas due to gleaning by and conduct of Red troops. In Poland, for example, Soviet Govt is approaching dilemma between using force and yielding ground. Soviets would be most reluctant to resort to force and Warner believes continuation of quiet but firm pressure may well produce effective results.
Sent Dept; repeated to Moscow as 379.
- Christopher Frederick Ashton Warner, Counselor and Superintending Under Secretary of the Southern Department, British Foreign Office.↩