Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

740.00119 Council/10–445: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State ⁵⁸

Moscow, October 4, 1945—7 p.m.
[Received October 5—1:40 a.m.]

3454. Outcome of London Conference⁵⁹ raises several interesting questions with respect to Soviet reaction.

1. First is question of adaptation of general party line and official ideology to new situations. Importance of this to Soviet leaders should never be underrated, for a regime which forbids individuals to formulate their own political thought must itself always have an answer for everything, and entire structure of Soviet power and influence among Communist and Left Wing groups abroad is cemented together principally, and in some cases only, by clarity, consistency and vigor of ideological appeal. Soviet press initially presented results of Conference to Russian public boldly and bluntly, without a single hopeful note, and evidently with a view to creating impression that most of Russia’s reasonable and constructive proposals along lines of international collaboration had met with cold and unfeeling rebuff in London at hands of Western Powers. Molotov’s press interview,⁶⁰ as published here, contained only one hopeful phrase, and served generally to underline to Soviet public that this must be regarded as serious matter, with far-reaching implications. To Soviet man in the street this must come as distinct shock; for prospect of successful collaboration with Western Allies in post-war era has been held out to him ever since Moscow Conference, 2 years ago, as one of main achievements of Soviet leadership, and on these prospects he has been taught to state his hopes for peace and better times. To be sure, he has been warned on many occasions by state propaganda machine that there were dangerous reactionary elements in both England and America lowering background and awaiting opportunity to incite western world to new crusade against Russia. But these were invariably portrayed as minority elements in opposition to majority opinion and to political regimes in power in Western countries. Anglo-American masses and their respective governments were pictured to Soviet citizen as impressed with Soviet achievements and as yearning for benefits of collaboration with USSR. It must now be explained why official representatives of Western Powers should suddenly have dealt rebuff to Soviet aspirations which, as far as Soviet public has been informed, were the essence of reasonableness and progressive idealism. For this, mere personal attacks on Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin⁶¹ will not be enough and it is cardinal Communist dogma that individuals are only agents of social forces, and that their personalties do not determine course of events. It will also not be easy to portray either of these statesmen as the agent of conservative-reactionary elements such as, in this case, the Hearst-McCormick press. Yet it will be impossible to admit that in their attitudes and actions at the London Conference they could have represented majority opinion in their respective countries. Moscow will therefore probably be forced to take position that both the Democratic and the Labor parties contain reactionary wings, to whose intrigues these statesmen have fallen victim. This thesis will suffice for immediate future; and foreign critics of handling of Conference on part of American and British Governments will now no doubt be cited profusely to demonstrate to Soviet reader discontent to [of] the masses in England and America with policies of their Governments. But such tactics must at long last create widespread impression among Soviet public that American and British Governments are no longer representative. This leads directly to general denial of democratic character of Western political life and to re-espousal of original Leninist thesis of spuriousness and viciousness of “capitalist democracy”. And this, in turn, is perilously close to a reversion to entire ideology of “capitalist encirclement” which preceded Russia’s recent gestures toward collaboration with Western Powers and which, if again adopted at this time, would involve a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy and in entire pattern of Russia’s role in future international society.

2. Second question is that of effect of outcome of London Conference on actual Soviet policy. Some fear a general tightening up in treatment of western countries: a sharpening of tone and curtailing of amenities. For this the Soviet Government—perhaps unfortunately for themselves at such a moment—have not left themselves a very large margin; and Moscow diplomats, at least, may take solace from fact that it would require considerable inventiveness to make them much more uncomfortable, officially and personally, than heretofore. More interesting are possibilities for major moves in Soviet policy; and question is being asked, for example, whether negative outcome of Conference will not lead to early unilateral Soviet action against Turkey⁶² or elsewhere. Although it is early to judge, I think this quite unlikely. For the moment Soviet reaction will probably take form of creating maximum trouble for Western governments through groups within their own countries or within countries over which they have control. Sudden flood of complaints at Paris Trade Union Conference about “colonial imperialism” of Western Powers and cracks in Paris Humanité about our fighting together with Japs against natives of Iridochina and China itself are only opening guns in this tactical offensive. Such attacks have thus far been concentrated on policies of Western Powers in Asia; but our actions in Europe will not be forgotten. We must expect concerted efforts to discredit policies of American and British Government at home and abroad, to mobilize public opinion against recent actions of our statesmen and to create situation in which fear of public opinion will cause these statesmen in near future to become more pliable to Soviet purposes. But it is my own belief that Kremlin will think more than once before deciding on any actions or policies which could mean a final break with Western World.

3. This brings us to third question which is possible effect of course and outcome of Conference on inner political situation in Moscow. Kremlin must face fact that if it has not been thrown for a loss, it has at least been stopped without a gain. Its downs are numbered; and such an outcome is equivalent to a reversal: the first serious one suffered by Russians since Moscow Conference inaugurated high level intercourse with Western statesmen. Whether this can pass off without recriminations and a test of strength within Soviet ruling group remains to be seen. This group has now remained in power, practically without alteration in composition or even in incumbency of official position, much longer than the govt of any other great country. It has become dangerously ingrown and remote not only from mass of people but even from [mass of] Communist Party members. Atmosphere of Kremlin today has a definite staleness about it. Meanwhile there are signs of fairly wide popular discontent: Among intelligentsia, who chafe at cultural isolation; among student youth, who suspect that there is a great deal they are not being told; and above all among returning veterans whose horizons have been broadened and appetites whetted by experiences in foreign countries.

This [dis]content is nothing which a well run totalitarian machine (which this one is) should not normally be able to take in its stride but present issue cuts deep. Soviet failure to come to terms with West would not only be direct source of deep disappointment and concern to Soviet public, in which natural liking for US has attained legitimacy for first time in recent wartime associations, but would complicate, insofar as it might affect foreign credits, the formidable economic problems with which regime [is faced.] If anything could test unity of Kremlin, this would be it.

Should ruling group be severely torn at this juncture over broad issues of Soviet foreign policy, much would depend on whether lines of cleavage within Kremlin might happen to coincide with broad lines of popular discontent throughout the country itself. If so, Russian political life could again be shaken to its foundation, as it was during the purges of 1936–37.⁶³ If not, then the most that can be looked for would be change in composition of Political Bureau and a redistribution of Govt posts. A certain shift in Govt jobs is presaged in any case by possibility that elderly Kalinin will be replaced as chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet,⁶⁴ and that Stalin may soon wish to relinquish post of Chairman of Soviet of People’s Commissars which he has held since May 1941. This would, of course, have no bearing on Stalin’s position in party Political Bureau, which is real source and channel of his authority. Whether Molotov’s position will be affected by London Conference remains to be seen. In either case, answer to this last question will be indicative.

Sent to Department as 3454, repeated to London as 493 and Paris as 363.

Kennan

58. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wrote in a personal letter of October 8, 1945, to Mr. Kennan that he had read this telegram with great interest and declared that the “analysis contained therein of Soviet reaction to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the probable effect thereof on future Soviet foreign policy and internal evolution is highly illuminating and contains much food for thought.”
59. For documentation on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in London, September 11–October 2, 1945, see vol. ii, pp. 99 ff.
60. Molotov gave his press interview in London on October 3, 1945. A translation was sent as enclosure 1 in despatch 2168, October 4, from Moscow, not printed.
61. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
62. For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the demands of the Soviet Union for revision of the regime of the Turkish Straits and other matters affecting Turkish-Soviet relations, see vol. viii , first section under Turkey.
63. For reports concerning the arrests and trials of this period, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, index entries under Purges, p. 1030.
64. Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin did resign because of ill health on March 19, 1946; he died on June 3.