Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

811.3361/7–1745: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 17, 1945—3 p.m.
[Received July 18—1:27 a.m.]

2596. Serious difficulties have recently been experienced by our Assistant Naval Attaché²² and officers and crews of American vessels in Murmansk. Three separate incidents have occurred in last 3 months. In all of these incidents the conduct of Soviet authorities has been highhanded and in some cases even offensive and has contrasted markedly with treatment received by our personnel at other ports. Incidents in question are as follows:

1. Alleged firing on balloons by US vessels on May 9. Dept has been apprised of this incident by Soviet Embassy at Washington²³ and will also have noted Dept’s 1248 June 7 and our 2314, June 28 and 2332, June 29.²⁴ Dept will recall that charges advanced by Russians were of slim plausibility and that Soviet authorities were completely noncooperative in assisting our officials to conduct investigation.

2. Incident involving Chief Mate Kenneth Worrell.

As far as Embassy is aware Dept has not yet been informed of this incident. On June 17, Worrell threw a small stock [stick?] of wood at a Soviet worker who in spite of repeated orders to desist was misusing some of the ship’s loading gear. Worker received slight cut on forehead, refused offer of medical assistance on board ship and went ashore at once. Worrell was later induced to come ashore by false pretenses and was detained incommunicado more than 48 hours for questioning. In handling this matter Soviet authorities acted in such a way as to give cause for complaint on our part in a number of respects. Some of these are as follows:

(a) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was badly misinformed by Soviet diplomatic agent concerning seriousness of injury and resulting condition of Soviet worker and misinformation was of a character tending to magnify incident out of all reasonable proportions.

(b) Diplomatic agent insisted that Soviet police authorities had right to board American Govt vessels and to arrest an officer of the ship for an act committed in the course of his official duties.

(c) Worrell was asked to come ashore and visit the militia office “to answer a few questions”. He had no warning that he was to be incarcerated and held incommunicado.

(d) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was not permitted to be present at any of the questioning of Worrell or to visit him in prison.

(e) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was flatly denied access to the police authorities handling the case.

(f) Although diplomatic agent justified police action on theory that court was now operating on peacetime basis, Worrell was brought before a military tribunal.

(g) Diplomatic agent attempted to advance against the vessel charges of “sabotage” which he later admitted were based on ignorant and unsubstantiated rumors.

(h) Our Assistant Naval Attaché was treated by Soviet authorities with unmistakable discourtesy. On June 20 when he requested permission to be present at questioning of Worrell, he was told that he could be received “in a few minutes” by officer in charge of militia. After waiting 1½ hours in outer office he was informed that he could be received neither by that officer nor by any other responsible officer there.

(Some of these points, taken individually, may seem of small importance; but in their aggregate they indicate a provocative and contemptuous attitude on part of Soviet authorities, and in a country as sensitive as this to matters of “face” officers of our Govt stationed in remote cities of Soviet Union need the full support of our Govt for maintenance of their official dignity and prestige if their services are to be effective.)

3. Detaining of vessel Daniel Willard 4 days after she was ready to sail. Under date of June 29 Assistant Naval Attaché telegraphed Naval Attaché²⁵ that Murmansk local militia were threatening to board US vessel to arrest a Navy sentry charged with pointing an unloaded pistol at stevedores who were obviously pilfering cargo. (Witnesses have sworn they saw stevedores putting on new shoes from broken case.) Naval Attaché instructed Assistant Naval Attaché to refuse militia permission to board vessel and arrest sentry but to protest only, without offering physical resistance, if militia forced its way aboard. Assistant Naval Attaché offered to allow sentry to appear at militia headquarters for questioning if assured his return to ship same day. Such assurance was refused by local representatives Soviet Govt. On July 2 Assistant Naval Attaché ordered vessel to sail in accordance with instructions and to pick up cargo in Archangel. Port refused clearance alleging various reasons, all of which proved groundless. Ship finally sailed July 6.

Question now arises what action if any should be taken by Embassy on diplomatic level with respect to these incidents. I understand little if any further shipping is scheduled through port of Murmansk and there is good reason to suspect that much of trouble was due to effort of officious and anti-American diplomatic agent and NKVD officials in background to create conditions which, would hasten expected departure of American Naval representatives from Murmansk. However this may be, I think it undesirable from general standpoint of prestige of our officials in Soviet ports that such behaviour on part of Soviet officials should go unquestioned by our Govt. Unless these troublemakers are made to suffer for trouble they have caused we cannot expect to remain immune from similar difficulties in other ports.

I recommend Embassy be authorized to lodge vigorous protest with Foreign Office over conduct of Murmansk officials in these three cases and to tell Foreign Office that pressure of our wartime responsibilities is such that we cannot afford to have our ships held up and time of our officials taken with annoyances of this sort and that if further difficulties along these lines are experienced in Soviet ports by vessels bringing Lend-Lease supplies to Soviet Union it may be necessary for our representatives in individual cases to suspend automatically further unloading of vessels involved and require them to depart at once in which case unloaded supplies might have to be allocated elsewhere. In particular I think we should voice expectation that Govt vessels will not be boarded by Soviet police authorities on matter involving acts by American personnel committed on board ship, unless possibly in important instances clearly affecting peace of port and then by agreement with American representatives; that no personnel of US armed forces serving on our vessels visiting Soviet ports will be detained by Soviet authorities except by agreement both our representatives; that no US personnel of any sort will be detained incommunicado; and that local official US representatives be permitted to be present at all questioning of US personnel by police authorities.

I see no reason for us to attempt to justify these requirements by reference to principles of international law and usage. It seems to me we are entitled to take position, if pressed, that these are minimum conditions under which we can afford to despatch American Lend-Lease vessels to Soviet ports and that if Soviet authorities are not prepared to cooperate in individual instances in making observance of these conditions possible we will be obliged to go on assumption that their need for the particular supplies in question cannot be urgent.

The above views are my own and have not been passed on by the Ambassador or General Deane neither of whom is at present in Moscow.²⁶ Naval section of Military Mission has seen this message and has itself been in communication with Navy Dept (Office of Naval Operations) on these cases.

Kennan

22. Lt. Col. John M. Maury, naval member of U. S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.
23. aide-mémoire of June 5, p. 860.
24. None printed: the contents of telegrams 2314 and 2332 are summarized in Department’s aide-mémoire of August 1, p. 873.
25. Rear Adm. Houston L. Maples, naval member of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.
26. Ambassador Harriman and Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union, were attending the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference. In telegram 166, July 31, to the Secretary of State at Potsdam, the Department informed Mr. Harriman that “Department [is] taking no action pending your return to Moscow” (811.3361/7–1745).