871.00/11–2645: Telegram
The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 27—3:39 a, m.]
917. From Ethridge. Although I leave here Thursday,27 on the way home, I am sending this telegram at the end of a busy week in Bucharest because of the urgency of the situation. The position of the Western Democracies is disintegrating fast, the Russian position becoming stronger all the time, and unless we can take firm and effective action in Rumania it will soon be too late. We are jeopardizing the confidence of the Rumanian people in our intent and ability to carry out commitments we have made to the world.
[Page 628]During the past week I have talked to almost all the major political figures, including the British and Soviet representatives, the King, leading members of the parties in the Groza coalition govt, leaders of the opposition and numerous persons representing labor and industrial groups. Before leaving today for the provinces for 2 days, I should like to summarize briefly and tentatively for your information my impressions of the Rumanian situation.
Although the pattern of seizure of power is much the same as that I found in Bulgaria there are significant differences. In the first place, there is no political grouping here, such as the Fatherland Front regime of a year ago in Bulgaria, which the Yalta signatories could accept as a common denominator. Secondly, the refusal of Groza last August to resign at the King’s demand has created a constitutional deadlock which is an important contributing factor in the present situation. Both sides profess to be anxious to solve it but in the meantime the governmental situation is approaching the chaotic and some decision must be made. In the third place the question of parliamentary elections is in the discussion stage because the present Govt contends that further preparations are necessary. My own conviction is that the Govt will not go to the people yet because it is not willing to risk itself in a free election and wants more time to consolidate its power.
I am entirely convinced that the Groza govt is in no sense representative under the Yalta formula because the two political groups which have the support of the vast majority of the Rumanian people are not only out of the Govt, but their leaders are being harrassed by the Govt, their political clubs largely taken over, their newspapers entirely suppressed and all public meetings of the opposition barred. The Peasant and Liberal Parties are represented in the Govt by only a few dissident leaders under Soviet control. The Social Democratic Party which participates in the coalition is greatly discontented with the policies of the Govt and claims to be seeking an appropriate time to leave the coalition.
Of the parties composing the Groza coalition only the Socialist Party can be considered substantially independent of direct Russian domination. The Communist Party is almost wholly a Russian creation in contrast with the party in Bulgaria. It is led by persons of non-Rumanian origin, and in[ is] pursuing a policy which has no basis in Rumanian traditions, policies which are daily increasing tension and resistance here. The Plowmans Front and Patriotic Union are new groups created by the Communists to win adherents among peasant and artisan classes. Tatarescu, who seems to be the broker who is selling Rumania out to the Russians, has been so discredited by his [Page 629] past conduct that he is now wholly dependent upon the Russians for protection.
The Socialist Party alone has its roots in Rumanian history and apparently has been gaining popularity during the past years although its leaders admit that constant efforts are made by the Communists to split and weaken it.
The policy pursued by the Groza govt, under close and [apparent omission] direction is calculated only to further Soviet exploitation of the country without regard to the armistice terms and has resulted in a degree of Soviet control beyond anything I found in Bulgaria. That is natural, of course, because Rumania is presently wealthy but the armistice agreement to which Allies subscribed has been circumvented by a series of conventions implementing its terms. Russia already has claimed 700 factories taken over from the Germans, it has a major interest even in banking institutions, it has joint ownership of Rumanian-owned oil, steamship and airline companies and it has so priced the goods which Rumania has to deliver in reparations that Rumania is paying approximately three times what she anticipated when signing the armistice. In addition the presence of more than 600,000 Russian troops who must be fed, clothed and paid largely at Rumania’s expense, constitutes a drain that the country cannot long stand. Five-sevenths of all of current armistice expenditures go to the upkeep of the Russian Army. Outside companies, including those Americans have an interest in, are being squeezed to the point where they will have to get out of the country unless the trend is changed. Given another few months, Russia will have complete economic domination of Rumania and the sort of Govt the country has will make little difference. Groza and Tatarescu are the complete servants of Russia in the delivery of Rumania into the hands of a dictatorship army [which?] certainly is worse by universal agreement than the German occupation.
As for the two major position groups, both barred from public speaking or writing, while anyone may criticize the conservative policies of the Bratianu Liberal Party in the past and the negative maneuvering of Maniu, they personally undoubtedly represent very important elements, if not the absolute majority of democratic Rumanian opinion. Maniu particularly remains the unquestioned symbol of Rumanian democracy and of traditionally Rumanian and democratic feeling and in free elections his party would certainly win the biggest block of seats. Nevertheless, 27 of Maniu’s district leaders have been jailed. Two of Bratianu’s district leaders in Bucharest are in jail and the other two are in hiding. The personal security of the major leaders has not, however, been threatened as yet. There is no terror here in the Bulgarian sense of blood baths, but there is nevertheless great fear, [Page 630] great repression of political opponents, midnight arrests, secret police beatings, disappearances and all of the accoutrements of making people behave your way.
A consequence of the King’s demand that Groza resign last August and his refusal to sign any decree since then or receive any Minister of the Govt has been a further rise in his personal prestige and popularity. He has become the symbol of resistance to the Communists and of Russia. Even Communists have admitted that his great popularity and six of them have said that they hope the Americans would be able to find a solution to the constitutional impasse between the King and the Govt. Of course, they want him to go eventually but they would not dare now to try to dissolve the monarchy. All the Communists who urged me to try to find a settlement to the constitutional impasse intimated strongly that the Russians also desire a settlement. Whether Russia wants a settlement or not Rumanians certainly do. In view of the great prestige of the King, however, it is possible that the Soviet Govt may be willing to make concessions in the political field if it can do so in such a way as to avoid giving the appearance of having acted under Anglo-American pressure. I am seeing Susaikov Wednesday night and he may raise the question. If so, I shall, of course, report it. Communists denied settlement because, even though directed by Russians, many of them are Rumanian in feeling and are getting alarmed at what is happening. Inflation is rising rapidly, transport is breaking down, factories are not able to get raw materials, shut off as they are from outside trade and Russians making such drafts of food that people fear a shortage of major proportions by February.
It is obvious to me that little can be done here except to keep the pressure on to salvage as much as can be saved of Rumanian political and economic independence. The real answer lies, as with Bulgaria, in Russia’s intent and in the American Govt’s efforts to work out all its problems with Russia. Much could be done if we would insist that the Allied Control Commission become a truly tripartite body rather than a Soviet authority as at present with our only role one of constantly futile protest.
I am not recommending a course at this time. Perhaps the conversation with Susaikov will suggest one.
I am only trying now to indicate the urgency of the Rumanian situation and the fact that the country is just being swallowed up economically, that its people are becoming more and more disillusioned, their morale sinking all the time and that continued failure on our part to insist upon the application of our announced principles can only result in their being driven to communism, which is repulsive to them. [Ethridge.]
[Page 631]This is 917. Mr. Ethridge suggests that the Secretary may wish to repeat to Moscow for Harriman.
- November 29. Mr. Ethridge had arrived in Bucharest on October 19.↩