871.01/8–2145: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department

M–1456. During my meeting with the King, referred to in my M–1454 of this date, he gave me the following details on his conference with General Susaikov, which immediately preceded his talk with me:

Susaikov was particularly disturbed by those portions of the King’s appeal which indicated

(a)
That Groza had been called upon to resign, and
(b)
That appeal for assistance had been made to Britain and America as well as to Soviet Russia.

Susaikov pointed out that the King’s request to Groza, followed by Groza’s refusal to resign, had played directly into the hands of Britain and America by making the continuance of the Groza regime appear as a dictatorship. Susaikov stated also that the King should have called him, Susaikov, into consultation before taking any such important step, and that there was no need to call on British and American representatives likewise for assistance. He added that both the Russian Government and he himself as Deputy Chairman of the Control Commission thought very highly of the Groza government. That government had made excellent progress on reparations payments, and on the carrying out of other armistice provisions, had executed needed internal reforms, had accomplished peace treaties with practically all of Rumania’s neighbors, and had entered into beneficial collaboration agreements with Russia. He implied that, compared with these accomplishments, the question of completing peace negotiations with England and America was of secondary importance. Susaikov then stated that 2 courses were now open to the King:

1.
To follow through with his present appeal,
2.
To withdraw his request for Groza’s resignation and call back his appeals to British and American representatives.

He urged the King to consider consequences carefully before continuing further on his present course. The King made no reply.

[Page 579]

The King then proceeded to give me the following brief factual background of events leading up to his request for Groza’s resignation:

Several days ago, his advisers informed him that since the United States Government did not at the inception, and does not now, consider the Groza regime to be able recognized democratic government for Rumania, the Groza government could not properly represent Rumania at the preparatory peace conferences. The King then called in Groza and discussed the matter in detail with him. Groza assured the King that his government was a strong one and that since he could count on full Russian support, his worries in connection with final peace consultations were groundless. Following constitutional procedure, the King then called upon his various advisers and political leaders individually for their opinions. The majority of these opinions were to the effect that the Groza government is not truly democratic and it should be replaced at this time. The King thereupon once more called in Groza, informed him of the opinions he had received, and stated that in view of these opinions and his own personal convictions, he was asking for Groza’s resignation. Groza refused saying that his government is now in a stronger position than ever before and that he is convinced that it is to the best interests of the Rumanian people and of the King himself for the Groza regime to remain as the governing body for Rumania. At the conclusion of this interview, the King addressed himself in turn to the Allied Control Commission Representatives of Russia, America and the United Kingdom in Rumania. His appeals for assistance are set forth in my M–1454 of this date.

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Schuyler
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