740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3–1645: Telegram
The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 16—6:35 p.m.]
193. Rumanian political events of the past 3 weeks placed in relation to the general scheme of events in Rumania since the Soviet armies occupied the country give additional clarity to the definition of present Soviet projects and future plans. (See my telegram No. 128, February 19, 12 p.m.)
In the near future the Groza Cabinet, according to both private and public declarations of several Ministers, will proceed to the (1) expropriation of all estates of farmland in excess of 50 hectares and distribution of expropriated lands to the peasants; (2) strengthening of relations by every means between Rumania and the Soviet Union including a mutual assistance pact; (3) purging from the military and civilian services all non-Democratic (that is non-NDF) elements.
Concurrently it is expected that other forces which were set in motion by the Communists during the tenure of General Radescu will continue their activities unchecked. These forces find expression through (1) vigilance committees which preserve order in place of now inadequate police and gendarmerie; (2) peasant committees that expropriate and distribute land without legal authority and (3) workmen’s committees which demand a voice and sometimes a dominant voice in the management of every industry. The program of these forces as nearly as I have been able to learn is the program of the local Communist Party. It includes a complete Agrarian reform, destruction of the National [Page 515] Peasant and National Liberal Parties, elimination of foreign trade excepting with the Soviet Union, dissolution of the banking institutions and disappearance of the Monarchy.
In Rumania the Soviet Government now can exert pressure as required directly on the government, on the government through the ACC or on the government through the people. Both Groza and Tatarescu personally are so compromised by past activities that they are likely to act as willing servants. Should, however, they rebel it would be a simple matter as Vishinsky told Petrescu only last evening in speaking of Vice President Tatarescu “to uncover the record and act accordingly”. And conditions throughout the country, which are already running toward anarchy, would make it possible at such time: to set up by popular demand a Communist.
The forestalling of such an event is the chief preoccupation of nearly all Rumanian leaders. As an armistice signatory it is our concern too. At one stage it seemed it would be possible for the Rumanians themselves to arrest the communization movement and bring about the moral rehabilitation of the nation. For this they needed a little encouragement from the United Nations such as the granting of co-belligerency, the return of the control of the communication system, and the return of administration direction of the whole country.
The time has now passed when such inducements will prove effective. In fact if forces set in motion can be controlled but if they are it will be through an immediate examination of the situation in Rumania on the highest level among the Allies in the spirit of the published declaration of Yalta such as an examination to be followed at once by a setting up in Rumania of a truly tripartite commission under a revised ACC.
Repeated to Moscow as 53 and Caserta as 34.