740.00119 Control (Rumania)/3–1445: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 15—11:47 a.m.]
756. In accordance with the Department’s 569, March 12, 8 p.m., I have today addressed to Molotov concerning our attitude to the situation in Rumania, a formal note embodying the request set forth in the Department’s message. I am stating in this note that a similar proposal is being made to the British Government.
I believe we should recognize that if we are successful in arranging for such a consultation here that we will face a considered and predetermined policy established not by Molotov alone but by the higher Soviet Governmental and party authorities. This policy is probably in line with their long-range plans established some time ago for the Balkan and eastern European states. The most, therefore, that we can expect, at least in the early stages of the discussions, is a chance to repeat orally and in greater detail the views which have already been set forth to Molotov in my letters and which Berry and General Schuyler have outlined to Soviet officials in Rumania. I recognize that the Rumanian situation is in many ways secondary in importance to Poland and if we come to a point in our relations with the Soviet Government where we feel we must make a major issue I believe that we would be on firmer grounds to do so in connection with [Page 512] Poland. Also, a serious and public issue over Rumania might prejudice our chances of a reasonable settlement regarding Poland. On the other hand, I heartily concur with the Department’s firm position taken in regard to Rumania and agree that we should not give in and not let the situation go by default, but should continue to keep it open and press for a satisfactory solution along the lines the Department has set forth.
Should these consultations materialize, would the Department consider detailing Berry to proceed here to act as my adviser while they are in progress? I think it would be valuable to have someone who has a thorough knowledge of conditions on the spot and who can speak with authority in questions of fact, since the Soviet policy will undoubtedly be founded on the thesis that our information is incorrect.
Sent to Department as 756, repeated to Bucharest as 45 and to London as 118.