The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)
50. The British Government has suggested to the Department that the heads of the British and American Delegations on the ACC should inform Vinogradov19 of the reports which they have received concerning claims of Mrs. Pauker20 and Gheorghiu-Dej21 (reurtels 59 [Page 469] January 23,22 68 January 26,23 78 January 28,24 81 January 3025) to have received Soviet approval of a plan to put a Communist government into power in Bucharest, and should then say:
“As we understand the Soviet Government supports the present Rumanian Government we assume there is no justification for these exaggerated claims made by the Rumanian Communists, but we should be grateful for any information the Head of the Control Commission may be able to give us on this subject.”
The Department is replying to the British proposal that the United States Government does not feel that it would be advisable to participate in such an approach to the Soviet authorities at this time. Information contained in your 81 January 30 on Gheorghiu-Dej’s statement to the King and in your 89 February 126 to the effect that the political crisis has not materialized serve to confirm our opinion that, at least for the present, the matter should be treated as an internal Rumanian affair which does not call for consultation or action on the part of the Allied Control Commission or the Governments represented on it.
The Department would appreciate receiving your observations and recommendations as the situation develops as well as any information you and General Schuyler may obtain from conversations with Rumanian and Soviet officials.
Sent to Bucharest, repeated to Moscow.27
[President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, with their advisers, met in conference at Yalta, February 4–11, 1945. The three leaders agreed upon a “Declaration on Liberated Europe” providing for joint action by the three powers in meeting [Page 470] political and economic problems of liberated Europe, in accordance with democratic principles. For text of the declaration, see item V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, page 971. Regarding the consideration of the declaration at the Conference, see ibid., entries in Index under “Declaration on Liberated Europe,” page 1002. Regarding the consideration of other issues related to Rumania see ibid., entries in Index under “Rumania”, page 1013. For the undated Briefing Book Papers setting forth United States policy and attitudes on various issues related to Rumania, prepared for President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State for use at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference, see ibid., pages 237–238,238–240, and 245–248.]
- Lt. Gen. Vladislav Petrovich Vinogradov, Deputy Chairman (Soviet) of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.↩
- Ana Pauker, leading member of the Rumanian Communist Party.↩
- Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, leading member of the Rumanian Communist Party and Rumanian Minister of Communications.↩
- Not printed; in it the American Representative reported having been informed by the Rumanian Foreign Minister that the Rumanian Communists, acting under instructions brought from Moscow by Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, intended in the next few days to create a political crisis (871.00B/1–2345).↩
- Not printed; it reported that a National Democratic Front (a union of leftwing Rumanian political parties dominated by the Communists) manifesto was expected shortly to call for a change in government (871.00B/1–2645).↩
- Apparent misnumbering; probably a reference to telegram 74, January 28, from Bucharest, which transmitted a summary of the program of the National Democratic Front, the text of which was published on January 28 in the official organ of the Rumanian Communist Party, Scanteia (871.00B/1–2845).↩
- Not printed; in it the American Representative reported having been informed by Marshal of the Court Negel that Gheorghiu-Dej on his return from Moscow was received by the King to whom he stated his “impression”, gained in Moscow, that a leftist government would be more successful in securing for Rumania: 1) cobelligerency status; 2) return of Rumanian prisoners of war; 3) northern Transylvania; and 4) economic assistance (871.00B/1–3045).↩
- Not printed; it reported that the threatened political crisis had not materialized and concluded “apparently … the Communists decided that they were too weak at this time to force out the Radescu government and replace it by one of their own making.” (871.00B/2–145)↩
- Repeated to Moscow as telegram 231.↩