860C.51/11–3045: Telegram
The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 1—2:15 p.m.]
618. Deptel No. 263 of Nov. 9, 7 p.m. I informed Marshal Zymierski99 Nov 29 regarding our inability to furnish credits for Polish Army. He expressed great disappointment.
Emphasizing I was speaking personally and not on behalf of my Govt., I expressed opinion that activities of secret police causing many arrests and much terror and even affecting American citizens might have had unfavorable effect on US Govt. I said that once it became known in the US that political arrests are as general as they are in Poland today prestige of Polish Govt would undoubtedly be adversely affected. Stating that I had previously brought this condition to the attention of President Bierut I expressed hope that Marshal Zymierski would do all in his power to put an end to present practices which are abhorrent to democratic people.
Marshal admitted to me that many arrests by security police had taken place. He mentioned recent unpleasant meeting between him and Radkiewicz, Minister of Security, when Marshal (although Vice [Page 424] President and Minister of National Defense) had called on latter. Marshal said that police had arrested cousin of his wife and that he was naturally furious. He admitted furthermore that because of suspicion that General Anders2 had sent a courier to a certain house the whole house had been surrounded and that his wife’s cousin although innocent had been one of those apprehended. Marshal said that cases like this must continue as long as Anders supported by Brit was encouraging armed rebellion in Poland against the Govt.
I quickly replied that British Govt like American Govt is wholeheartedly opposed to any armed rebellion and that both Bentinck and I had made this very clear in connection with insinuations which had been made to us inviting our encouragement.
Zymierski said that there are two sides to the picture: (1) the side which I see regarding arrests which he regretted but which he thought might be necessary and (2) the attempt of Anders to destroy discipline in the Polish Army (he cited case of Polish officer refusing to obey commands to place wreaths on tombs of Soviet soldiers on All Saints Day and acts of Polish soldiers desecrating graves of Russian soldiers).
He then launched bitter attack against British policy in not relieving Anders of his command but rather of increasing his prestige by permitting Polish troops proceeding to Palestine for political reasons to fight for the Arabs against the Jews. Zymierski said that if Polish troops had been brigaded with British he would have no objection but as they were under a Polish flag he felt that Polish Govt recognized by British should be consulted.
He said that General Modelski3 had proceeded to London to negotiate with British Under Secretary of War for return of Polish troops, that latter had pounded table and had told Modelski that the British Govt could insist on certain points and that there was no use arguing about it. Zymierski then ordered Modelski to return to Warsaw immediately.4 Marshal said he could not understand unfriendly attitude [Page 425] of British Govt regarding repatriation Polish Army. He said that he was especially annoyed that the thirteen to fourteen thousand Polish troops now returning from Italy of which one thousand have already arrived at Katowice have come with very few officers. I suggested that perhaps officers might not be inclined to return. Marshal retorted that desire not to return was due to British and Anders’ propaganda. He cited Anders as dictator controlling even civilian functions such as education of families of Polish Army abroad and imprisonment of officers and men holding divergent political views.
Although extremely bitter to Britain he appeared most friendly to US mentioning telegram of congratulations to General Eisenhower on his appointment as Chief of Staff5 and expressing hope that American Army officers would act as instructors in Polish military schools.
Zymierski promised to furnish me information justifying arrests of groups which he said were endeavoring to overthrow regime and he indicated despite disappointing news which I gave him regarding credits for Army utmost cooperation.6
- Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski, Minister of National Defense and Vice-President of the Presidium of the Polish National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government.↩
- Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders, Commander, II Polish Corps, in Italy.↩
- Lt. Gen. Izydor Modelski, head of the Polish Military Mission which arrived in London in mid-October 1945 to take up with the British Government the question of the repatriation of Polish troops in England.↩
- General Modelski and the Polish Military Mission returned to Warsaw in mid-November 1945. According to report of the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, in his telegram 11732, November 8, 2 p.m., the British-Polish negotiations on the question of repatriation of Polish troops in England had deadlocked because the Polish Military Mission refused to accept the principle that all Polish soldiers expressing the wish to return home should be transported to Poland. The Polish officials insisted on selecting a limited number of “technicians” who were urgently needed in Poland and leaving the question of the repatriation of others to be determined at some later time. (860C.20/11–845)↩
- General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower became Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, November 20, 1945.↩
- Telegram 648, December 7, from Warsaw, reported that Rola-Zymierski had on December 5 again expressed his disappointment over the American refusal to extend credit for the purchase of uniforms, overcoats, and shoes for the Polish Army. The Marshal said he wished equipment for 50,000 and not for 350,000 as he first requested. Ambassador Lane reaffirmed that if Rola-Zymierski could put an end to the activities of the security police, American authorities would be willing to consider the Polish request in a much more favorable light. (860C.51/12–745)↩