Subject: Swedish proposal to alleviate Norwegian distress caused by the
Germans.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy advise the Secretary of State in the sense of the
letter attached. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in
the present instance military considerations are of greatest importance
and the attached reply has been written from this standpoint.
[Annex]
Draft Reply to the Secretary of State From the
Secretaries of War and the Navy
In the light of the complete review contained in your letter of 22
December 1944,5 the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have at our request not only reexamined the
proposals in connection with your memorandum of 22 November
19446 for the introduction of relief supplies behind
German lines in Norway, but have also reexamined the entire question
[Page 27] of movement of relief
supplies behind and through the blockade in the light of the changes
in the strategic and logistic situation which have come about since
the first proposals of nearly a year ago. It is understood from your
letter, dated 22 December 1944, that neither this Government nor the
British Government is committed to the relief program recommended by
the Joint Anglo-American Relief Committee, but that the
conversations that have taken place have been exploratory rather
than definitive.
As you are aware, the feeding of civil populations behind our own
lines is an increasingly heavy burden on our logistical and
administrative facilities. The shortages of shipping, transport of
all kinds, and port facilities during the past year have served to
increase this burden. In certain critical categories of the basic
items such as food and clothing, not only are we unable to discharge
completely our obligations to civilians behind our lines but we are
experiencing great difficulty in supplying the needs of our own
combat forces. There is possibility that the enemy may withdraw from
certain areas that they now occupy (e.g. northern Italy) in which
case we are committed to shoulder an even greater burden. In
defending War Department requests for appropriations for the purpose
of civil relief before the Congress, the following statement was
made:
“One of these objectives is to secure the civilian
populations to the maximum extent possible, which is an
obligation under international law; and second, to see that
the civilian populations do not interfere with military
operations in any important particular; and that they are so
treated that they will be able to assist the forward
movement of our troops to the greatest extent possible. That
is the beginning and the end of our involvement in this
business.”
It has been recognized that these civilian relief
operations in many cases must extend beyond immediate combat areas
and direct lines of communication.
On the German side, we have no reason to believe that this burden is
less onerous or that the objectives of civil relief are for them
militarily any less desirable. Present indications are that food is
becoming a critical item in Germany. If we discharge this obligation
of our enemies the net effect will be to relieve their economy and
thus aid their war production. If the premise is accepted that
relief feeding on our side is a matter of operational necessity then
relief feeding by us on the German side is counter-operational, and
to that extent may prolong an already bitter campaign of unknown
duration. With regard to this phase of the question, little
distinction can be made between relief shipments behind the blockade
and shipments through the blockade.
The Germans have in the last year suffered the loss of several food
[Page 28] producing areas and
there is other evidence of food shortages. This critical period in
German food supply makes suspect the worth of German promises coming
from a nation wherein every resource is dedicated to the purposes of
war.
Even if only ships now in the Baltic were used with “fuel from
Western Hemisphere sources” to be furnished at “designated points of
origin,” and even if our own already strained supply and manpower
situation would permit, Allied port and transport facilities would
be interfered with in any plan of relief offered.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised us that, for the above
reasons, they consider that there is a military interest in relief
shipments behind or through the blockade and that they are
constrained, in the light of the present strategic and logistic
situation, to reaffirm the statements in their letter of 2 December
19447 both as
to the proposal to forward relief supplies to northern Norway and
any similar proposals which may follow. With reference to the
understanding set forth in the last paragraph of your letter, dated
22 December 1944, they are of the opinion that the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the details of any relief plans of this
nature, should be considered before committing the Government.
We are in agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any stop-gap
or interim measures for temporary relief which may prolong the war
and increase loss of life and property in battle cannot be supported
on military considerations. In our opinion the greatest aid that can
be given to distressed countries is to liberate them at the earliest
possible moment.
