Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.00/6–445: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

London, 4 June 1945.

73. Following is text of message prepared in the Foreign Office referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:

1. Following are M. Mikolajzcyk’s views on new proposals as expressed to us on June 2nd.

2.

• (a) M. M. and M. Stanczyk would be prepared to accept invitation to participate in discussions in Moscow on sole condition that invitation is issued by the Commission of Three in conformity with the Crimea decision.
• (b) M. M. points out however that the list of candidates for the discussions now proposed excludes any representation of the Christian Labour Party and the National Democratic Party altogether. He considers representation of the Christian Labour Party most important, since although a progressive party it represents the religious elements: If it were excluded conversations could not be considered really representative of popular opinion in Poland, which would thus be split. M. M. does not believe that there will be real difficulty in persuading the Russians or Lublin to accept M. Popiel the Christian Labour Leader in this country and the Reverend Piwowarczyk, a progressive and representative priest for Cracow, as representative of the party at the conversation. M. M. urged that a strong effort should be made to secure Russian agreement on this point although he did not make it actually a condition of his own acceptance.
• (c) M. Grabski is very ill and beside M. M., M. Stanczyk should therefore be invited from London. M. Kolodzie, who was leader of the Polish Seamen’s Union here but was expelled from posts after declaring himself in favour of Lublin, represents nobody, according to M. M.: But latter does not object to his being invited.
• (d) Of candidates from inside Poland M. Witos cannot of course be excluded and therefore Archbishop Sapieha who otherwise would be suitable, must be dropped. M. M. said that of remainder only M. Zulawski is a real party representative: Others suggested are however distinguished figures and can be accepted.
• (e) M. M. stated that M. Trampczynski, venerable and highly respected National Democrat in Poland, has recently been allowed to give an interview to the Lublin Press Agency which has been published in spite of the fact that it expressed some criticism of the present administration. In these circumstances, M. M. thinks it quite possible that he would be accepted by Lublin and by the Russians as a candidate for the conversations, thus securing representation for the National Democrat Party, which would otherwise be unrepresented. M. M. would be much in favour of this being suggested.
• (f) M. M. assumes that all those participating in the conversations in Moscow would be guaranteed: (1) Freedom of movement and discussion during the conversations and (2) Freedom from arrest and from interference during and after the conversations, including the right to go wherever they wish outside Russia and Poland when the conversations in Moscow are over. M. M. would like this to be agreed by the Russians.
• (g) As regards the arrested party leaders, M. M. would not wish to await their release, but he considers their release absolutely necessary in order to create appropriate conditions for the conversations and he points out that it would not be sufficient that Stalin should agree to Mr. Hopkins’ request that they should be granted an amnesty, since the Russian interpret an amnesty as not excluding detention and isolation. M. M. said that in negotiating the Stalin–Sikorski agreement,⁷⁸ the Russians insisted on the use of the term amnesty for the Poles in Russia and consequently large numbers of them were kept in isolation and not released.

3. M. M. made it plain that, while he felt bound to accept the invitation to Moscow, subject to the single condition of its being issued by the Commission of Three he was not hopeful of the result. He thought that the Russians under pressure were merely giving way as regards the conversations knowing that the subsequent step, the formation of a government, was the only point that really mattered.

4. We have now heard from the U. S. Chargé d’Affaires to Polish Government that M. Mikolajczyk expressed very similar views to him.⁷⁹ Only differences of any importance were:

(1) In reply to question, M. Mikolajczyk definitely expressed concurrence in proposed list of candidates for conversations:

(2) As regards (d) above, M. Mikolajczyk only said that M. Witos would be preferable to Archbishop Sapieha:

(3) M. Mikolajczyk did not mention M. Trampczynski to U. S. Chargé d’Affaires at all:

(4) As regards (f) above, M. Mikolajczyk merely said that he assumed all the Poles invited would be allowed to meet freely and discuss among themselves without restrictions:

(5) As regards (g) above, M. Mikolajczyk said that he hoped that by the time the conversations in Moscow took place, the majority at least of the arrested leaders would have been released and proceeded to make and emphasise the point about an amnesty, as he did to us.

5. M. Mikolajczyk’s points under paragraph 2 (a)–(g) above all seem to us reasonable. As regards (a) it is no doubt intention that the invitation should be issued by the Commission of Three. We hope that President Truman will be ready to instruct Mr. Hopkins to try to secure Russian acceptance of Christian Labour Party and National Democrat Party representatives mentioned under (b) and (e). While it is not essential that all four parties should be represented at the conversations, it would clearly make far better impression on Poles generally and on world opinion, if they were. While attitude of extreme Nationalist Right Wing of National Democrat Party makes its exclusion excusable, exclusion of Christian Labour Party and thus of direct representation of very important religious element would be really unfortunate. As regards (f) above it will be remembered that early in discussions of Commission of Three M. Molotov treated it as a matter of course that participants in conversations should be free from restrictions, so this point should present no difficulty: But having regard to the arrest of the 15 political leaders and Russian attitude of Poles generally we feel that M. Mikolajczyk is entitled to be reassured on this point. We agree with M. Mikolajczyk in attaching importance to (g).

6. While in no way minimising the value of Mr. Hopkins’ admirable work or importance of resolving the deadlock with the Russians and of getting them back to basis of Crimea agreement, we cannot but agree with M. Mikolajczyk that Russian agreement to opening of conversations before the Commission of Three (which should have taken place over 3 months ago) will represent no real advance in Polish question if the Soviet Government do not allow these conversations to result in formation of a government in which non-Lublin elements are adequately represented and can exercise real influence and which can ensure conditions for election on proper basis. We should not disguise from ourselves that we shall have to keep up pressure on the Russians to secure these real results and it would no doubt be a tactical mistake vis-à-vis the Russians and of world opinion, when the news comes out, to give the impression publicly that the Polish question is solved. We propose to take the line here of guarded satisfaction that the present deadlock has been resolved, but to point out that this is only the first, long delayed step, towards tackling the problem of forming a new Polish Government in accordance with Crimea agreement.

78. Presumably, the reference here is to the agreement for mutual aid between Poland and the Soviet Union, signed at London on July 30, 1941, with a protocol. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 869. See also telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 243. The wording of the secret protocol to this treaty is printed ibid., p. 244, footnote 92. This agreement was signed by General Wladyslaw Sikorski, then Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, and Ivan Mihailovich Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom; it was not signed by Stalin. Stalin and Sikorsky did sign the declaration of the Governments of the Soviet Union and Poland concerning friendship and mutual assistance in Moscow on December 4, 1941, but that declaration made no reference to amnesty.
79. Regarding the conversation between Mikolajczyk and Mr. Schoenfeld, see telegram Poles 62, June 2, 6 p.m., from London, p. 316.