860C.01/6–345: Telegram
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser to President Truman, to the President
031100. At Stalin’s dinner on Friday night,72 I took the occasion to talk to him privately. I again impressed on him as earnestly as I could the unfavorable effect produced in America by the detaining of the 14 [16] political leaders within Poland. I specifically exempted from the discussion anyone charged with killing Russians and confined my discussion to those who were charged only with possession of illegal radio transmitters. I told him that I believed we would have no insurmountable difficulties with getting the list of names approved for the group to consult with the Moscow Commission if these men could be released. I made it perfectly clear to him that, while we knew nothing of the merits of the case based on our own investigation, the offenses apparently seemed far more serious to the Soviets than they did to us. I made it clear that public opinion in America considered that these men were arrested for political purposes and took the occasion to tell him that I shared that view.
I told him further that if this preliminary consultation was not settled prior to your meeting in Berlin it would stir up endless trouble and probably take most of the time of the Berlin meeting.
I told him that our fundamental interest was in a good working relationship with the Soviet Union after the war and reminded him that he and his representatives had repeatedly stated that they wished to have a close and friendly relationship not only with us but with all the peace loving nations. I finally told him that he must believe me when I stated that our whole relationship was threatened by the impasse over Poland. I stated, however, that Poland was only a symbol and that the United States had appropriate interest in all countries in this part of the world. I suggested that he release these particular prisoners outright and that he find a way to do it that would clearly indicate his desire to meet us part way.
Stalin said that he was unwilling to order these particular Poles released. He claimed that he had information in regard to these prisoners which was not available to us and stated that all of them were engaged in “diversionist” activities. He said he believed that the United States Government had been misinformed in regard to the facts and that the statements of the Polish London Government were inaccurate. Nevertheless, Stalin said that he believed me when I told him this matter was having an unfavorable effect on public opinion [Page 319] in America and he assumed the same was true in Great Britain. And therefore he was inclined to do whatever he could to make it easy for Churchill to get out of a bad situation. But he insisted that the men must be tried, though he stated they would be treated leniently.
I told him that I regretted his decision to try these particular prisoners and asked him, if he was determined to do so, when the trials would be held, reminding him that so long as this was hanging in the air it was bound to create friction between all of us. He replied that he did not know about the timing of the trials but that he would find out and let me know.
He listened very attentively to everything that I had to say and I gained the impression that he is going to consider the move which the Soviet Union will make and that I would hear from him at an early date. While he at no time retreated from his position that he intended to try these prisoners, I gained the impression that he wanted time to discuss the matter with his associates. At noon, Moscow time, Sunday73 I have not yet heard from him.
In discussing the list of names for consultation he volunteered the information that he would not insist upon Kolodzei, Communist Polish sympathizer in London, providing the British objected and that he would be ready to consider another name.
- For Mr. Hopkins’ memorandum of his conversation with Marshal Stalin at a private dinner at the Kremlin on June 1, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. i, p. 57.↩
- June 3.↩