Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

740.00119 Potsdam/6–645

Memorandum of the Fourth Hopkins–Stalin Conversation at the Kremlin, May 30, 1945, 6 p.m.⁵³

May 30, 1945, 6 p.m.

[Extracts]

Present:	Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
	Ambassador W. A. Harriman
	Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
	Marshal Stalin
	Mr. V. M. Molotov
	Mr. Pavlov54

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mr. Hopkins then said he would like to continue the discussion on Poland. He said first of all he would like to make a general observation. Historically speaking the people of Russia and, since the revolution, the people of the Soviet Union, had distrusted successive Polish Governments and to some extent the Polish people. Likewise, for many years the Polish people had feared Russia and since the revolution the Soviet Union. He said that [at] their first meeting he had indicated to Marshal Stalin as clearly as he could that the United States was not only not interested in the establishment of a cordon sanitaire around Russia but on the contrary was aggressively opposed to it; that the United States had no economic interests of substantial importance in Poland and that we believed that the United States, the Soviet Union and England in working together to help create a new Polish state that would be friendly to Russia could have an immense moral and political effect in the task of bringing about genuine Polish-Soviet friendship. He said that the Soviet Union alone working directly with Poland would find this a more difficult task and in those circumstances Poland might remain a troublesome and even threatening area for Russia. However, if the three nations genuinely get together and are associated with the creation of a new Polish state we believe that would have a most helpful effect in the establishment of a friendly and independent Poland which would be genuinely friendly to the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin said he agreed. That there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Government to exclude her Allies England and America from participation in the solution of this problem.

Mr. Hopkins inquired if the Marshal believed it would be a fact that the United States and British participation would be helpful.

Marshal Stalin said that undoubtedly the solution would carry more weight if it was tripartite.

Mr. Hopkins said he would like to accent once again the reasons for our concern in regard to Poland, and indeed, in regard to other countries which were geographically far from our borders. He said there were certain fundamental rights which, when impinged upon or denied caused concern in the United States. These were cardinal elements which must be present if a parliamentary system is to be established and maintained. He said for example:

(1) There must be the right of freedom of speech so that people could say what they wanted to, right of assembly, right of movement and the right to worship at any church that they desired;

(2) All political parties except the fascist party and fascist elements who represented or could represent democratic governments should be permitted the free use, without distinction, of the press, radio, meetings and other facilities of political expression;

(3) All citizens should have the right of public trial, defense by counsel of their own choosing, and the right of habeas corpus.

He concluded that if we could find a meeting of minds in regard to these general principles which would be the basis for future free elections then he was sure we could find ways and means to agree on procedures to carry them into effect. He then asked the Marshal if he would care to comment in a general sense or more specifically in regard to the general observations he had made concerning the fundamentals of a new Polish state.

Marshal Stalin replied that these principles of democracy are well known and would find no objection on the part of the Soviet Government. He was sure that the Polish Government, which in its declaration had outlined just such principles, would not only not oppose them but would welcome them. He said, however, that in regard to the specific freedoms mentioned by Mr. Hopkins, they could only be applied in full in peace time, and even then with certain limitations. He said for example the fascist party, whose intention it was to overthrow democratic governments, could not be permitted to enjoy to the full extent these freedoms. He said secondly there were the limitations imposed by war. All states when they were threatened by war on [and?] their frontiers were not secure had found it necessary to introduce certain restrictions. This had been done in England, France, the Soviet Union and elsewhere and perhaps to a lesser extent in the United States which was protected by wide oceans. It is for these reasons that only in time of peace could considerations be given to the full application of these freedoms. For example he said that in time of war no state will allow the free unrestricted use of radio transmitters which could be used to convey information to the enemy. With reference to freedom of speech certain restrictions had to be imposed for military security. As to arrest, in England during the war individuals dangerous to the state had been arrested and tried in secret; these restrictions had been somewhat released [relaxed?] but not entirely repealed in England since the war in the Pacific was still going on.

He said, therefore, to sum up: (1) during time of war these political freedoms could not be enjoyed to the full extent, and (2) nor could they apply without reservations to fascist parties trying to overthrow the government.

Marshal Stalin continued that he wished to give a few examples from Russian history. He said that at the time of the revolution the Russian communist party had proclaimed the right of freedom of religion as one of the points of their program. The Russian Patriarch and the entire then existing church had declared the Soviet Government an anathema and had called on all church members not to pay taxes nor to obey the call to the Red Army but to resist mobilization, not to work, etc. He said what could the Soviet Government do but to in fact declare war on the church which assumed that attitude. He added that the present war had wiped out this antagonism and that now the freedom of religion, as promised, could be granted to the church.

Mr. Hopkins said he thoroughly understood the Marshal’s opinions. He added that when he had left the Crimea Conference President Roosevelt had thought the Polish matter was virtually settled. He had been relaxed and pleased over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said he and all the other American representatives thought the same and felt that in very short time Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr would be able to carry out the Crimea Decision. Since that time he had been sick and out of touch with Washington and had only followed events from the press and from personal letters which he had received from time to time. He must confess that he had been bewildered and disturbed that one thing after another seemed to occur to prevent the carrying out of the decision which all had thought was clear and sure. He said that if, with his knowledge, he had been bewildered as to the real reason for this it was easy to imagine how bewildered and concerned the masses of people in the United States were over the situation. Mr. Hopkins said that he must say that rightly or wrongly there was a strong feeling among the American people that the Soviet Union wished to dominate Poland. He added that was not his point of view but it was widely held in the United States and that friends of international collaboration were wondering how it would be possible to work things out with the Soviet Union if we could not agree on the Polish question. Mr. Hopkins added that for himself he felt very strongly that if we could find a meeting of the minds on the substance of what we wished to see in the new Polish state we should be able to overcome the difficulties. He himself had had difficulty in understanding the immediate causes of disagreement, namely interpretation of wording such as the role of the existing government in the future Provisional Government of Poland. He concluded that he felt that the three great powers should in a short time be able to settle this matter.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was true but it was necessary for all three Governments genuinely to wish to settle this matter. If one of them secretly did not wish to see it settled then the difficulties were real.

Mr. Hopkins replied that as far as the United States Government was concerned we had no interest in seeing anyone connected with the present Polish Government in London involved in the new Provisional Government of Poland and he did not personally believe that the British had any such idea.

Marshal Stalin replied that nevertheless a representative of the London Government had been suggested by the British and American Governments. He had in mind a representative of the London Government in Poland who was involved in the illegal internal administration of Poland.

Ambassador Harriman said that no name from the London Government had been at any time suggested.

Marshal Stalin replied that he must state that the facts were different since Jankowski had been mentioned and that he was not only Deputy Prime Minister of the present Polish Government but also head of the illegal internal administration in Poland which took its orders from the London Government. He said Jankowski was also connected with the Polish Home Army headed by General Okulicki who had been involved in Axis sabotage against the Red Army. He added that furthermore Jankowski shared the views of the present Polish Government, namely that the Crimea Decision represented another partition of Poland.

After some discussion with Ambassador Harriman on this subject Marshal Stalin said it was possible that Ambassador Harriman did not know of Jankowski’s connections with Okulicki but that the Soviet Government did.

Mr. Hopkins said he wished to state here and now that the United States did not desire to have involved in the execution of the Crimea Decision any present agents of the London Government, whether in Poland or without.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was very good news.

Mr. Hopkins continued that he knew that [what?] President Roosevelt had in mind and that President Truman has in mind no attempts on the part of our Government to suggest anyone even for consultation who is against the Crimea Decision. He said, furthermore, lie knew that President Roosevelt and now President Truman had always anticipated that the members of the present Warsaw regime would constitute a majority of the new Polish Provisional Government. He said he wished to state that without equivocation. He said he feared Marshal Stalin had obtained the impression that we and the British were attempting to get people in for consultation who were known to be hostile to the Soviet Union. Nothing could be farther from our thoughts and if there were any names on the list submitted who were known to be agents of the present Polish Government and who were hostile to the Soviet Union we would certainly be glad to consider removing those names. He inquired whether it would not be possible for he and Marshal Stalin to sit down and in a completely informal and unofficial manner discuss the possibility of summoning eight or ten Poles to work with the Commission to form a new Provisional Government. He said he found it difficult to discuss the question of the number of ministries which should be occupied by the non-Warsaw Poles at this time. He felt it would be better to have this emerge as a result of consultation of representative Polish leaders.

Marshal Stalin said that at Yalta it had been decided to call eight Poles for consultation apart from the representatives of the Warsaw Government. Five of these eight to come from Poland and three from London. He said it was of course understood these discussions would not be decided by majority vote and that he was prepared to consider agreeing unofficially on the basis of personal exchange of views with Mr. Hopkins the individual Polish leaders who might be summoned for consultation with the Commission.

Ambassador Harriman said that he thought that on that basis some progress could be made. That the most important names from our point of view were Mikolajczyk, Witos and Zulawski.

Marshal Stalin replied that Witos had said that he was too old to consider an important government post and that he had designated Mikolajczyk as his deputy. He said that from London Mikolajczyk, Grabski and either Kolodzei or General Zeligowski could make up the three.

Ambassador Harriman replied that Mikolajczyk, when he saw him in London, had been very anxious to bring with him a socialist leader from London and had suggested Stanczyk.

Marshal Stalin replied that Stanczyk had at one time proposed to close down the seaman’s union in Poland and for that reason a portion of Poland’s labor was against him. He said, however, that he thought that Zeligowski was a good man and that there was no objection to Mikolajczyk or Grabski.

Ambassador Harriman replied that he had bad news in that he had heard Grabski was too ill to travel.

Marshal Stalin said he was prepared tomorrow to discuss with Mr. Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman the exact list of persons who might be invited for consultation and he felt that there should be eight exclusive of the representatives of the Warsaw Government.

Mr. Hopkins again emphasized that he could only speak for himself and that it would be an exchange of views and that he could not of course, even by implication, say anything on behalf of Great Britain.

Marshal Stalin said he fully understood and agreed with Mr. Hopkins’s statement.

Mr. Hopkins said that when he left here, which would be after they had thoroughly explored the Polish situation, he hoped to stop in Berlin, if the Marshal would give his permission, and see what Berlin looked like. He said it was purely a matter of personal curiosity and he would be glad to see Marshal Zhukov.⁵⁵

Marshal Stalin said immediately that Mr. Hopkins could certainly stop in Berlin if he so desired.⁵⁶

Mr. Molotov said that the Marshal planned to give a dinner for Mr. Hopkins on Friday night if that was agreeable.⁵⁷

Mr. Hopkins expressed his appreciation and said he would be delighted to attend.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be at 6:00 p.m. tomorrow, May 31st.

53. Memorandum prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State.
54. Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to Marshal Stalin.
55. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany; Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany.
56. Mr. Hopkins visited Berlin briefly on June 7.
57. For Mr. Hopkins’ report on his conversation with Marshal Stalin during dinner at the Kremlin on the evening of June 1, see Hopkins’ telegram 031100, June 3, to President Truman, p. 318.