Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

500.CC/5–945

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State ³⁰

San Francisco, May 9, 1945, 11 a.m.

Present—	The Secretary	Dr. Bowman31
	Mr. Eden	Mr. Allen
	Mr. Dunn	Mr. Bohlen
	Ambassador Harriman	Mr. Thompson
	Ambassador Clark Kerr	Mr. McCloy32

The Secretary said that he had asked Mr. Eden to come to consider further steps in relation to the Polish problem. Ambassador Harriman outlined the present position and said he felt, despite the Prime Minister’s cable,³³ that the proposal to telescope the stage of consultations with the stage of the formation of the government was a good one and not a step backward. If we did nothing now, the matter might die and it was important to maintain our position and not give the impression by silence that we were accepting the Soviet thesis as set forth in Marshal Stalin’s cable,³⁴ He said he was not concerned so much about the details of the percentage of non-Lublin representation as he was to see Mikolajczyk. He had always been afraid that we might make some agreement which Mikolajczyk would not or could not accept and thus lose our greatest asset, He thought it would be a good idea if he and Clark Kerr were to go to London, see Prime Minister Churchill and Molotov in regard to the type of reorganization of the Polish Government which would be acceptable and then after referring to Washington, with the approval of the President and the Prime Minister, put it personally before Stalin when they returned to Moscow. In reply to the Secretary’s question, Ambassador Harriman explained that it was not a new proposal to take to Stalin but a telescoping of some steps in the process. He said he felt that Stalin cared more for the general state of relations with the U. S. and Great Britain than Molotov, and it was possible that Stalin would prefer on balance a partially friendly Poland to a fully controlled Poland which they would regard as entirely friendly at the expense of strain in his overall relations with the U. S. and Great Britain. He said that while the three heads of government would undoubtedly have to discuss this subject when and if they met, he felt they would not have time in any such meeting to go into great detail and it would, therefore, be invaluable to have some preliminary work done so as to narrow the issues for their consideration. At Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Allen read the text of Stalin’s last reply to Prime Minister Churchill.³⁵ The Secretary observed that since this reply had come prior to their talk with Molotov on the subject of the sixteen Poles, Stalin’s reference to this matter could not be taken as an answer to our request for a fuller explanation.

Mr. Eden then remarked on the question of the meeting of the three heads of government that yesterday he had spoken with Mr. Molotov concerning the Foreign Ministers meeting some time in the near future in London and found him responsive. He also found Mr. Molotov responsive to the idea of a Big 3 meeting. In the circumstances, Mr. Eden felt that there was a possibility that the Prime Minister did not want to put forward any plan in regard to Poland before he and the President had met with Stalin. He added, however, that this possibility did not in any way affect the desirability of the two Ambassadors going to London to see the Prime Minister and Mikolajczyk.

Ambassador Harriman said he would go to London with a complete open mind but that he did feel some ground must be prepared before the Big 3 meeting. In any event, he thought it very important that Stalin should realize that the Polish question was a very serious one.

The Secretary said he did not believe it possible for the President to consider meeting the Prime Minister and Stalin before the end of the San Francisco Conference. There was some discussion at this point as to the length of the Conference and the amount of paper work that had to be done. The Secretary remarked in this connection that the Secretariat had processed 800,000 pieces of paper in five languages yesterday and he felt that the organization of the Secretariat was an exceptionally efficient one.

Ambassador Harriman returning to the subject of Poland said that his plans were to leave San Francisco this afternoon and to spend a couple of days in Washington, then on to London and to France to see General Eisenhower, and finally back to Moscow.

Mr. Eden said he thought it would be well for him to let the Prime Minister know they were coming, subject, of course, to the approval of President Truman.

Mr. Dunn inquired whether or not we should attempt to go forward with, the Polish matter until we had heard from the Russians in regard to the sixteen arrested Poles.

Mr. Eden answered that he had understood that conversations in San Francisco only had been terminated by this subject and we should wait and see what developed on this matter to which Ambassador Harriman agreed.

Ambassador Clark Kerr remarked that there had been some indications that some of these Poles might be let off because of lack of evidence.

30. Meeting held May 9, 1945, 11 a.m., at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.
31. Isaiah Bowman, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State and Adviser to the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference.
32. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.
33. Reference may be to Churchill’s telegram of May 4 to Eden, the text of which was subsequently transmitted to President Truman in Churchill’s telegram 41, May 11, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. i, p. 6.
34. Presumably, the reference is either to Stalin’s message of April 24 to Truman, p. 263, or to Stalin’s message of May 4 to Churchill, a copy of which was transmitted to Truman on May 5, p. 285.
35. Presumably, reference is to Stalin’s message of May 4 to Churchill, a copy of which was transmitted to Truman on May 5, p. 285.