860C.01/5–545

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman 23

[Translation]

Since you are interested in the Polish question and should be familiar with Mr. Churchill’s message to me concerning this question, dated April 28,24 I feel it appropriate to transmit to you the full text of my reply to Mr. Churchill, sent to him on May 4, 1945.

[Enclosure—Translation]

Copy of Message From the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

I have received your message of April 28, 1945, on the subject of the Polish question.

I am obliged to say that I cannot agree with the arguments which you advance in support of your position.

1. You are inclined to regard the suggestion that the example of Yugoslavia should be taken as a model for Poland as a repudiation of the procedure agreed between us for the creation of a Polish Government of National Unity. This cannot be admitted. The example of Yugoslavia is important, it seems to me, first of all because it points the way toward the most expedient and practical solution of the problem of establishing a new united government, when a governmental organ exercising state authority in the country is taken as a basis for this.

2. It is quite clear that unless the presently acting provisional Polish government, based on the support and trust of the majority of the Polish people, is taken as the basis for the future government of national unity, there is no possibility of expecting a successful solution of the problem placed before us by the Crimean Conference.

I am unable to share your views on the subject of Greece in the passage where you suggest that the Three Powers should supervise elections. Such supervision in relation to the people of an Allied State could not be regarded otherwise than as an insult to that people and a flagrant interference with its internal life. Such supervision [Page 286] is unnecessary in relation to the former satellite States which have subsequently declared war on Germany and joined the Allies, as has been shown by the experience of the elections which have taken place, for instance, in Finland;25 here elections have been held without any outside intervention and have led to constructive results.

Your remarks concerning Belgium and Poland as theatres of war and corridors of communication are entirely justified. It is a question of Poland’s peculiar position as a neighbor State of the Soviet Union which demands that the future Polish government should actively strive for friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, which is likewise in the interest of all other freedom-loving nations. This is a further argument for following the example of Yugoslavia. The United Nations are concerned that there should be a firm and lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Poland. Consequently we cannot be satisfied that persons should be associated with the formation of the future Polish government who, as you express it, “are not fundamentally anti-Soviet,” or that only those persons should be excluded from participation in this work who are in your opinion “extremely unfriendly towards Russia.” Neither of these criteria can satisfy us. We insist, and shall insist, that there should be brought into consultation on the formation of the future Polish government only those persons who have actively shown a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and who are honestly and sincerely prepared to co-operate with the Soviet State.

3. I must comment especially on paragraph 11 of your message, in which you mention difficulties arising as a result of rumors of the arrest of fifteen Poles, of deportations and so forth.

As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to which you refer consists not of fifteen but of sixteen persons, and is headed by the well-known Polish general, Okulicki. In view of his especially odious character the British Information Service is careful to be silent on the subject of this Polish general, who “disappeared” together with the fifteen other Poles who are said to have done likewise. But we do not propose to be silent on this subject. This party of sixteen individuals headed by General Okulicki was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki’s group, and especially the General himself, are accused of planning and carrying out diversionary acts in the rear of the Bed Army which resulted in the loss of over 100 fighters and officers of that Army, and are also accused of maintaining [Page 287] illegal wireless transmitting stations in the rear of our troops, which is contrary to law. All or some of them, according to the results of the investigation, will be handed over for trial. This is the manner in which it is necessary for the Red Army to defend its troops and its rear from diversionists and disturbers of order.

The British Information Service is disseminating rumors of the murder or shooting of Poles in Sedlitz. These statements of the British Information Service are complete fabrications, and have evidently been suggested to it by agents of Arciszewski.

4. It appears from your message that you are not prepared to regard the Polish Provisional Government as the foundation of the future Government of National Unity, and that you are not prepared to accord it its rightful position in that Government. I must say frankly that such an attitude excludes the possibility of an agreed solution of the Polish question.

[For statement by the Secretary of State at San Francisco on May 5, 1945, regarding the concern of the United States Government over the arrest of prominent Polish democratic leaders by Soviet authorities, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1945, page 850.]

  1. Transmitted on May 5, 1945, to the Acting Secretary of State by the Soviet Chargé, Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov.
  2. See Prime Minister Churchill’s telegram 21, April 29, to President Truman, p. 265.
  3. The March 16–17 Finnish elections resulted in substantial gains for leftwing parties inclined toward more friendly relations with the Soviet Union; large gains were made by the Communist Party. For an appraisal of these Finnish elections, see telegram 128, March 23, 5 p.m., from Helsinki, vol. iv, p. 611.