860C.00/5–245
Memorandum of Conversation2
| Present: | The Secretary of State |
| Mr. Eden | |
| Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Dunn | |
| Ambassador Harriman | |
| Sir A. Cadogan | |
| Ambassador Gromyko | |
| Mr. Sobolev4 | |
| Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Podtserob5 | |
| Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson6 |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Secretary said that the purpose of this meeting was to study the Polish question. He and Mr. Molotov had had a friendly conversation last evening on the prospects of the Conference and they had both expressed the hope that a solution of the Polish question could be found. Since the last meeting on this subject we have received Marshal Stalin’s reply to the joint British and American message. We do not consider that this reply advances the matter. As we have pointed out before, the failure to carry out the Yalta decision has resulted in a situation which is receiving the serious consideration of the United States Government. Mr. Harriman will soon return to Moscow—of course, not before the departure of Mr. Molotov—and will present the views of the United States Government to the Polish Commission. We all have in mind the importance of finding a solution of this problem.
Mr. Molotov said that some progress had been made. Mr. Mikolajczyk was a stumbling block in Moscow. This had now been settled. There was no objection to his being invited for consultation in view of the declaration he had made.
The Secretary said this was very gratifying. We had not known this before.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had previously objected to Mikolajczyk because he had expressed objections to the Crimea decisions. He had subsequently changed his views, possibly with Mr. Churchill’s help.
[Page 273]Mr. Eden pointed out that there had been a genuine misunderstanding of Mikolajczyk’s position which arose because of the fact that his first statement had been made in reply to a letter which he had received.
Mr. Molotov said that he was anxious to make some progress on the Polish question at the Conference.
Mr. Eden inquired whether we could decide on the names of the Polish leaders to be invited for consultation.
Mr. Molotov replied that the agreement on Mikolajczyk represented some progress and it was difficult for him to take steps on another question. He wished now to consider what we could do for the Poles at this Conference.
The Secretary inquired what would be Mr. Mikolajczyk’s status.
Mr. Molotov said that he would be invited for consultation with the Moscow Commission.
The Secretary pointed out that we have always been ready to consult with the Lublin Poles once the list of other Polish leaders to be invited for consultation was decided upon.
Mr. Molotov said it was not necessary to agree upon the full list in advance. We could have some Polish leaders and the Lublin Poles.
Mr. Eden said this would be satisfactory if we could agree here upon the list. We have already agreed upon the Warsaw leaders and Mr. Mikolajczyk.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that there was no objection to Grabski. Possibly some candidate could be indicated by the Warsaw Government.
Mr. Eden suggested Stanczyk.
Mr. Molotov pressed for someone who had been proposed by the Warsaw Poles and mentioned General Zelegowski.
Mr. Eden pointed out that Stanczyk was a Socialist who had broken with the Socialists who supported the present Prime Minister of the London Polish Government. He was greatly liked by Mr. Eden’s Labor colleagues in the British Government and it would be a great help to get him invited.
Mr. Molotov said he thought one of the three Poles to be invited from London could be chosen from among the names suggested by Warsaw. Otherwise, we could let the Moscow Commission decide the matter.
Mr. Eden suggested that four be invited from London.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that we had agreed to inviting three from London and five from Poland.
[Page 274]Mr. Eden replied that this was based on the proposal that the three from London be chosen from those not supporting the Warsaw Government.
Mr. Molotov said it was better at this stage to confine ourselves to three—Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and one to be selected by Warsaw upon whom we could all agree. Then he could ask Moscow if they approved of this proposal.
Mr. Eden inquired about the Poles from within Poland.
Mr. Molotov said this was for the Commission to decide. If we could agree on whom we are to invite from London and do something for the Poles at this Conference, that would represent some progress. He could not agree on the names of Poles from within Poland without consulting the Warsaw Poles who should be invited to Moscow.
Mr. Eden pointed out that it was necessary to know who was coming from Poland. If Stanczyk were not invited, it would be necessary to know if a Socialist from within Poland was being invited.
Mr. Molotov said Stanczyk’s name had not been given before.
Mr. Eden pointed out that he was mentioned in February and in the joint message.
Mr. Molotov said his name was not mentioned at the Crimea. It was not possible to invite representatives of a single group.
Mr. Eden said that Stanczyk was not from the same group as Mikolajczyk.
Mr. Molotov said we might have representatives from within Poland who would be Socialists.
Mr. Harriman pointed out that Zulawski, who was a prominent Socialist, had been mentioned.
Mr. Molotov said it was better to discuss this in Moscow than to take counsel with the Poles. He was not talking of an ideal solution, but of some progress. He hoped that Moscow would confirm the view he had expressed and that it would be possible to do something for the Poles at this Conference.
Mr. Eden said that we could not invite Poles here until we have a Polish Government which we all recognize.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that Argentina had been invited and said that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide for every new member of the Organization being invited by agreement of the five great powers. It had also been agreed that only those who had declared war before March 1 were to be invited to the Conference. This principle had been violated, but as regards Poland we could not make even one step forward. He was confident that the Soviet Government [Page 275] was not the only one which would be embittered by this. Could we not find what step we could take forward?
The Secretary said this was very clear. We could carry out the Crimea decision on consultation with democratic leaders from within and without Poland who would form the new Provisional Government of National Unity which we would all recognize and which would immediately take its place at the Conference.
Mr. Molotov said the Crimea decision did not state that it was impossible to invite the present Provisional Government if the new Government had not been established. He had not pointed this out at the Conference because he was reluctant to emphasize our differences. He would inform Moscow of this conversation. Perhaps he would receive some instructions before he left San Francisco.
Mr. Eden said we were in a difficult situation. It was important to show the world that we were moving toward agreement.
Mr. Molotov asked what could we do here in the absence of the Poles. He was assured that if Mikolajczyk were invited, that would constitute a great step forward.
The Secretary said we had not previously heard of the approval of Mikolajczyk.
Mr. Molotov said he was informed that Stalin had written to Prime Minister Churchill on this matter.8 He repeated could we not take some step forward at this Conference.
Mr. Eden said that supposing it were possible to agree on the Poles from within Poland and the two Ambassadors return to Moscow, could they not agree on a new government before the end of the Conference.
Mr. Molotov inquired how we could settle this matter without the Poles. He suggested a more modest program which was:
- 1.
- Decide which three Poles we invite from London.
- 2.
- The Moscow Commission members proceed to Moscow and there decide whom to invite from within Poland.
- 3.
- The Polish Government be invited to the Conference on the condition that their delegation be reconstituted when the Polish Government is reorganized.
Perhaps we might think of these suggestions.
The Secretary said he thought we had gone as far as we could now and that we should consider the problem and meet again.
Mr. Eden said it was difficult to agree on the people from London without knowing who was coming from within Poland. Mikolajczyk would be certain to ask whom he was to meet.
Mr. Molotov said that Mikolajczyk was always inclined to delay matters.
[Page 276]Part II
Mr. Molotov inquired when the Soviet amendments could be discussed.
The Secretary proposed, and it was agreed, that a meeting for this purpose be held at 9:00 p.m. He had four additional points which he wished to mention briefly. We were receiving many questions about the fifteen Polish leaders who had disappeared. The State Department had no information on the matter.
Mr. Molotov said he also had no information, but would get in touch with Moscow.
Mr. Eden also expressed the interest of his Government in this question.
- Meeting held May 2, 1945, 11 a.m., at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California; one of a series of meetings between United States, British, and Soviet officials held during the course of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.↩
- For another portion of this memorandum, see vol. iii, p. 112.↩
- Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in London and member of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference.↩
- Boris Fedorovich Podtserob, secretary and translator for Foreign Commissar Molotov.↩
- Political and Liaison Officer to the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference.↩
- Apparently, reference is to Marshal Stalin’s message of April 24 to Prime Minister Churchill; see footnote 89, p. 264.↩