Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/4–2945: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman

London, 29 April 1945.

21. The message referred to in my number 20 follows.

1. I thank you for your message of April 24th. I have been much distressed at the misunderstanding that has grown up between us on the Crimean agreement about Poland. I certainly went to Yalta with the hope that both the London and Lublin Polish Governments would be swept away and that a new government would be formed from among Poles of good-will, among whom the members of M. Bierut’s government would be prominent. But you did not like this plan, and we and the Americans agreed therefore that there was to be no sweeping away of the Bierut government but that instead it should become a “new” government “reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad”. For this purpose M. Molotov and the two ambassadors were to sit together in Moscow and try to bring into being such a government by consultations with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad.

2. The commission then would have to set to work to select the Poles who were to come for consultations. We tried in each case to find representative men, and in this we were careful to exclude what we thought were extreme people unfriendly to Russia. We did not select for our list anyone at present in the London Polish Government, but three good men, namely Mikolajczyk, Stanczyk and Grabski, who went into opposition to the London Polish Government because they did not like its attitude towards Russia, and in particular its refusal to accept the eastern frontiers which you and I agreed upon, now [not?] so long ago, and which I was the first man outside the Soviet government to proclaim to the world as just and fair, together with the compensations, etc. in the west and north. It is true that Mikolajczyk at that time still hoped for Lwow, but as you know he has now publicly abandoned that claim.

3. Our names, for those from inside and outside Poland, were put forward in the same spirit of helpfulness by the Americans and ourselves. The first thing the British complain of is that after nine weeks of discussion on the commission at Moscow, and any amount of telegrams between our three Governments not the least progress has been made because M. Molotov has steadily refused in the commission to give an opinion about the Poles we have mentioned so that not one of them has been allowed to come even to a preliminary round-table discussion. Please observe that these names were put forward not as necessarily to be members of a new and reorganized Polish government but simply to come for the round-table talk provided for in the Crimean declaration out of which it was intended to bring about the formation of a united provisional government, representative of the main elements of Polish life and prepared to work on friendly terms with the Soviet government, and also of a kind which we and all the world could recognize. That was and still is our desire. This provisional government was then, according to our joint decision at the Crimea, to pledge itself to hold “a free and unfettered election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot”, in which “all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates”. Alas, none of this has been allowed to move forward.

4. In your paragraph 1. you speak of accepting “the Yugoslav precedent as a model for Poland.” You have always wished that our private and personal series of telegrams should be frank and outspoken. I must say at once that the two cases are completely different. In the case of Poland, the three powers reached agreement about how we should arrange for the emergence of a new government. This was to be by means of consultations before our commission between representatives of the Bierut government and democratic Polish leaders from inside and outside Poland. In the case of Yugoslavia, there was nothing of this kind. You seem now to be proposing that after your representative on the Moscow Poland commission has made it impossible to start the conversations provided for in our agreement, that the agreed procedure should be abandoned. Thus we British feel that after all this time absolutely no headway has been made towards forming the “new” and “reorganized” Polish Government, while on the contrary the Soviet Government have made a 20-years treaty⁹⁰ with the present provisional Polish Government under M. Bierut although it remains neither new nor reorganized. We have the feeling that it is we who have been dictated to and brought up against a stone wall upon matters which we sincerely believed were settled in a spirit of friendly comradeship in the Crimea.

5. I must also say that the way things have worked out in Yugoslavia certainly does not give me the feeling of a 50-50 interest and influence as between our two countries,⁹¹ Marshal Tito has become a complete dictator. He has proclaimed that his prime loyalties are to Soviet Russia. Although he allowed the members of the royal Yugoslav Government to enter his government, they only number 6 as against 25 of his own nominees. We have the impression that they are not taken into consultation on matters of high policy and that it is becoming a one-party regime. However I have not made any complaint or comment about all this, and both at Yalta and at other times have acquiesced in the settlement which has been reached in Yugoslavia. I do not complain of any action you have taken there in spite of my misgivings and I hope it will all work out smoothly and make the Yugoslavs a prosperous and free people, friendly to both Russia and ourselves.

6. We could not, however, accept the “Yugoslav model” as a guide to what should happen in Poland. Neither we nor the Americans have any military or special interest in Poland. All we seek in material things is to be treated in the regular way between friendly states. Here we are all shocked that you should think that we would favour a Polish Government hostile to the Soviet Union. This is the opposite of our policy. But it was on account of Poland that the British went to war with Germany in 1939.⁹² We saw in the Nazi treatment of Poland a symbol of Hitler’s vile and wicked lust of conquest and subjugation, and his invasion of Poland was the spark that fired the mine. The British people do not, as is sometimes thought, go to war for calculation but for sentiment. They had a feeling which grew up in years that with all Hitler’s encroachments and doctrine, he was a danger to our country and to the liberties which we prize in Europe, and when after Munich⁹³ he broke his word so shamefully about Czechoslovakia, even the extremely peace-loving Chamberlain⁹⁴ gave our guarantee against Hitler to Poland. When that guarantee was invoked by the German invasion of Poland, the whole nation went to war with Hitler, unprepared as we were. There was a flame in the hearts of men like that which swept your people in their noble defence of their country from a treacherous, brutal and, as at one time it almost seemed, overwhelmingly German attack. This British flame burns still among all classes and parties in this island, and in its self-governing dominions, and they can never feel this war will have ended rightly unless Poland has a fair deal in the full sense of sovereignty, independence and freedom on the basis of friendship with Russia. It was on this that I thought we had agreed at Yalta.

7. Side by side with this strong sentiment for the rights of Poland, which I believe is shared in at least as strong a degree throughout the United States, there has grown up throughout the English-speaking world a very warm and deep desire to be friends on equal and honourable terms with the mighty Russian Soviet Republic and to work with you, making allowances for our different systems of thought and government, in long and bright years for all the world which we three powers alone can make together. I, who in my years of great responsibility have worked faithfully for this unity, will certainly continue to do so by every means in my power, and in particular I can assure you that we in Great Britain would not work for or tolerate a Polish government unfriendly to Russia. Neither could we recognize a Polish government that did not truly correspond to the description in our joint declaration at Yalta with proper regard for the rights of the individual as we understand these matters in the western world.

8. With regard to your reference to Greece and Belgium, I recognize the consideration which you gave me when we had to intervene with heavy armed forces to quell the EAM⁹⁵-ELAS⁹⁶ attack upon the centre of government in Athens.⁹⁷ We have given repeated instructions that your interest in Roumania and Bulgaria is to be recognized as predominant. We cannot however be excluded altogether, and we dislike being treated by your subordinates in these countries so differently from the kindly manner in which we at the top are always treated by you. In Greece we seek nothing but her friendship, which is of long duration, and desire only her independence and integrity. But we have no intention to try to decide whether she is to be a monarchy or a republic. Our only policy there is to restore matters to the normal as quickly as possible and to hold fair and free elections, I hope within the next four or five months. These elections will decide the regime and later on the constitution. The will of the people expressed under conditions of freedom and universal franchise, must prevail; that is our root principle. If the Greeks were to decide for a republic, it would not affect our relations with them. We will use our influence with the Greek government to invite Russian representatives to come and see freely what is going on in Greece, and at the elections I hope that there will be Russian, American and British commissioners at large in the country to make sure that there is no intimidation or other frustration of the free choice of the people between the different parties who will be contending. After that our work in Greece may well be done.

9. As to Belgium, we have no conditions to demand though naturally we should get disturbed if they started putting up V-weapons, etc. pointed at us, and we hope they will, under whatever form of government they adopt by popular decision, come into a general system of resistance to prevent Germany striking westward. Belgium, like Poland, is a theatre of war and corridor of communication, and everyone must recognize the force of these considerations without which great armies cannot operate.

10. As to your paragraph 3, it is quite true that about Poland we have reached a definite line of action with the Americans. This is because we agree naturally upon the subject, and both sincerely feel that we have been rather ill-treated about the way the matter has been handled since the Crimea Conference. No doubt these things seem different when looked at from the opposite point of view. But we are absolutely agreed that the pledge we have given for a sovereign, free, independent Poland with a government fully and adequately representing all the democratic elements among Poles, is for us a matter of honour and duty. I do not think there is the slightest chance of any change in the attitude of our two powers, and when we are agreed we are bound to say so. After all, we have joined with you, largely on my original initiative early in 1944 in proclaiming the Polish-Russian frontier which you desired, namely, the Curzon line including Lwow for Russia. We think you ought to meet us with regard to the other half of the policy which you equally with us have proclaimed, namely, the sovereignty, independence and freedom of Poland, provided it is a Poland friendly to Russia, Therefore HMG cannot accept a government on the Yugoslav precedent in which there would be four representatives of the present Warsaw provisional government to every one representing the other democratic elements. There ought to be a proper balance and a proper distribution of the important posts in the government; and this result should be reached as we agreed at the Crimea by discussing the matter with true representatives of all the different Polish elements which are not fundamentally anti-Russian.

11. Also, difficulties arise at the present moment because all sorts of stories are brought out of Poland which are eagerly listened to by many members of Parliament and which at any time may be violently raised in Parliament or the press in spite of my deprecating such action and on which M. Molotov will vouchsafe us no information at all in spite of repeated requests. For instance, there is the talk of the 15 Poles who were said to have met the Russian authorities for discussion over 4 weeks ago, and of M. Witos about whom there has been a similar but more recent report; and there are many other statements of deportations, etc. How can I contradict such complaints when you give me no information whatever and when neither I nor the Americans are allowed to send anyone into Poland to find out for themselves the true state of affairs? There is no part of our occupied or liberated territory into which you are not free to send delegations, and people do not see why you should have any reasons against similar visits by British delegations to foreign countries liberated by you.

12. There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other states, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or dominions are on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offence. If so, let me know. But do not I beg you, my friend Stalin, under-rate the divergencies which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.

90. The agreement regarding friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic (National Council of the Homeland), signed on April 21, 1945, was to remain in force for 20 years from the moment of signing.
91. In regard to the proposal to share wartime influence between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the basis of proposed percentages in the Balkan countries, including Yugoslavia, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, pp. 112–131, passim. See also The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, The Macmillan Company 1948), vol. ii, pp. 1451–1459, and Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 72–81, 226–235. The substance of the arrangements, particularly concerning Yugoslavia, was given in Churchii’s speech of January 18, 1945, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 407, cols. 398–399. For reports on discussions of Balkan affairs during the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow in October 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1004–1024, passim.
92. For documentation regarding the invasion of Poland by Germany and entry of the British and French into the war, September 1–16, 1939, see Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. i, pp. 402 ff.
93. The Munich Agreement, signed on September 29, 1938, between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, regarding the cession by Czechoslovakia to Germany of the Sudeten German territory; for text, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945. series D, vol. ii (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1014. or Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, vol. ii (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949), p. 627. For documentation regarding the German-Czechoslovak crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. i, pp. 483 ff.
94. Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, May 28, 1937–May 10, 1940.
95. Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front), the Communist-controlled resistance organization in Greece.
96. Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (National People’s Liberation Army), the military organization of the EAM.
97. For documentation regarding the policy of the United States with respect to the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, pp. 84 ff.