Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/4–2345

Minutes of Second Meeting Regarding the Polish Question⁶⁷

April 23, 1945, 10:30 a.m. to 12:05 p.m.

Principal Participants:	Mr. Stettinius
	Mr. Eden
	Mr. Molotov
	Sir Alexander Cadogan
	Mr. Grew
	Mr. Dunn
	Mr. Harriman
	Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr
	Mr. Gromyko

Mr. Stettinius asked whether Mr. Molotov had had an opportunity to study the joint message of the Prime Minister and the President of April 18 and indicated that Mr. Eden and he would be very pleased to hear his reaction.

Mr. Molotov replied in the affirmative and stated that he would like to ask the following questions: In as much as the message does not specifically state that the proposal set forth in Stalin’s message of April 7 cannot be accepted as a basis for discussion, he stated that it is not clear what was the meaning of point 4 in the joint message which refers to the fact that we could not commit ourselves to any formula regarding the composition of the new Polish government until the Polish leaders had been consulted. He added that he could not understand why we could not use the Yugoslav precedent to establish a new government in Poland since it is common knowledge that the Yugoslav Government was set up by agreement between the three powers. He particularly referred to the statement in the message indicating that the Yugoslav precedent was not acceptable to the British and American Governments and wanted to know why we could not use this agreement as an example since it had already proved useful in the case of Yugoslavia, He added that Stalin’s proposal on this point was a concrete one and, therefore, should be accepted. He pointed out that the President’s and Prime Minister’s message did not contain any reasons why the Yugoslav precedent was declined. He then asked for an explanation for this attitude.

Mr. Eden replied that there were two points the President and the Prime Minister had in mind in refusing to accept the Yugoslav formula: (1) That it was not applicable in the case of Poland since the Yalta declaration provided for consultation with Polish leaders before a government could be established and, therefore, we could not accept any formula until after this consultation had taken place. In the Yugoslav formula there was no provision for consultation before a commission. (2) Stalin’s message refers to the numerical relationship of the various groups which would be included in the new Polish government and indicates that the proportions would be similar to the proportions in the present Yugoslav Government. We could not agree to this since we did not wish to agree with any formula until we had consulted with Polish leaders.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he supported the views of Mr. Eden and thought that his statement was very accurate.

Mr. Eden then asked what Mr. Molotov thought of paragraph 1 in the joint message and pointed out that it was an attempt to pick up Stalin’s suggestion and go back to the proposals made at Yalta to the effect that five Poles should be brought from Poland and three from London for consultation.

Mr. Molotov indicated that he would like to say a bit more regarding Yugoslavia. He stated that since he desired to make progress in the negotiations he had suggested the Yugoslav formula since this was an agreement which had been reached between the three Governments and that while no one obliges us to accept this formula for Poland he felt that by accepting this formula it would be possible to make progress and would give an opportunity to settle the Polish question. He added that if Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius did not think that this proposal was acceptable he would take notice of it, but he warned that by not accepting this proposal it would be much more difficult to reach a settlement. He reiterated that it was of course correct to take all decisions in conformity with the Crimea agreement and that of course we should consult with the Poles. He pointed out that we have very favorable conditions here in Washington with the presence of the three Foreign Ministers and the British and American Ambassadors from Moscow, but that there was one difficulty. There were no Poles here with whom to consult. He then stated that the joint message of April 18 had not arrived in Moscow until after his departure and reiterated that there are no representatives of the Polish Government so we cannot consult with them. He then insisted that without consultation with the Warsaw Poles we cannot discuss this question. He suggested, therefore, that in order to get along with this problem we might accept his practicable solution to work out the matter by using the Yugoslav formula.

Mr. Stettinius stated that as far as the United States Government is concerned the Yugoslav precedent is not applicable since we know that in the present Yugoslav Government there are twenty-one adherents of Tito and only six from abroad. Furthermore, since it was provided in the Yalta declaration that we should consult with Polish leaders we should proceed in conformity with that decision. He added that the joint message of April 18 was sent to Stalin only after it had been weighed most carefully and given full consideration and is the final position of the United States Government. He added that we feel it is entirely in conformity with the Yalta decision which must guide us in this matter.

Mr. Eden agreed that this was also the position of the British Government. He then asked whether Mr. Molotov would not agree, as a step forward, to inviting for consultation the leaders set forth in proposal 1 of the joint message.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States Government places great importance on the first proposal and that if Mr. Molotov would agree to this, the whole matter could move forward.

Mr. Molotov stated he wished to repeat that in proposing the Yugoslav precedent he was seeking a practical solution of the problem and added that the attitude of the Soviet Government is set forth in Stalin’s message of April 7. He then claimed that in order to discuss the new proposals of the Prime Minister and the President it would be necessary to observe the rules of the Crimea decision and to consult with the Warsaw Poles, in the first instance, He again stated that before he had consulted with the Warsaw Poles he would not dare state his opinion in regard to the proposals in the joint message. He added, however, that this did not exclude consultation with other Poles later.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether Mr. Molotov could not agree to carry out the Crimea decisions and consult with democratic groups from within and without Poland.

Mr. Molotov replied that of course it goes without saying that consultations should be held with different groups but he could not make any comments on the British and American Governments’ proposals until he had consulted with the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the joint message was sent on April 18 and that, therefore, Stalin could have had time to consult with the Warsaw Poles if he so desired, although the Yalta declaration did not provide that such consultation should take place. He added that he could not understand how Mr. Molotov felt he could settle the Polish question by the Yugoslav formula without consulting Warsaw, while at the same time he insisted he would have to consult Warsaw before he could comment on proposal 1 of the joint message.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Yugoslav precedent is a concrete example of how we could arrive at a solution without calling in Poles. He added that in the meantime the solution of the Polish question is no less important to the Soviet Union, which is most anxious to bring about the formation of an acceptable Polish government. He asked, therefore, how it was that the three Governments could agree on the Yugoslav question but refused to use that as a precedent to solve the Polish question. He pointed out that the British and American Ambassadors⁶⁸ as well as others are now in Belgrade where they can report on the situation and thus the Yugoslav question has moved forward and he added that if we could solve the Polish question the British and American Ambassadors could proceed to Warsaw. He asserted that if we declined to accept the Yugoslav precedent we cannot get on with the Polish question.

Mr. Eden emphasized that this was an entirely new proposal since there had been no mention of the Yugoslav formula at Yalta.

Mr. Molotov replied that we might go back and start out with a new proposal.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the new Yugoslav Government was formed on the basis of an agreement between Tito and Subasic⁶⁹ which the British and American Governments subsequently agreed to, while in regard to Poland provision was made for consultations with Poles first and that Stalin at Yalta had agreed to this.

Mr. Molotov replied that he could not object to this, but stated that he could not accept the British and American proposals until he had consulted with the Warsaw Poles, adding that here in Washington we could not consult with representatives of the Warsaw regime and that without Poles we cannot settle the Polish question.

Mr. Eden asked exactly what Mr. Molotov wanted us to agree to in the Yugoslav precedent. Did he want us to agree to the same proportions as in the Yugoslav formula or what?

Mr. Molotov replied that if the three Governments would use the Yugoslav formula to solve the Polish question and establish the same proportions as those in the present Yugoslav Government he felt that the Warsaw Poles would agree.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was bewildered by the position taken by Mr. Molotov since he had just read the Crimea decision which made it very clear as to what had been agreed upon and that now we were definitely getting away from it and working on something new. He then read the second paragraph of the Crimea decision which provides for the Commission to consult with representatives of the Warsaw regime as well as Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and abroad.

Mr. Molotov reiterated that the Soviet Government had suggested the Yugoslav precedent in order to make a practical step forward. He added that in his view this proposal fully corresponded with the Crimea decision but that he did not exclude that a different path could be followed. He then pointed out that in reexamining the Crimea decision we should start with paragraph 1 which provides for the reorganization of the “provisional government which is now functioning in Poland”. He added that if we did this we might produce a more practical solution, but he again stated that we must first consult with the Warsaw Poles which we can’t do here.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the first proposal in the joint message called for the same number of Poles for consultation as Stalin had suggested and that there were no new names in our list so that the Soviet Government, which has known these names for more than two months, has had plenty of time to consult the Warsaw Poles. He added that in regard to Mikolajczyk he wished to point out that since Mr. Molotov’s departure from Moscow Mikolajczyk had made a statement in which he unqualifiedly accepted the Yalta decision.

Mr. Molotov asked whether Mikolajczyk had agreed to the Curzon Line.

Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative and stated that the Prime Minister had sent another telegram to Stalin⁷⁰ pointing this out.

Mr. Molotov asserted that if any specific persons are to be consulted they should not be only those recommended by the President and Prime Minister but others might be asked, but he added again that the Soviet Government would like to consult with the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Stettinius then read point 3 of the joint message which provides that other Poles may be subsequently invited for consultation.

Mr. Molotov reiterated for the Soviet Union that the Soviets could not invite any Polish leaders without first consulting with the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that this puts us in a very difficult position since at Yalta we agreed to invite various groups for consultation and that the Commission should have the right to invite representatives of various Polish groups.

Mr. Molotov agreed that the Commission had the right to invite anyone, but it could not do this without first seeking the advice of the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that there was no such undertaking in the Crimea decision.

Mr. Molotov stated that in the Yalta declaration it was provided that the present government now functioning in Warsaw should be reorganized and that that government was specifically mentioned in the declaration while no reference was made to the Polish Government in London and, therefore, we cannot reorganize the Warsaw Government without consulting with it.

Mr. Stettinius agreed that we should consult with the Warsaw Government representatives regarding the reorganization of the government to create a new Government of National Unity but that there was nothing in the Yalta agreement which indicated in any way that we should first consult with the Warsaw Government as to who was to be invited to Moscow to discuss the question with the Commission.

Mr. Molotov again replied that since it was the Warsaw Government which was to be reorganized we should consult with them in the first place before any reorganization could take place.

Mr. Eden replied that such a procedure would amount to giving a veto to the Warsaw Government on those democratic Poles the British and American Governments wished to invite to Moscow for consultation.

Mr. Molotov contended that consultation and veto are two different things.

Mr. Eden then stated that since Yalta we had endeavored to canvass for names of suitable democratic Polish leaders to be brought to Moscow for consultation.

Mr. Molotov replied that discussions had taken place about the original names as well as new names and that other names may still be added, but he again insisted that it would be necessary to consult with the Warsaw Government regarding this matter which he held was the common intent of all three Governments.

Mr. Eden stated that if we were to adopt this procedure we would make no progress.

Mr. Stettinius asserted that it was his belief that we should consult here in Washington without having to seek the ideas of another government.

Mr. Molotov asked how can we settle the Polish question without Poles.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that it was absolutely clear in conformity with the Crimea decision that we were to consult with three groups and that the Warsaw Poles were to be one of these groups. He added that this was made absolutely clear at Yalta and in the declaration and it was understood that members of the Commission could make recommendations to their respective Governments.

Mr. Molotov stated that it appeared to him that we were bound to consult with Bishop Sapieha but not bound to consult with the Warsaw Poles. He then corrected himself and stated that he should have referred to the Bishop as Prince Sapieha.

Mr. Eden stated that this was not so since it was absolutely clear that among those to be called for consultation were representatives of the Warsaw regime.

Mr. Molotov reiterated that it appeared that we are engaged in reorganizing Prince Sapieha but not the Warsaw Government.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that we had agreed that the Warsaw Poles might come first to Moscow provided invitations had been issued to the other representative democratic leaders.

Mr. Molotov replied that the issue is one of reorganizing the present Polish Government and that if it is desired that the Warsaw Government be considered as just one of the groups similar to the Sapieha group or other groups of Poles the Soviet Government could not agree to this procedure.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether we could not make a public statement indicating that in Washington we had reviewed the Yalta decision and that the American and British Ambassadors to the U.S.S.R. were returning to Moscow to carry on the work of the Commission and that we could give out the names of those to be invited for consultation. He added that such an announcement would have a great effect on the eve of the solemn proceeding to take place at San Francisco for the establishment of world peace and that in issuing such a statement the doubts which are now present would be quelled and it could be no longer said that it was impossible for us to reach an agreement.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was bound to say that if we adopt any decisions which violate the Crimea decision it would have a most adverse effect on Soviet public opinion.

Mr. Stettinius assured Mr. Molotov that we desired to abide by the Crimea decision.

Mr. Molotov reasserted his belief in the Crimea decision but added that at Yalta we did not hesitate to mention the Warsaw Government, but now the British and American Governments desired to forget it and wished to consider that Government only as one of the groups to be consulted and not as a Government.

Mr. Stettinius stated that that was not our interpretation of the agreement.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Crimea decision refers to the Warsaw Government and makes no mention whatsoever of the Arciszewski Government or Mikolajczyk nor any mention of Prince Sapieha. He added that if it was now the intention to forget about the Warsaw Government the Soviet Government could not agree to this since such a procedure would make such a solution impossible.

Mr. Stettinius assured Mr. Molotov that we had no intention of ‘forgetting the Warsaw Government, but reminded him that the Crimea decision provided that there was to be a new Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov concurred.

Mr. Stettinius insisted that we must make it quite clear that there was to be a new government in Poland.

Mr. Molotov stated that if it was impossible to move forward he hoped that we would take the suggestions already made by the Soviet Government as being the only practicable ones and that we should, therefore, begin consultations with the Warsaw regime as soon as possible.

Mr. Eden reminded Mr. Molotov that the joint message of April 18 contained specific proposals in conformity with the Crimea decision but that we had so far received no reply to it nor had Mr. Molotov commented on it. He added that if the Soviet Government should accept these proposals we can go forward, but that if they did not accept them, what would Mr. Molotov propose we should do.

Mr. Molotov insisted that his previous statements had made absolutely clear the ideas of the Soviet Government to the effect that we should consult with the Warsaw Government first. He added that if this did not take place it would be impossible to make any progress in negotiations in Washington.

Mr. Stettinius asked if Mr. Molotov’s comments constitute the official reply to our proposals.

Mr. Molotov stated that he was not endeavoring to answer the joint message but only endeavoring to give an explanation of the question raised.

Mr. Eden stated that he had no idea what to say since it was evident that we cannot make any progress.

Mr. Molotov then referred to the possibility of accepting the Yugoslav precedent as the formula to work on here. After doing this, we could then consult with the Warsaw Government.

Mr. Eden pointed out that this would be against the Crimea decision.

Mr. Molotov disagreed since the Yugoslav governmental question had been settled by common agreement between the three powers and no one has yet tried to explain why the Yugoslav solution is not acceptable.

Mr. Eden said he thought he had already explained this.

Mr. Molotov replied that Mr. Eden had only referred to formal motives, adding that he felt that if we did agree on the Yugoslav formula to establish a new Yugoslav Government he could not understand why the same procedure should not be followed in regard to Poland. If we did this, the American and British Ambassadors would be in Warsaw as they are now in Belgrade and we could go forward with this. He asked again why we could not accept the Yugoslav formula.

Mr. Eden replied that it was quite different in regard to Poland since it had been agreed between the three powers that before establishing a government there should be consultation between three groups of Poles including those from abroad.

Mr. Molotov agreed that of course consultation is necessary.

Mr. Eden stated that in the case of Yugoslavia all we had done was to approve the agreement reached between two Yugoslav groups and he pointed out that in the case of Poland there was no such agreement.

Mr. Molotov suggested that we should continue our consultation.

Mr. Stettinius again reminded him that the joint message was sent after the points contained therein had been most carefully considered and that this is the final position of the United States Government and is in conformity with the Yalta agreement. He added that he felt obliged to call the attention of Mr. Molotov to the fact that over two months had passed since the Commission started its work and so far no Poles had been consulted.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Moscow Commission had made an attempt to invite the Warsaw Poles for consultation but that London had cancelled it so that this procedure was called off. He pointed out that this was done at the insistence of the British Government and not the American Government and that the Soviet Government had agreed to abide by the wishes of the British Government. He added that this first step was made but it had to be cancelled although the Commission thought this was a good step, so that in actual practice the Commission had been prevented from taking the first step.

Mr. Eden emphasized that the reason this proposal had been cancelled was because it was learned that it was to be an exclusive consultation with the Warsaw representatives.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was anxious to start the consultations with the Warsaw Poles and then consult with the other Polish groups later.

Mr. Eden pointed out that as of today all we have is a proposal that the Warsaw Government have the power to veto any persons whom the United States and British Governments desire to invite for consultation.

Mr. Molotov again stated that there is a difference between consultation and veto.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not understand why at Yalta the Soviet Government had not insisted that permission be obtained from the Warsaw Poles before consideration was given to inviting representative Poles for consultation.

Mr. Molotov replied that it follows from the spirit of the Crimea decision that we must consult with Warsaw first.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Harriman had just reminded him that Stalin at Yalta was ready to invite Bishop Sapieha and Witos for consultation without first asking the approval of the Warsaw Government.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was possible that these men may come to Moscow for consultation.

Mr. Eden asked where Witos and the other Polish leaders were at this time.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no recent information since he was travelling for a long time although he believed that these leaders were at their homes in Poland.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether Mr. Molotov would agree to a public statement before the San Francisco Conference to the effect that the three Governments concur that the Crimea decision is still in force, that the various groups are to be invited to Moscow and that the consultations will continue.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had no objection to the first part, but added that we had not reached agreement on the second part.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether we could agree to say that the names of persons to be invited to Moscow for consultation would be settled before Mr. Molotov leaves for San Francisco.

Mr. Molotov replied that this could not be done without consultation with the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Stettinius asserted that he is most anxious to indicate to the world that we are working in collaboration and unity, particularly prior to the solemn task just facing us of setting up a world organization. He added that if we cannot prove to the world that we are working in collaboration with each other it will put in jeopardy the establishment of the world organization.

Mr. Molotov agreed that we could prove to the world our collaboration when we had achieved a settlement of the Polish question but this could not be done without first consulting the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Stettinius reiterated that the United States Government had no intention of ignoring the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Molotov replied that it appeared now that we did not wish to reorganize the Warsaw Government but just wished to consider them as one of the groups to be consulted and that this was not in conformity with the Crimea decision.

Mr. Eden drew attention to the passages in the joint message which refer to the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Molotov replied that it would be best to read the Crimea decision which was agreed to by the three Governments instead of reading from the joint message which was only agreed to by two of the Governments and which seems to ignore the Warsaw Poles.

Mr. Eden replied that we have never denied that the Warsaw Poles would play a prominent part in the reorganized government and read passages from the joint message confirming this.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Crimea decision does not refer to the representatives of the Warsaw Poles but to the present government now functioning in Poland and he added that it appeared now that the British and American Governments were ashamed to refer to this as a government.

Mr. Stettinius asked whether Mr. Molotov was under the impression that the new Government of National Unity was just to be a continuation of the present Warsaw Government.

Mr. Molotov replied that the new Polish government is to be set up on the basis of the Warsaw Government with new groups taking part in it and added that this attitude is the final position of the Soviet Government as stated in Stalin’s message of April 7.

Mr. Eden replied that the joint message of the Prime Minister and the President constitutes our final position on this question.

Mr. Molotov replied that as regards the joint proposals it would be necessary to consult with the Warsaw Poles since there are certain specific questions which involve them.

Mr. Stettinius: Have you any further points to discuss?

Mr. Eden: No.

Mr. Molotov: No.

Mr. Stettinius: Let us adjourn now so that I can report to President Truman. I will let you know when we can meet later today.

67. Meeting held at the Department of State, April 23, 1945, 10:30 a.m. to 12:05 p.m.
68. R. C. Skrine Stevenson and Richard C. Patterson, Jr., respectively.
69. On November 1, 1944, Josip Broz Tito, President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, and Dr. Ivan Subasich, Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, signed an agreement providing for the form of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government. For text of the agreement, see Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 251–253. The new united government was established at Belgrade on March 7, 1945, with Tito as Prime Minister and Minister of War, and Subasich as Minister for Foreign Affairs. For documentation regarding the conclusion of the Tito-Subasieh agreement and the establishment of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1378–1398 and 1417–1446, and post, pp. 1174 ff.
70. For text of Prime Minister Churchill’s message of April 22, 1945, to Marshal Stalin, see Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 (Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), vol. i, document No. 436, p. 329. (Hereinafter cited as Stalin’s Correspondence).