760C.61/4–2045
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | The President |
| The Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Grew | |
| Ambassador Harriman | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
After the Secretary presented Ambassador Harriman to the President the latter said that he wished to thank the Ambassador for the great service he had done for him in connection with Molotov’s coming to the San Francisco Conference. He said that he deeply appreciated this and he wished to congratulate the Ambassador and [Page 232] to express the hope that he would return to Moscow and continue his excellent work. Ambassador Harriman said that he had felt that that was the most appropriate suggestion he could make when Marshal Stalin had indicated his desire to make some gesture. He said that he had not felt it possible to do anything about the Polish question since Stalin was merely speaking of a gesture.
At the President’s request Ambassador Harriman then made a brief report on his opinion of the present problems facing the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. He said that he thought the Soviet Union had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time—one, the policy of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, and the other, the extension of Soviet control over neighboring states through unilateral action. He said that he thought our generosity and desire to cooperate was being misinterpreted in Moscow by certain elements around Stalin as an indication that the Soviet Government could do anything that it wished without having any trouble with the United States. He said that he thought the Soviet Government did not wish to break with the United States since they needed our help in order to reduce the burden of reconstruction and that he felt we had nothing to lose by standing firm on issues that were of real importance to us. The Ambassador then outlined a number of the specific difficulties which he had recently encountered in Moscow and described the deterioration of the Soviet attitude since the Yalta Conference. The President said that he was not in any sense afraid of the Russians and that he intended to be firm but fair since in his opinion the Soviet Union needed us more than we needed them. Ambassador Harriman said that he believed that some quarters in Moscow believed erroneously that American business needed as a matter of life and death the development of exports to Russia. Mr. Harriman said that this was of course not true but that a number of Russian officials believed it. The President again repeated that he intended to be firm with the Russians and make no concessions from American principles or traditions for the fact of winning their favor. He said he felt that only on a give and take basis could any relations be established.
Ambassador Harriman said that in effect what we were faced with was a “barbarian invasion of Europe”, that Soviet control over any foreign country did not mean merely influence on their foreign relations but the extension of the Soviet system with secret police, extinction of freedom of speech, etc., and that we had to decide what should be our attitude in the face of these unpleasant facts. He added that he was not pessimistic and felt that we could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians but that this would require a reconsideration [Page 233] of our policy and the abandonment of the illusion that for the immediate future the Soviet Government was going to act in accordance with the principles which the rest of the world held to in international affairs. He said that obviously certain concessions in the give and take of negotiation would have to be made. The President said that he thoroughly understood this and said that we could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but that on important matters he felt that we should be able to get 85 percent.
The Ambassador then outlined briefly the issues involved in the Polish question explaining his belief that Stalin had discovered from the Lublin Poles that an honest execution of the Crimean decision would mean the end of Soviet-backed Lublin control over Poland since any real democratic leader such as Mikolajczyk would serve as a rallying point for 80 or 90 percent of the Polish people against the Lublin Communists. He said it was important for us to consider what we should do in the event that Stalin rejected the proposals contained in the joint message from the President and the Prime Minister and if Molotov proved adamant in the negotiations here in Washington.
He said he would like to inquire in this connection of the President how important he felt the Polish question was in relation to the San Francisco Conference and American participation in the world organization. The President replied immediately and decisively that in his considered opinion unless settlement of the Polish question was achieved along the lines of the Crimean decision that the treaty of American adherence to a world organization would not get through the Senate. He added that he intended to tell Molotov just this in words of one syllable.
The Secretary inquired whether if Molotov was so late in arriving in Washington there would not be sufficient time for any real discussion between the Foreign Ministers, if the President would desire that the conversations on Poland be continued in San Francisco. The President replied that he thought that was a good idea.
Ambassador Harriman inquired whether or not we would be disposed to go ahead with the world organization plans even if Russia dropped out as he had understood from the Secretary. The President said that the truth of the matter was that without Russia there would not be much of a world organization.
In concluding the interview the President stated that he fully realized that he was not up on all details of foreign affairs and would rely on the Secretary of State and his Ambassadors to help him in this matter but that he did intend to be firm in his dealings with the [Page 234] Soviet Government. He said he hoped to see the Secretary and Ambassador Harriman again before Molotov arrived.