860C.01/4–1645: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 16—11:25 a.m.]
1189. Molotov is planning to leave for Washington at dawn tomorrow, Tuesday, April 17 in Hurley’s43 plane.
He insists on going via Alsib44 as it is a Soviet route. I am trying [Page 224] to work out the fastest schedule possible but at best it will take him 2 days longer than across the Atlantic.
Only Clark Kerr and I are also planning to leave tomorrow morning via Bari, Casablanca, Azores and with luck we are scheduled to arrive Washington Wednesday evening.
I saw Stalin last night with Hurley and after the discussion on China brought up Poland. I emphasized President Roosevelt’s deep concern over the Polish question, restating the position he had taken at the Crimea and in his last telegram on Poland.46 I cleared up some of the accusations made against the British Ambassador and myself by Stalin in his message and made Molotov admit them. Stalin said he thought that a solution could be reached quickly and suggested the Yugoslav formula. I stated that the situation was not comparable for the reasons given by President Roosevelt. In spite of Molotov’s initial objection Stalin stated that Molotov’s presence in the United States gave a splendid opportunity to attempt to reach an understanding since not only could he discuss the question with President Truman but also with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius, and Clark Kerr and myself. The members of the Polish Commission would also be there. All involved except Churchill and himself would be present.
This morning Clark Kerr has shown me the President’s message to the Prime Minister on a suggested joint reply to Stalin as well as several cables from Eden to the Prime Minister suggesting amendments.
In view of my talk with Stalin last night and the fact that Molotov is leaving for Washington tomorrow morning, and if it is believed to be desirable to send a joint message to Stalin at this moment, I recommend that reconsideration be given to the first proposal in the President’s suggested draft, even with the proposed British amendment. I feel strongly that it is essential to the success of the consultations with the Commission in Moscow that we should have a really representative group of Polish leaders from within Poland at the beginning of the consultations and therefore recommend that the list of Poles from Poland be expanded to five persons not associated directly or indirectly with the Warsaw regime. In the discussions in Washington with Molotov it may become desirable to make further concessions, but only after obtaining his agreement to Proposal Three.
I further recommend that reference to quotation of my alleged statement (see my 1168, April 14, 9 p.m.) regarding the liquidation of the Warsaw Poles be deleted.