860C.01/4–345: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:05 a.m.]
1021. Commission for Poland met for 2 hours tonight. No agreement was reached on any point. Molotov rejected our redraft of his “principles” for the work of the Commission. In the discussion of individuals to invite for consultation he firmly resisted Clark Kerr’s and my insistence on Mikolajczyk and tried to pin us down to an admission that our insistence on one man, Mikolajczyk, was preventing the Commission from functioning. He refused to answer Clark Kerr’s counter question as to whether the Soviet Government refused to permit Mikolajczyk to come to Moscow by contending that before deciding that question we should ask a small group first without him.
[Page 197]I asked him about his attitude toward the other four names we had proposed for consideration to be invited from London, namely Popiel, Stanczyk, Seyda and Grosfeld. He replied that the Warsaw Government had objections to all of our suggestions except Grabski.
In reply to our question as to what he specifically proposed doing, Molotov went back to a suggestion that he made a month ago, that we should invite the three representatives of the Lublin Government, Grabski and our choice between the two men the Warsaw Government had suggested from London, namely General Zeligowski and Kolodziej, and from within Poland Kutrzeba and one of the other Poles proposed by the Warsaw Government. I pointed out that this meant the Warsaw Government would be represented by five men and other Polish elements would be represented only by two. He countered that when we got these seven men in Moscow we could discuss with them what others we should invite. He intimated that if we could persuade the Warsaw Poles to agree to invite Mikolajczyk he would not object. Clark Kerr and I stated categorically that such a procedure would not be acceptable to our governments.
When he was asked to give us another alternative Molotov’s only suggestion was that we invite the Warsaw Poles alone.
Tonight he was much firmer than ever in his opposition to Mikolajczyk and more open in his insistence that the opinion of the Warsaw Poles should be our guiding influence as it was their government which has to be reorganized “in accordance with the Crimea decision”. He declined to discuss the President’s and Prime Minister’s messages as “it was inappropriate to do so as a member of the Commission since they were addressed to Marshal Stalin”.
No arrangements were made for a further meeting of the Commission as there appeared no basis for it at the present time.
Judged on the conversation tonight we are at a breaking point. However, it has been my experience in dealing with the Soviets in the past 4 years that sometimes they are the toughest just before they are ready to make substantial concessions, providing they find they can’t move us. Stalin’s reply to the President and the Prime Minister may well follow the line of Molotov’s adamant attitude tonight or it may give us some loophole on which to base future discussions. If Stalin’s reply gives no concrete basis for future discussions we are faced with the decision of what we wish to put forward to Molotov in the next Commission meeting as the definite position of our two Governments on which we are prepared to break if necessary. I still believe that, confronted with a definite and firm position on our part, there is a chance at least that the Soviet Government may yield and allow the negotiations to continue.
[Page 198]If Stalin’s message is unsatisfactory another course which should be given serious consideration would be to order me home immediately for consultation. Aside from my belief as previously expressed that it is important that I have an opportunity to talk with you and the President about our relations in general, I think the mere fact that I was called home at this time with no Polish Commission meeting scheduled might have a salutory effect.