860C.01/3–2545: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 25—7:45 p.m.]
906. Polco. ReEmbtel 882, March 24, 1 p.m.37 At the meeting of the Polish Commission on March 23 Molotov seized on every possible issue to raise objections to our interpretation of the Crimea declaration and to our proposals for procedure. He insisted that his memorandum of March 22 (reEmbtel 869, March 23, 5 a.m.) setting forth the view of the Soviet Government represented the correct interpretation of the Crimea declaration and criticized the interpretation given in our memorandum (reDeptel 640, March 18, 1 p.m.). He again refused to discuss seriously the names of Poles to be invited for consultation and gave every evidence of a desire to resort to delaying tactics with respect to this particular point.
Molotov began the discussion by asking whether the Commission should continue its work. Clark Kerr and I both stressed the importance which our governments attached to the Polish question and the desirability of reaching an early settlement. Molotov then introduced the Soviet contention that the Warsaw Government should serve as the “basis” for the formation of a new Polish Government. Throughout most of the discussion Molotov endeavored to obtain our agreement to this contention and also to his proposition that the Warsaw Poles should be consulted in the first instance. Moreover, he refused to admit that the other two democratic elements mentioned in the Crimea declaration were on a par with the Warsaw Poles. I firmly rejected Molotov’s arguments and stated that the United States Government could not accept these contentions. I reminded Molotov that at Yalta there had been considerable discussion on the wording of the declaration and that the word “enlarged” as suggested by the Soviet delegation had been rejected and the word “reorganization” substituted.
I added that no useful purpose would be served by trying to introduce the word “basis” into the discussions and that the Crimea decision should stand as written.
Molotov introduced the point raised in his memorandum that not all Polish Democratic leaders could be invited for consultation since the members of the London Government who considered themselves Democrats would thereby be included. Clark Kerr and I both made it perfectly clear that neither of our governments had ever considered [Page 181] inviting the leaders of the London Government. I stated that in the opinion of my government, Democratic Poles of varying viewpoints should be invited for consultation, but that any who are still irreconcilably hostile to friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union should be excluded. I emphasized our insistence that Mikolajczyk as the outstanding Polish Democratic leader outside of Poland be included. Molotov took exception to this, dropping his previous argument that Mikolajczyk had opposed the Crimea declaration and asserting that at the time of both his visits to Moscow last year38 Mikolajczyk had inspired terrorist acts against Red Army officers in Poland. Both Clark Kerr and I refused to admit the validity of this charge.
Molotov then referred to the four points set forth in his memorandum and asked whether Clark Kerr and I would accept them as a basis for the Commission’s work. We each said that we were unable to accept point (a) and suggested that a paragraph be substituted for it based on the language in our memorandum. We proposed the following wording: “the new Government of National Unity is to be made broadly representative of Democratic elements of the Polish State by a reorganization of the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland with the inclusion of Democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad.” Molotov was non-committal but asked that our suggested redraft be submitted to him in writing for his consideration. Clark Kerr proposed that points (b) and (c) of Molotov’s memorandum be revised and combined, and we undertook to submit a revised version of these points as well.
I suggested that in the interests of making progress in our work we proceed to the consideration of the names of Poles to be invited and asked Molotov whether he had now received sufficient information to express an opinion on the 15 or 20 names we had submitted to him at various stages. He said that he had not and again insisted on the necessity of inviting Poles from Poland and abroad acceptable to the Warsaw Government. In this connection he again emphasized that the Commission should work “as a commission” and referred to Churchill’s statement to this effect made at the farewell luncheon at Yalta. He recalled that at the first meeting the Commission had invited the Warsaw Poles to Moscow for consultation but that the invitation had been withdrawn at the following meeting on the insistence of the British Ambassador. Clark Kerr explained that when [Page 182] it became clear that the other two Democratic elements of Poles were not to be invited simultaneously with the Warsaw Poles he had, on instructions from his government, insisted that the invitation to the Warsaw Poles be withdrawn. I reminded Molotov that in the Commission a telegram39 of February 24 to the Warsaw Government, eight names of Democratic leaders in Poland and abroad had been “named” for invitation. Molotov had signed that telegram but after undefined objection from Warsaw Molotov had objected to all but the two accepted by Warsaw. I suggested that if some of the original nominees could not be found, other persons representing the same political groups might be substituted for them. On Molotov’s inquiry I said that we had little information concerning the persons proposed by the Lublin Government but that we understood the writer Jan Victor was a good man but he was not a political leader. He could not be accepted, as a substitute for persons on our list. If Witos, for example, could not be found, Kiernik40 might be a satisfactory substitute. I also stressed the importance of inviting a churchman and suggested the names of Bishop Lukomski41 and Bishop Adamski42 as possible substitutes for Bishop Sapieha if he was not available. Molotov was non-committal regarding all of these persons, as well as Zulawski whom I also mentioned.
Molotov constantly declines to distinguish between Poles to be invited for consultation and candidates for the reorganized government. It is obvious that he has no interest in discussions with Poles of various groups and desires only to invite to Moscow a few prospective members of a reorganized government acceptable to the Warsaw Government.
At the outset of the meeting both Clark Kerr and I informed Molotov that sufficient time had not elapsed for us to receive the reaction of our governments to his memorandum of March 22 and we agreed to discuss this matter further at our next meeting on Monday43 providing instructions had been received. I hope that the Department will be able to give me an expression of its views on Molotov’s memorandum before that time. At the Monday meeting we shall also discuss again names of men to invite for consultation. I made it plain that I would be willing to agree to a list of men only if as a group they were representative of all Democratic opinion as distinguished from satellites of the Warsaw Government.
- See footnote 36, p. 179.↩
- Mikolajczyk, who was then Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, visited Moscow from July 30 to August 10, 1944, when he conferred with Marshal Stalin and also with members of the Soviet-sponsored Lublin Committee, and in mid-October 1944 when he conferred with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. For documentation regarding these visits, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, pp. 1298–1315 and 1321–1328.↩
- For discussion of the contents of this telegram, see telegram No. 540, February 24, 3 p.m., from Moscow, p. 123.↩
- Władysław Kiernik, member of the Peasant Party.↩
- Bishop of Lomza.↩
- Stanislaw Adamski, Bishop of Upper Silesia.↩
- March 26.↩