President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)20
718. I cannot but be concerned at the views expressed in the second paragraph of point 5 of your 910. I do not understand what you mean by a divergence between our Governments on the Polish negotiations. From our side there is certainly no evidence of any divergence of policy. We have been merely discussing the most effective tactics and I cannot agree that we are confronted with a breakdown of the Yalta agreement until we have made the effort to overcome the obstacles incurred in the negotiations at Moscow. I also find puzzling your statement in paragraph 4 that the only definite suggestion in our instructions to Averell is for a political truce in Poland. Those instructions, of which you have a copy, not only set forth our understanding of the Yalta agreement but they make the definite point that the Commission itself should agree on the list of Poles to be invited for consultation and that no one of the three groups from which the reorganized Government is to emerge can dictate which individuals from the other two groups ought to be invited to Moscow. I must in all fairness point out that while fully aware that time is working against us Averell has had his instructions since March 9 but has not acted on them at your request in order that other points could be included. Our chief purpose at that time was and remains without giving ground to get the negotiations moving again and tackle first [Page 164] of all the point on which they had come to a standstill. I cannot urge upon you too strongly the vital importance of agreeing without further delay on instructions to our Ambassadors so that the negotiations may resume. The need for new instructions to our Ambassadors arose out of the unwillingness of Molotov to accept our proposal concerning the list of Poles to be invited in the first instance. Since our Ambassadors informed him that the matter was being referred to their Governments, the negotiations are held up pending those instructions. With this in mind I have examined the points which you propose to submit to Stalin in your 905 and have the following comments to make:
We are in agreement on point (a) and this is covered in our instructions to Averell.
I cannot believe that Molotov will accept the proposal contained in point (b) that any Pole can be invited unless all three members of the Commission object and I am opposed to putting forward such a suggestion at this time as it would, in my view, almost certainly leave us in a stalemate which would only redound to the benefit of the Lublin Poles. I also think the demand for freedom of movement and communication would arouse needless discussion at this state in the negotiations.
On point (c) we are agreed that the Poles invited for consultation should discuss the composition of the Government among themselves with the Commission presiding in an impartial arbitral capacity so far as possible. Harriman has already been instructed to this effect but feels, and I agree, that this might be pressed later.
I have covered your point (d) in my previous message and continue to feel that our approach would be better calculated to achieve the desired result. With reference to point (e) you will recall that this had been agreed to by Molotov who took fright when Clark-Kerr revealed that you were thinking of a large special mission. I am willing to include in Averell’s instructions the wording you propose in point (e).
Please let me know urgently whether you agree that in the light of the foregoing considerations, our Ambassadors may proceed with their instructions.
I heartily agree that we cannot invite the Lublin Poles to San Francisco and the State Department is coordinating a reply to the Soviet note with your Foreign Office.21
[Page 165]Harry is getting along well. There is nothing seriously wrong with him and he is getting a good rest.
- Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.↩
- In an aide-mémoire to the Soviet Embassy, dated March 29, 1945, the Department of State refused to agree to the extending of an invitation to the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw to attend the San Francisco Conference. For text, see vol. i, p. 164.↩