President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)7
713. Your 907. I had drafted and released for transmission my reply8 to your 905, March 8, before I had received your 907 of March 10. I did not hold up on my first message as I don’t believe that the main issues in that reply are basically affected by the points you raise in your 907.
With reference to your observations on the last part of the instructions to Ambassador Harriman in regard to a political truce in Poland, I can assure you that our objectives are identical, namely, to bring [Page 156] about a cessation on the part of the Lublin Poles of the measures directed against their political opponents in Poland to which you refer and vice versa. The only difference as I see it is one of tactics. You would prefer that the demand in regard to the Lublin Poles be put squarely to the Soviet Government as such whereas we feel that the chances of achieving our common objective would be immeasurably increased if it were done under the guise of a general political truce. You will recall at Yalta that Stalin made quite a point of the “terrorist” activities of the underground forces of the London Government against the Red Army and the Lublin Poles. Whether or not these allegations have any foundation in fact is beside the question since it is definitely the position of the Soviet Government. In view of Stalin’s attitude we feel we would be inviting certain refusal if we merely demanded that the Lublin Poles alone be forced to cease their persecutions of political opponents. Furthermore, we must be careful not to give the impression that we are proposing a halt in the land reforms. This would furnish the Lublin Poles with an opportunity to charge that they and they alone defend the interests of the peasants against the landlords. However, in view of your feeling on this point we have made sure that Harriman will not deliver those instructions until Clark Kerr has received his. I would also be very glad to consider any suggestions which you may have in order to strengthen this point bearing in mind the considerations which I have set forth above.
The question of sending in observers is being pressed by Harriman under other instructions. We feel, however, that more would be accomplished by pressing for low level observers at this point who would certainly see as much if not more than some more spectacular body. If you feel strongly that some reference to observers should go into the present instructions to Harriman, I will have no objection. Since we wish to get on as speedily as possible with the business of the Commission in Moscow, I would appreciate your letting me have urgently your views on my two messages so that instructions can be issued to Harriman and Clark Kerr for transmission to Molotov.