Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 EW/5–2445

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres)

[Washington,] May 24, 1945.

Participants:	Mr. Armand Berard, Counselor, French Embassy
	Mr. Bonbright (WE)21
	Mr. Despres (A–C)

At Mr. Bonbright’s invitation, Mr. Berard called upon Mr. Bonbright and me at my office this morning. I told Mr. Berard that in the light of Russian unwillingness to invite the French to participate in reparation discussions we had advised the Russians, after consultation and agreement with the British, that we were prepared to begin discussion of reparation on a three power basis, with the expectation that the question of French participation would again be considered at an early stage in these discussions. I then traced in some detail the background of negotiations over this question, beginning with Yalta, in order to make clear that we had persistently urged French participation and had retreated from this position only when the disadvantages of allowing the reparation discussions to be further delayed over this issue seemed to us compelling. I told Mr. Berard of Mr. Pauley’s plans, including his intention to spend a few days in Paris. I mentioned that Mr. Pauley would undoubtedly wish to avail himself of this opportunity to discuss with French officials their views regarding reparation and related questions.

Mr. Berard stated that the French Government’s reaction to this news would undoubtedly be very strong, and that General de Gaulle²² in particular and the Government in general would regard this as evidence of a continued refusal to grant France her proper place as a major power in the shaping of the European settlement. He said that during the San Francisco Conference, his Government had come to feel that the position of France was perhaps beginning to receive genuine recognition, but that this decision regarding reparation discussions would be interpreted as indicating that the status of France was still ambiguous. German reparation was a subject in which the French had a particularly strong interest and their own special views. The reaction of some of the people in the Government would be that if France was not to be included with the other three powers in the initial consideration of such questions as reparation, she should perhaps abandon any attempts to participate in Allied deliberations and carry our [out] her own policies on a unilateral basis. Mr. Berard said that the inclusion of France was not at all comparable to the inclusion of Poland and Yugoslavia in the reparation discussions and that the bad effects of the decision to go ahead on a three power basis put forward by Mr. Berard, but we pointed out that as a practical pate at a later stage, after many of the basic decisions had already been taken.

Mr. Bonbright and I expressed sympathy with the point of view put forward by Mr. Berard, but we pointed out that as a practical matter the conclusion seemed inescapable that there was at present no satisfactory alternative to the course which we had reluctantly taken. It was felt that if reparation discussions did not begin soon, this matter would be dealt with unilaterally by the occupying powers, and that three power discussions were therefore better than none at all.²³

21. James C. H. Bonbright, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs.
22. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers in the Provisional Government of the French Republic.
23. The substance of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 2341, May 26, 6 p.m., to Paris for the information of Messrs. Pauley and Lubin. In the first line of paragraph 2, the word “stated”, used in this memorandum and in the draft of the telegram, had been changed in telegram 2341 as it was despatched to “expressed the personal opinion”. (740.00119 EW/5–2645)